

DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 164 365

SO 011 134

AUTHOR Newcombe, Alan G., Ed.; Newcombe, Hanna, Ed.
TITLE Empirical Studies of Behavioural Patterns at the
United Nations. Peace Research Reviews, Vol. VII, No.
4, May 1978 [And] Vol. VII, No. 5, May 1978.
PUB DATE 78
NOTE 270p.; Parts marginally legible due to print quality;
Best copy available
EDRS PRICE MF-\$0.83 HC-\$14.05 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS *Behavior Patterns; Changing Attitudes; Conflict
Resolution; Correlation; Factor Analysis; Foreign
Policy; Government (Administrative Body);
*International Organizations; *International
Relations; International Studies; Nationalism;
*Political Attitudes; Prediction; Questionnaires;
*Social Science Research; Voting; World Affairs
IDENTIFIERS *United Nations

ABSTRACT

These volumes present the findings of four studies of behavioral patterns of delegates at the United Nations (UN). UN voting records, delegate questionnaires, and national, political, social, and geographic variables were analyzed. The first study, "Exploring Delegate Attitudes at the United Nations," reports delegates' reactions to issues such as taxation powers for the UN and the desirability of having an international military force for the UN. Generally positive attitudes were found. However, delegates from authoritarian and developed countries tended to be more negative. The second study, "Delegate Orientations toward the United Nations: A Ten-Year Perspective," looked for attitude shifts among delegates from 1961 to 1970. It was found that underdeveloped nations and those with close U.S. relations have become more positive toward the UN, while developed nations, large nations, and those without close U.S. relations have become more negative. The third study, "Quantifying and Predicting Delegate Behavior at the United Nations," explored the predictive power of national attributes such as type of government on delegate behavior. Some were found to have predictive relevance. The final study, "Analyzing USA-USSR Support Patterns in the General Assembly," analyzed voting records for predictive patterns. Among the findings it was noted that underdeveloped nations opposed U.S. resolutions in the 23rd and 24th UN sessions, but they supported the United States in the 26th session. (BC)

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ISSN 0553-4283

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Peace Research Reviews

Volume VII

Number 4

Six issues per Volume, published by the
Peace Research Institute - Dundas
25 Dundana Ave, Dundas, Ontario, Canada



Alan and Hanna Newcombe, 1978

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The subscription rate is \$20.00 per Volume of six issues, or \$14.00 per Volume if payment is sent with order.

Editorial Office: 25 Dundana Ave., Dundas,
Ontario L9H 4E5, Canada

Co-Editors: Dr. Alan G. Newcombe &
Dr. Hanna Newcombe

Editorial Assistant; Kate Allan
Typing: Kate Allan
Printing; Mervin Davidson

PUBLISHED MAY 1978

Attributes and National Behavior:

Modern International Relations Monograph Series

By Jack E. Vincent, Ph.D.

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Florida Atlantic University

Boca Raton, Florida

PART 1

- a) Exploring Delegate Attitudes at the United Nations. Delegate Orientations at the United Nations. *Peace Research Reviews*, 7, 4, 1978
- b) Quantifying and Predicting Delegate Behavior at the United Nations. Analyzing US-USSR Support Patterns in the General Assembly. *Peace Research Reviews*, 7, 5, 1978.

PART 2

- a) This consists of 42 monographs of a large scale project testing several attribute, attribute distance based theories. All of these monographs are on tape and can be printed out on your computer. For complete information on these tapes see the advertisement at the end of *Peace Research Reviews*, 7, 5, 1978.
- b) Ten of the monographs above will be published by the University Press of America. For complete information on the two books see the advertisement at the end of *Peace Research Reviews*, 7, 5, 1978.

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SOME EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF BEHAVIOURAL PATTERNS
AT THE UNITED NATIONS

Jack Vincent
Florida Atlantic University

Part 1

INTRODUCTION

Part 1 presents new research findings concerning the United Nations. No effort is made, in the presentation, to summarize all of the work in this area of United Nations research, in that this has already been accomplished in various *Peace Research Reviews* authored by Hanna Newcombe. Rather, the major thrust will be to present previously unpublished findings in the area of delegate attitudes and General Assembly voting patterns. Each study is "self-contained" in the sense that it stands as completed research effort within the area of concern. For that reason, there are some occasional redundancies in the presentations.

Part 1, Section 1 reports on delegate reactions to statements about the international relations system and the United Nations. The questionnaire items cut across such areas as: taxing powers for the United Nations; the desirability of an international military force for the United Nations; the preferred role of advisory opinions in connection with the Court of Justice; the way in which national interests should enter into United Nations politics; and, the importance of the United Nations in reducing conflict in the world. Basically, the items are divided into "wish items", something which the delegates wish to see happen or be accomplished, and "perceptual items", the way in which they tend to see the United Nations and the world system actually operating. Although the questionnaire survey is somewhat dated, gathered in 1965-66, the results recorded here have never been published. Most important, the study provides the foundations for further

studies that may wish to probe the same area and make comparisons. As is the case with all of the analyses studies in this series, (Part 1 and Part 2) a major concern in Section 1 to establish the relationship of national attributes to the behavioural data treated. This is accomplished through various correlational analyses which determine the predictive importance of attributes, such as Economic Development, to the questionnaire data.

Part 1, Section 2 focuses on the analytical problems of uncovering shift patterns in delegate attitudes over roughly a 10-year period. It demonstrates that there have been considerable shifts, by delegates, in their attitudes towards principal organs. The study explores several hypotheses which could presumably account for the findings. For example, the differences in results between time periods may be the consequence of a difference in the characteristics of the samples selected (sample hypothesis) or, because somewhat different questionnaire techniques were used over the time period of concern, is it possible that the differences in questionnaire format (scaling hypothesis) can account for the differences observed? It will be seen that basically both the sample hypothesis and scaling hypothesis must be rejected and, since this is the case, the study moves forward to determine which delegates, viewed in terms of the attributes of their home states, are doing the shifting that does occur. For example, if the mean scores of all delegates shift, say in a positive direction, towards greater support for the United Nations, does this mean that all delegates are, in fact, shifting, or rather is some sub-category, such as developed rather than underdeveloped, or democratic rather than authoritarian, doing the shifting? As will be seen, this type of analysis becomes fairly complex but does enable the study to come to relatively firm conclusions about which classes of delegates have been shifting and whether their shifts have tended to be "positive", that is, basically UN supportive, or "negative" implying for that category a decline in the attitudinal support base for the United Nations.

Part 1, Section 3 attempts to examine some everyday behavioural aspects of delegate behaviour such as: the degree to which delegates are instructed; the tendency of other delegates

to affect a delegate's own position on various matters; the kinds of meetings engaged in by delegates, in terms of formality or informality; and the amount of time delegates spend in preparing resolutions.

The primary research task is to determine whether national attribute data sheds any light on the observed patterns. From a correlational analysis, it is concluded that certain national attributes such as democracy, close U.S. relations, and Development have at least some predictive relevance for such patterns.

Part 1, Section 4 attempts to establish a new framework to study support patterns within the General Assembly. It establishes six analytical categories that need to be studied if one is concerned with the question of the degree to which nations, in fact, tend to support the voting patterns of one nation as opposed to another. The study applies the six-fold framework to U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. voting data, and then determines the degree of support of the remaining states in the principal categories, such as "U.S.A. for, U.S.S.R. against". In this connection, several tables are presented giving the exact degree of U.S.A.-U.S.S.R. support for the 23rd-24th Sessions and the 26th Session. The study then determines whether variation in respect to the support patterns is related to national attribute data. Using the canonical correlation technique, a model is constructed for each of the two time periods considered and an analysis is made to reveal any differences between the models. The relevance of each attribute for such differences such as Economic Development, Democracy, and Militarism is then given, and conclusions are drawn.

Part 1, Section 1

EXPLORING DELEGATE ATTITUDES AT THE UNITED NATIONS¹

This study examines United Nations delegate attitudes about a number of matters concerning the United Nations and the international system. It attempts to ascertain what

relationships, if any, can be found between delegate attitudinal patterns and the characteristics of their home states. It is a complement of a previous study entitled "National Attributes as Predictors of Delegate Attitudes at the United Nations"². The principal difference between the two studies is that the former limited itself to an examination of organ-related attitudes, such as the voting system of the Security Council, while the present one probes attitudes that are more general and philosophical in character. A comparison of results will be given later.


The importance of delegate attitudes to the development of the United Nations calls for elaboration and theoretical development. In general, it can be assumed that delegates possess "influence potential" because of the kind of role they play in the United Nations setting. Richard F. Pederson has pointed out:

"Other characteristics of the U.N. which uniquely influence negotiations include the fact that all U.N. negotiation is in effect multilateral, as is also the openness of U.N. activity, e.g., the fact that at any moment any one of the negotiators may make a public test of negotiating strengths by taking an issue out of private talks and into the public forum...They [the delegates] have a large measure of discretion in tactics...There are exceptional cases when issues must be decided immediately and U.N. delegations are compelled to vote without instructions from their governments; such votes may establish governmental policy...a U.N. delegation in its advisory capacity may exert significant influence on national policy...Some delegations, in fact, receive only general instructions, allowing them the latitude to make many decisions themselves...Information and the consequent assessment of it by delegations are often crucial elements in final government policy decisions."³

In short, delegates: (1) sometimes make decisions without directions from their home governments, (2) supply information to their home governments, hence this personal opinion is probably reflected in this intelligence, and (3) are frequently asked for their advice when home governments compile instructions. For these reasons the assumption of "influence potential" on the part of delegates seems to be a reasonable one.⁴

The following diagram, as a kind of conceptual scheme, may help illuminate the present project and indicate some paths of possible future research.

FIGURE 1
A MODEL FOR THE EXPLORATION OF DELEGATE INFLUENCES AT THE UNITED NATIONS



The above figure then, may be thought of as a simplified model relating to delegate influence and action at the United Nations, as well as a possible program of systematic study.⁵ Beginning on the left of the model it suggests that an important ingredient in delegate action relates to home government instructions. Clearly, when instructions are compelling and specific, the delegate is basically a creature of his home government.⁶

As the above quotation from Pederson indicates, however, home governments frequently allow delegates considerable latitude. This is supported by Alker and Russett who have pointed out:

"The usual mechanism for transmitting...policies into resolutions

speeches, and votes in the Assembly is the diplomatic communication from the national foreign offices. When a delegate is not specifically advised...he relies on more general instructions, his own personal initiatives and obligations, and a number of national, regional and caucusing group loyalties and attitudes. Some idea of the degree of personal freedom exercised by the diplomats themselves can be obtained on an impressionistic basis by interviewing them...The specific influence of personal interpretations and national instructions on each of the issues in the Assembly is, however, difficult to uncover systematically as is the content of each diplomat's official correspondence."⁷

Going back to the model, there are a number of acts that a delegate must engage in that are little conditioned by his attitudes, that is, those acts the delegate must perform when he is following specific and compelling instructions. In the model these are designated as "prescribed" acts and are shown as emerging from the delegate without going through the "zone of attitudes".⁸

As indicated above, however, not all instructions are specific and compelling. Many instructions may be of a more general character, allowing considerable delegate interpretation and freedom in respect to application. Acts related to such instructions are viewed as falling in the "semi-prescribed" category. A delegate probably can't completely flaunt the intention of the general instructions but their application in a concrete case is assumed to be influenced by his feelings, perceptions, etc.

Finally, we have a range of delegate activity which we might call "unprescribed" in the sense that the delegate is given no instructions--general or otherwise--for this kind of activity. This is not to say that the delegate can do anything he wants in such activity areas. He, like everyone else, is hemmed in by a variety of social and cultural restraints. Rather, it is simply to indicate, for the sake of the model's completeness, that there may be a number of delegate acts for which the instructions are irrelevant. Again, we must assume, for such activities, that the delegate's personal

attitudes will have a considerable bearing on his action.

The flow--instructions+delegate+action--however, is complicated by the fact that the delegate himself is a source of information for the home government and this information may be used in the formulation of instructions. This circuitous flow of causality is indicated in the model through the "information arrow" pointing back at the home government. Thus, even though the instructions that are specific and compelling are depicted as "going around" delegate attitudes during their translation into action, in the sense that the delegate presumably must engage in prescribed acts on the receipt of such instructions, nevertheless the information upon which those instructions were formulated may have come in great measure from the delegate himself. Thus, delegate attitudes may "stand behind" or influence even specific and compelling instructions.

The summation of all delegate acts, prescribed, semi-prescribed and unprescribed, together, equal, in the model, United Nations activity. That is U.N. outcomes, such as budgets, resolutions, conferences, etc., are viewed as the end product of delegate acts. Non-delegate personnel, in this formulation, are assumed to perform roles supportive of such acts, i.e., secretariat personnel are assumed to implement the various goals that are articulated by delegate acts, although some others are given, of course, by the Charter and gentlemen's agreements between states. Such U.N. outcomes, in turn, are assumed to have international relations impact. That is, United Nations outcomes may have international relations consequences in the sense that relationships and activity between states are altered as a result of such outcomes. Home governments, of course, anticipate and react to such U.N. outcomes and this is indicated by the arrow from international relations impact to home government. Again, the potential relevance of delegate attitudes is made clear if it is agreed that at least a portion of United Nations activity may be derived from semi-prescribed

and unprescribed acts which help fashion these outcomes (and even the prescribed acts, if delegate attitudes are assumed to "stand behind" some specific and compelling home government instructions). Also, of course, even instructions that are formulated without reference to delegate information, but in terms of anticipated and actual U.N. outcomes, may have relevance to delegate attitudes, to the extent such attitudes helped shape U.N. outcomes.

Besides suggesting possible causal links between attitudes, action, outcomes, and impact, the model also suggests many potentially fruitful areas of inquiry. Concerning instructions, numerous questions can be raised. What is the ratio of "specific and compelling" instructions to "general instructions" when the delegates are considered as a whole? What predictors are relevant to the frequency and magnitude of instructions?⁹ Do the instructions of delegates from authoritarian states tend to be more specific and compelling than the instructions of delegates from democratic states?

Similar probes can be envisioned in respect to information. Do the delegates from developed states send more information back to their home governments than delegates from underdeveloped states? Can we predict the priorities home governments will assign to delegate information, as opposed to other kinds of information, when they are formulating their instructions to delegates?

Turning to the action side of the figure, additional explorations are suggested. For example, a difficult but possibly very important research problem would be to attempt to clarify all kinds of acts engaged in by U.N. delegates and then try to establish some sort of observational tests to determine whether certain kinds of acts are more important for U.N. activities and functions than other kinds of acts. That is, delegates may be conceived of as engaging in almost the entire range of human activity, such as dancing, social, voting, official, playing tennis, recreational, etc., and the difficulties in sorting out the kinds of acts that should be focussed upon in research should not be underestimated, i.e.,

certain social acts may have considerable relevance. In this connection there may be some way of determining the relative predictive importance of "prescribed" as opposed to "semi-prescribed" and "unprescribed" acts in such areas as budgetary contributions, charter amendments, etc. In short, the above model suggests several areas where additional research might be conducted to establish a solid foundation for assessing the character and importance of delegate impact at the United Nations.

As a pilot project, this study cannot hope to touch on all of these research possibilities at once. It should be clear that the primary focus is upon uncovering some delegate attitudes¹⁰ and the problem of assessing the predictive relevance, in respect to these attitudes, of a certain category of potential relevant predictors, viewed as "national attributes". (The notion of "attribute theory" will be developed later.) That is, the study asks the question, "Can we predict delegate attitudes on various matters in terms of the kinds of states from which the delegates are derived?" This exploration should be considered important because of the potential relevance, explained above, of delegate attitudes to United Nations activity and international relations. National attributes, as predictors, are chosen in part because of their "accessibility". In the long run, other, less easily obtainable predictors may also have relevance, in the sense of accounting for more of the variance observed in attitudes. In this author's opinion numerous explorations along these lines should be made.

QUESTIONNAIRE CONSTRUCTION

The delegates were asked to react to a number of statements about the United Nations and international affairs. Each item was assumed to relate to delegate "wishes" (values) or to delegate "perceptions" (cognition). The distinction between wishes and perceptual items was established by asking 43 non-delegate judges¹¹ to sort a pool of items into two categories, labelled "wish statements" and "perception statements", respectively. Only those items upon which there was 90%+ agreement, in the sense that they fell into

one category or the other, were used in the analysis.

The items chosen labelled as "wish statements" were:

1. It seems desirable to give the United Nations some limited taxing powers.
2. It is desirable to give the United Nations, under suitable conditions, a permanent, international military force.
3. It would be desirable to amend the Charter to give the International Court of Justice absolute compulsory jurisdiction over certain categories of cases.
4. Advisory opinions of the International Court should be respected almost as if they were decisions.
5. If the world is to disarm, it is desirable to give the U.N. major responsibility, rather than some agency outside of the U.N. system.
6. The United Nations needs to be strengthened in almost all aspects.
7. It is desirable to place the remaining non-self governing territories more firmly under the control of the U.N.
8. Members of the Secretariat should be selected solely on merit (no geographic considerations).
9. Each member state should decide for itself, in terms of its interests, the meaning of the Charter.
10. States should generally follow their "national interest" as they pursue policies at the U.N.
11. It is generally preferable to pursue one's "national interest" instead of moral values if they come into conflict.

The items chosen labelled as "perceptual statements" were:

1. The United Nations environment tends to make a person less nationalistic.
2. It is very doubtful the United Nations will evolve into a world government.
3. Suppressing the quest to achieve "national interests" would generally benefit the United Nations.
4. It is clear that members of the Secretariat, including the Secretary General, can rise above national and regional

- interests to become truly international persons.
5. The United Nations seems to have contributed significantly to reducing conflict in the modern world.
 6. If large scale war were to occur between major powers, the United Nations would be of little use in controlling the conflict.
 7. The United Nations seems to have more influence on world affairs than it did 5 to 10 years ago.
 8. There are few international problems that the U.N., in its present form, is not capable of solving, if a real effort is made to use its facilities.
 9. States apparently can openly defy the United Nations with little loss of international status.
 10. Most states pay careful attention to United Nations resolutions in formulating their policies.
 11. Moral values do play a large role in the activities at the United Nations.
 12. Conflict seems to be the normal state of affairs in international relations.
 13. To expect "world peace" in the near future, in the sense of man living harmoniously and co-operatively with man, is basically utopian.
 14. The national state system in many ways seems outmoded.

Regarding "wish" items, the judges were asked, in their opinion, to decide "which, *if granted*, would further the interests and development (benefit) the United Nations system, and which, if granted, would be disbeneficial to the system". There was 90%+ agreement that "wishes" 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 fall into the benefit category, and "wishes" 9, 10, and 11 fall into the disbenefit category.


Regarding "perception" items, the judges were asked, in their opinion, to decide "which, *if accurate*, indicate a situation (actual or hypothetical) favorable to the interests and development of the United Nations

system". There was 90%+ agreement that items 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11 and 14 fall into the favourable category and that items 2, 9, 12 and 13 fall into the unfavourable category.

To facilitate analysis, when agreement with an item implies either a beneficial wish, or favourable perception, such a response will be called a "positive response", and disagreement to such an item a "negative response"; and when agreement to an item implies a disbeneficial wish or unfavourable perception, it will be called a "negative response", and disagreement with such an item a "positive response"¹². Positive responses then, are *assumed* to indicate delegate wishes and perceptions of situations supportive of the United Nations system and its development, while negative responses are assumed to have the opposite connotations. To put it another way, the United Nations, as an operating institution, may partially depend for its effectiveness and growth, upon the kinds of wishes and situations implied by "positive" responses to the questionnaire.

In order to give the delegates a degree of flexibility in respect to their reaction to the items, they were asked to mark "answer lines" according to the following instructions:

Please place *one mark* on each answer line according to the following scheme:



*The answer line has been expanded here for explanatory convenience.

Naturally, you can mark anywhere on the answer line. The major idea is that agreement, or disagreement, increases as you move away from 0 on the answer line. We understand that you may hold certain reservations

They were also told:



On every item the range of delegate marks was from 1 to 21.

DATA COLLECTION

Initially, questionnaires were sent to all Ambassadors of Permanent Missions.¹³ Ambassadors were asked to

questionnaires indicate that at least 15 of the responding

delegates were actually Ambassadors.¹⁴ United Nations delegates are naturally reluctant to engage in any act which might reflect unfavourably on their country. For this reason, it is difficult to obtain a satisfactory harvest of questionnaire data. Sixty-five delegates did co-operate, however, and they tend to distribute well, in terms of the characteristics of their home states, across a number of categories of potential analytical concern.

TABLE 1¹⁵
SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS' STATES

Size

	Sample		Universe	
	N	%	N	%
Very Large	5	7.0	6	5.2
Large	12	18.5	26	22.6
Medium	21	32.5	36	31.4
Small	27	42.0	47	40.8
	65	100	115	100

Chi-square = .883

3 degrees of freedom = .80 level or more

Population

	Sample		Universe	
	N	%	N	%
Very Large	3	4.0	4	3.4
Large	11	17	23	20
Medium	24	37	34	29.6
Small	27	42	54	47
	65	100	115	100

Chi-square = 1.344

3 Degrees of Freedom = .70 level or more

Agricultural Population

	Sample		Universe	
	N	%	N	%
High	23	35.5	56	49.5
Medium	27	42.0	33	29.2
Low	12	18.0	17	15.1
Very Low	3	4.5	7	6.2
	65	100	113	100

Agricultural Population (cont.)

Chi-square = 4.184

3 Degrees of Freedom = .20 level or more

Literacy Rate

	Sample		Universe	
	N	%	N	%
High	18	28.0	25	23.8
Medium	19	39.0	30	28.6
Low	14	21.5	24	22.8
Very Low	14	21.5	26	24.8
	<u>65</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>105</u>	<u>100</u>

Chi-square = .465

3 Degrees of Freedom = .70 level or more

Freedom of the Press

	Sample		Universe	
	N	%	N	%
Complete Freedom	24	37.0	43	44.4
Intermittent Freedom	17	26.0	17	17.5
Freedom Internally Absent	16	25.0	21	21.6
Freedom Internally & Externally Absent	8	12.0	16	16.5
	<u>65</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>105</u>	<u>100%</u>

Chi-square = 3.079

3 Degrees of Freedom = .30 level or more

Status of Legislature

	Sample		Universe	
	N	%	N	%
Fully Effective	17	26.0	28	28.0
Partially Effective	18	28.0	23	23.0
Largely Ineffective	12	18.0	21	21.0
Wholly Ineffective	18	28.0	28	28.0
	<u>65</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

Chi-square = .49795

3 Degrees of Freedom = .90 level or more

Geographic Location

	Sample		Universe	
	N	%	N	%
Africa (includes N. Africa)	16	25.0	33	28.7
Americas	10	15.5	24	20.8
Asia (includes Australia)	11	17.0	20	17.5
Eastern Europe	6	9.0	9	7.8
Middle East	10	15.5	11	9.6
Western Europe	12	18.0	18	15.6
	65	100	115	100

Chi-square = 2.3745

5 Degrees of Freedom = .70 level or more

Chi-square to be interpreted as testing the proposition there are no significant differences between the two distributions (sample and universe). Chi-square would have to reach 7.81 for 3 degrees of freedom and 9.48 for 5 degrees of freedom, operating at the .05 level.¹⁵

Chi-square indicates that the frequency distribution of these ways of subdividing the sample are not significantly different from those in the universe, operating at the .05 level. If this held for all of the predictor variables considered in this study, the sample could be said to be unbiased in respect to the predictors (i.e., big states are not over-represented, etc.). This approach, however, does not get at the problem of another kind of bias. Thus, the delegates who answered the questionnaire might be generally more "positive" (or negative) than the delegates that refused to answer the questionnaire, or just different in their response patterns.

That is, the co-operative and non-co-operative delegates may constitute two different "populations" in respect to their responses to the questionnaire. Concerning the problem of bias, Zetterberg has argued:

"The relationships expressed in the theoretical propositions,

in other words, claim to be universally present. They are, accordingly, present in representative and non-representative samples. To disprove or demonstrate their existence is, hence, possible in any kind of sample--biased or unbiased. This important, and perhaps surprising, consideration, however, should immediately be qualified. When using a biased sample for a verification, we must have assurance that the relationship that we want to prove is not introduced into our data by selective sampling. This possibility, however, is, in most cases, rather unlikely...On balance, it appears that non-representative samples are not much inferior to representative samples when we want to disprove a theoretical hypothesis."¹⁶

This being the case, if it is assumed that delegate responses are not related to co-operation, the tests of significance employed in this study might be viewed as applying as if the sample were random. If this assumption is deemed unwarranted, they apply only to the co-operative universe, i.e., apply to chance association of the marks on the questionnaire to the predictors in respect to the co-operative delegates. Sampling variability in the first case refers to the population of *all* possible delegate responses, while in the second case it refers to the population of *co-operative* delegate responses.

To be more specific, if a certain "significant" correlation is found, say, between "economic development" and "wish" to give the U.N. taxing power, the correlation might be viewed as applying to a sample of the population of the co-operative universe (i.e., in the co-operative universe the true correlation is probably not zero) or to a sample of the universe of all delegates (i.e., in the entire universe of delegates the "true" correlation is probably not zero). In *either case*, the association could be the result of chance and the significance level, of course, "gives the odds".

If one wishes to ignore the problem of sampling variability, then all correlations can be viewed as equally important, in the sense of accurately describing the degree of **association** between the predictors and the questionnaire items for the co-operative delegates. The considerable size of the co-operative group (representing over half of the delegations) is deemed to make purely descriptive discussion of it quite meaningful.

FINDINGS (MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS)

The overall results, in terms of means and standard deviations, are summarized in the following table:

TABLE 2
Wishes

<u>Items</u>	<u>Fiducial Limit</u>	<u>Sample Means</u>	<u>Fiducial Limit</u>	<u>Standard Deviations</u>	<u>Standard Error</u>
1	11.3	13.1	14.8	7.0	.87
2	3.9	5.2	6.5	5.5	.68
3	7.7	9.4	11.1	6.9	.86
4	6.4	8.2	10.0	7.1	.88
5	2.7	4.1	5.5	5.5	.68
6	2.3	2.9	3.5	3.1	.28
7	6.0	7.9	9.8	7.5	.93
8	11.6	13.2	14.8	6.6	.82
9	14.8	16.2	17.6	5.5	.68
10	6.6	8.0	9.4	5.7	.71
11	9.8	11.3	12.8	6.3	.76

Perceptions

<u>Items</u>	<u>Fiducial Limit</u>	<u>Sample Means</u>	<u>Fiducial Limit</u>	<u>Standard Deviations</u>	<u>Standard Error</u>
1	7.1	8.7	10.3	6.6	.82
2	4.2	5.5	6.8	5.1	.63

TABLE 2 Perceptions (Cont.)

<u>Items</u>	<u>Fiducial Limit</u>	<u>Sample Means</u>	<u>Fiducial Limit</u>	<u>Standard Deviations</u>	<u>Standard Error</u>
3	7.5	9.0	10.5	6.3	.76
4	4.1	5.3	6.5	4.8	.60
5	3.1	4.2	4.3	4.5	.56
6	3.1	4.5	5.9	5.5	.68
7	6.0	7.7	9.4	6.7	.83
8	5.1	6.6	8.1	6.1	.76
9	8.1	9.9	11.7	7.4	.92
10	6.8	8.4	10.0	6.3	.78
11	5.4	6.9	8.4	5.9	.73
12	7.6	9.3	11.0	7.0	.87
13	10.2	12.0	13.8	7.2	.90
14	9.2	10.9	12.6	6.9	.86

The setting of fiducial limits assumes the *distribution of sample means* (if repeated samples are taken) is normally distributed but does not assume that the sample or universe distributions are perfectly normal.

The table indicates the fiducial limits (.05 level) of the population, calculated from the standard error. Remembering the previous discussion of the two ways the sample can be viewed, these limits might be viewed as applying to the *co-operative delegates* or to *all delegates*. In the former case, we would expect, in 95 out of 100 samples, that the mean value of the co-operative delegates would fall within these limits. In the latter case, we would expect, 95 chances out of 100, that the *all delegate means* fall within these limits. Thus, on Item 1 we would expect the *all delegate mean* to fall between 11.3 and 14.8.

Descriptively, the means show the general sentiment of the co-operative delegates on the items, and the standard deviation indicates the degree of dispersion.

Thus, delegates tend to disagree that the United Nations should be given some limited taxing powers, but they tend to agree that the United Nations needs to be strengthened in almost all aspects; and, examining the standard deviations, there seems to be more consensus on the latter question than on the former.

The overall results in regard to "wishes" may be summarized as follows: Delegates tend to agree that: (1) the United Nations should have a permanent military force, (2) the International Court of Justice should be given compulsory jurisdiction over certain categories of cases, (3) the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice should be respected as if they were decisions, (4) the United Nations should be given major responsibility for disarmament, (5) the United Nations needs to be strengthened in almost all aspects, (6) the non-self governing territories should be placed more firmly under control of the U.N. and (7) states should generally follow their national interests as they pursue policies at the United Nations; but disagree that: (1) it is desirable to give the United Nations some limited taxing power, (2) members of the Secretariat should be selected solely on merit, (3) each member state should decide for itself, in terms of its interests, the meaning of the charter and (4) it is generally preferable to pursue one's national interests instead of moral values, if they come into conflict.

Thus, generally speaking, the delegates tend to be on the positive side in respect to "wishes". Only on two items, relating to taxing powers and selection of members of the Secretariat, do the delegates come down on the "negative wishes" side as defined by the judges. It should be noted that on some items the delegates are strongly in agreement, such as on items 5 and 6, whereas on some items they come close to hitting the neutral point (11), as on items 1 and 11. Thus, on these two negative "wishes" the *degree* of disagreement is quite modest, and in the case of item 11, the fiducial limit extends itself into the "agreement zone".

Concerning "perceptions" the delegates tend to agree that: (1) the United Nations environment tends to make a person less nationalistic, (2) it is doubtful that the United Nations will evolve into a world government, (3) suppressing the quest to achieve national interests would generally benefit the United Nations, (4) members of the Secretariat, including the Secretary General, can rise above national and regional interests, (5) the United Nations seems to have contributed significantly to reducing conflict in the modern world, (6) if large scale war were to occur between the major powers, the United Nations would be of little use in controlling the conflict, (7) the United Nations has more influence on world affairs than it did 5 to 10 years ago, (8) there are few problems that the U.N. is not capable of solving, (9) states can openly defy the U.N. with little loss of international status, (10) most states pay careful ~~attention~~ to U.N. resolutions when formulating their policies, (11) moral values do play a large role in activities at the United Nations, (12) conflict seems to be the normal state of affairs in international relations, and (13) the national state system in many ways seems outmoded; and disagree that: (1) to expect world peace in the near future is basically utopian.

Again, the strength of the agreement varies from question to question, and on some items, such as 13, the mean falls only one unit of measurement off the neutral point. On other items, such as 5 and 6, the average degree of agreement seems quite strong. The delegates again seem to be on the "positive" side, for the most part, remembering the evaluation of the judges. Only on the items concerning world government, the use of the United Nations in large-scale war, the effect of defying the United Nations, and the normality of conflict, do the delegates' perceptions appear "negative".

In general then, both in terms of their "wishes" and their "perceptions", United Nations delegates tend to

be "positive" in the sense of having "wishes" which, if fulfilled, would tend to benefit the United Nations, and having "perceptions" which, if accurate, indicate situations and tendencies favourable to the United Nations. Our first major finding, then, is that delegates, generally, seem to "stand behind" the extension of U.N. functions and certain developments that would seem to benefit the U.N. and that the delegates, generally, seem to see certain situations and developments favourable to the U.N. system.

As pointed out earlier, however, delegate responses seem to range all the way across the entire answer line. The question then arises: What kinds of delegates, in terms of the attributes of their home states, tend to mark the negative side of the answer lines, and what kinds of delegates tend to mark the positive sides?

POSSIBLE PREDICTORS OF ATTITUDE SCORES

As indicated earlier, it is apparent that attitude scores might be related to a wide variety of potential predictors. For example, they might be related to the philosophical orientation or religious training of the respondents, or perhaps to certain personal experiences of the delegates at the United Nations. It was decided, however, as one potentially fruitful line of inquiry, to concentrate on variables related to the respondents' home states. That is, is it possible, knowing things about a respondent's home state, to predict his probable questionnaire response pattern?

Thirty-four possible predictors considered were taken from *A Cross Polity Survey*¹⁷. Fourteen additional predictors were taken from other sources. All variables considered are given in Table 3, and will not be repeated here.

Because the predictors have confusing interrelationships and because of their large number, they were factor analyzed¹⁸. Factor analysis is generally considered a useful research tool because it can reduce a large number of variables to a smaller number of factors with little loss of information. Each

factor, using methods explained below, has the desirable characteristic of being orthogonal to every factor in the analysis. This means that "factor scores" calculated from factor loadings on one factor have zero correlations with factor scores calculated from all other factors. Thus, confusing interrelationships between original variables are eliminated through the technique of factor analysis, and, when a particular factor dimension is being discussed, we know that it is a "unique dimension" which does not overlap with other dimensions. In short, factor analysis shows how variables are related to orthogonal linear dimensions cutting through the data, and how many such dimensions are needed to account for the bulk of the original variance.

To accomplish the factor analysis, each respondent's state was coded on the first 34 variables in terms suggested by the *Cross Polity Survey*. For example, in respect to the variable of population, Banks and Textor have given four gradations: very large (100 million and above), large (17-99.9 million), medium (6-16.6 million) and small (under 6 million). Respondents' states falling in the very large category were coded 1, those in the large category 2, and so forth. Rank numbers were then assigned to each state on each variable following procedures similar to those outlined by Alker and Russett in *World Politics and the General Assembly*²⁰. Thus, all rank numbers ranged from 1 to 65, with the average rank scores assigned in case of ties. The rank numbers for the rest of the variables were based on cardinal magnitude, i.e., the number of IGO memberships, except for Alliance, which was originally coded 1 = U.S. ally, 2 = neutral, 3 = U.S.S.R. ally. Once rank numbers were determined, all possible correlations between the variables were calculated and the resulting intercorrelation matrix was factor analyzed. The original 48 variables reduced to 11 factors (rotated) accounting for 83% of the total original variance. The results are given in the table below and, with each factor, the kind of characteristics necessary to produce high factor scores are indicated.

TABLE 3

Factor I (Variance accounted for = 21.6%) (Development)

High newspaper circulation (.88) High Literacy Rate (.86)
 High per capita gross national product (.86) High economic
 development status (.83) High per cent urban (.83) Western-
 ized (.83) Low agricultural population (.79) Negligible
 interest articulation by non-associational groups (.78)
 Modern beurocracy (.77) Significant interest articulation by
 associational groups (.70) Politically modern (.60) High
 gross national project (.55) High international financial
 status (.54) Old (.43) High political inculturation (.43)
 Large military (.43) High United Nations pay (.43) Low
 ratio of people per school (.42) Linguistic Homogeneity (.40)
 Representative system (.40) Effective legislature (.39)
 Many IGO memberships (.38) Long time in UN (.38) Significant
 interest articulation by parties (.37) Low distance from
 U.S.A. (.34) Non-communist (.30) Religious Homogeneity (.30)
 High United Nations Emergency Force pay (.30)

Factor II (Variance accounted for = 16.7%) (Authoritarianism)

No effective constitution limitations (.87) High censorship
 (.87) Ineffective legislature (.83) Opposition groups not
 tolerated (.82) Not representative system (.81) Strong
 executive (.79) Elitist political leadership (.77)
 Participation by military (.72) Significant interest
 articulation by institutional groups (.64) Negligible interest
 articulation by associational groups (.47) Mobilized system
 style (.47) Communist bloc (.41) Traditional beurocracy
 (.37) Communist alliance (.31)

Factor III (Variance accounted for = 7.8 % (U.S.A. relations)

Large import from U.S.A. (.86) Large export to U.S.A. (.77)
 Allied with west (.72) Linguistic Homogeneity (.55)
 Religious Homogeneity (.43) Non-communist (.42) Long
 distance from U.S.S.R. (.40) Long time in UN (.32) High
 population growth rate (.30)

Factor IV (Variance accounted for = 9.3%) (Bigness)

Big population (.87) High international financial status (.73) Big Gross National Product (.72) Big country (.67) Large Military (.66) Large United Nations delegation size (.59) High UN pay (.53) Long time in UN (.33) Significant interest articulation by institutional groups (.31) Politically modern (.31) High economic development status (.30) Many IGO memberships (.30)

Factor V (Variance accounted for = 4.4%) (Party-Mobilization)

One party system (.76) Mobilized system style (.65) High political inculturation (.54) Negligible interest articulation by parties (.35) Communist bloc (.31)

Factor VI (Variance accounted for = 3.6%) (Density)

Low population density (.87) Big country (.59)

Factor VII (Variance accounted for = 3.2%) (Growth Rate)

High population growth rate (.76) Non-elitist political leadership (.33) Linguistic Heterogeneity (.32) Small IGO memberships (.30)

Factor VIII (Variance accounted for = 3%) (Racial)

Racial homogeneity (.80) Short time in UN (.43)

Factor IX (Variance accounted for = 5.2%) ((U.S.A. Distance)

Low distance from U.S.A. (.75) Low ratio of people per school (.58) Old (.47) Many IGO memberships (.44) Politically modern (.39) Long time in UN (.44) Religious Homogeneity (.35) Non-communist (.35)

Factor X (Variance accounted for = 3%) (UN Pay)

High United Nations Emergency Force pay (.68) High UN

Factor X (cont.)

payment (.44) Limited interest articulation by institutional groups (.31)

Factor XI (Variance accounted for = 4.4%) (Distance)

Long distance from China (.81) Long distance from U.S.S.R. (.68) Low Political inculturation (.37)

Those possessing the highest factor scores tend to possess the characteristics indicated. Thus, there is a tendency for those states standing highest on factor I to have a high newspaper circulation, a high per capita gross national product, a high literacy rate, etc. In terms of its loading, the first factor might be said to be a "Development" dimension; the second, an "Authoritarianism" dimension; the third, a "U.S.A. relations" dimension; the fourth, a "Bigness" dimension; the fifth, a "Party-Mobilization" dimension; the sixth, a "Density" dimension; the seventh, a "Growth Rate" dimension; the eighth, a "Racial" dimension; the ninth, a "U.S.A. Distances" dimension; the tenth, a "U.N. Pay" dimension; and the eleventh, a "Distance" dimension. Thus, a state scoring high on Factor I and Factor II tends to be a developed, non-democratic state, and a state scoring in the middle to both factors tends to be a moderately-developed, ~~semi~~democratic state, etc. Combinations of scores between other factors may be similarly interpreted.

The mystery surrounding factor analysis can be dispelled, *if it is understood that the way the subjects are ordered on a factor dimension is a highly similar way to the way in which they are ordered on the heaviest loading variables.* Thus, if "Development" proves to be a good predictor of a questionnaire item, say, by having positive correlation with an item such as "Advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice" should be respected almost as if they were decision", then each of the *heaviest* loading variables on the dimension, i.e., "newspaper circulation", "per capita gross national product", "literacy rate", etc., will very likely have a similar

correlation in the same direction as the item.¹² It should be apparent that this study could have generated hundreds of significant correlations by running all 48 of the independent variables separately against the questionnaire items. But, for what purpose? If "newspaper circulation" is virtually the same predictor as "per capita gross national product" which is virtually the same as "literacy rate", etc., why not replace all such predictors with a single predictor related to each? This, of course, is what factor analysis does. A single significant correlation of a factor dimension with a questionnaire item, then, may be the equivalent of several "significant" correlations, in the sense that the variables loading most heavily on the dimension could have been individually related to the item instead.

To summarize, the factor analysis of the national attributes of the respondents' states has produced 11 predictors, each of which is orthogonal to the others. Variance explained by one predictor, then, will not also be explained by another predictor. Thus, we know that any variance accounted for by "Authoritarianism" cannot be accounted for by "Bigness" and so forth.

GENERATING HYPOTHESES

In order to facilitate analysis and discussion, it was decided to predict the "direction" of relationship between the "independent indices" and the questionnaire scores before the actual calculating of the correlations²². These predictions are based upon what should be expected in terms of previous findings and, in the absence of other data, what seems reasonable.

In the case of "Development", delegate members coming from the most developed states should have the most negative attitude orientations and delegates from the most under-developed states should have the most positive attitude orientations. This association is predicted because of the association of "negativism" and "Development" found in two

previous studies.

The first, *The Caucusing Groups of the United Nations: An Examination of their Attitudes toward the Organization*, was based upon the 1961-62 sample of 61 respondents²³. It analyzed delegate attitudes toward the major organs of the United Nations along caucusing group lines. A typical finding took the following form:²⁴

Shifts in Security Council Importance by Caucusing Groups
By Percentage of Delegates

	Increasing	Decreasing	Same
African	35	18	41
Afro-Asian	24	32	41
Arab	20	30	50
Communist	28	72	--
Europe	--	43	57
Latin America	29	29	36
Scandinavian	--	50	50
Soviet	60	--	20

Percentages in the nominal categories above, such as "increasing", were correlated with the economic development of the caucusing groups, defined as the average per capita gross national product. It was found, on a large number of questions, that a higher ratio of the members in the underdeveloped groups seemed to view the organization in more dynamic terms, and be more positively oriented toward it than the developed groups. The study warned that: "Bi-polarization along economic lines, coupled with negativism on the part of the developed...could have unfavourable consequences for the future of the United Nations."²⁵

The second study, *National Attributes as Predictors of Delegate Attitudes at the United Nations*, extended the investigations of the first study, but changed the focus from groups to individual delegates. The results and methods of that study may be summarized as follows:

"The article makes a case that United Nations delegates' attitudes are important for the operation and development of the United Nations because delegates make certain decisions, relay information, give advice, and engage in other kinds of activity which allow them to shape the institution in which they operate. A survey of attitudes concerning the major organs of the United Nations shows most delegates satisfied with the voting procedures, Charter membership arrangements, and role and past performance of the organs. Also, most delegates tend to see all organs as increasing in importance and express a desire to increase the role and powers of the organs. However, these sentiments vary from organ to organ and from question to question. For example, most delegates appear less satisfied with the voting procedures of the Security Council than those of the General Assembly. On all questions probed, however, there was a wide range of response. The principal purpose of the project was to relate the variation in response to attributes of the respondents' states, such as their per capita gross national product. In all, forty-eight such attributes were considered, cutting across political, social and economic areas. A factor analysis of the forty-eight variables, to eliminate confusing interrelationships, yielded eleven factors. The respondents' home states were located on the factors through the calculation of factor scores, and the factor scores in turn were related to the questionnaire data through correlational techniques. It was found that two factors were of primary importance, in the sense of producing numerous significant associations. These were: "Development" and "Distance" (from the U.S.S.R. and China). "Negative attitudes", defined in terms of "dissatisfaction" and a "desire to decrease" the role and importance of the organs, were found to be associated with "high development" and "closeness

to the U.S.S.R. and China". Negativism by delegates from such states, particularly developed states, was viewed as a potentially serious hampering influence, given the kind of support patterns needed for most U.N. activities. This study was based on 1965-66 data."²⁶

It can be seen that there is a considerable degree of agreement between the two studies, regarding the importance of high economic development as a predictor of "negative" delegate attitudes and on the implications of this association for the future of the United Nations. Also, a significant body of impressionistic literature about the United Nations tends to imply that such an association might be the case.²⁷

In more formal terms, the lack of enthusiasm with the United Nations by delegates from the developed states and positive orientation by delegates from the underdeveloped states might be postulated as follows:

States differ in their economic development. States with higher economic development generally have higher capabilities to supply needs, regardless of international organization affiliation, than states with lower economic development. International organizations may be considered devices which augment in a limited way the capabilities of states. Because the capabilities of developed states are already high, the contributions of international organizations to their capacities are generally less significant, as a fraction of total capabilities, than in the case of states with lower economic development. Because statesmen may value an augmentation of capabilities to the extent that it is a "significant increment", representatives from underdeveloped states may generally value international organizations more than developed states. This may be particularly true if representatives from underdeveloped states are in a position to have a considerable voice in the organization (i.e., have a majority where majority rule is

used). Thus, attitudinal differences might be expected among statesmen, toward the United Nations and the international system, related to their home states' economic development. One might expect, for example, that representatives from economically underdeveloped states would be more inclined to wish to bolster the position of the organization than representatives from developed states.

In the case of "Authoritarianism", the delegates from the more authoritarian states should have more negative attitudes than delegates from the more democratic states. This prediction is made even though "Authoritarianism" did not emerge as an important predictor in the "National Attribute Study" and, in fact, was a weak predictor of certain "positive" attitudes. The primary justification for this prediction is the emphasis on sovereignty and nationalism by authoritarian regimes of both "left" and "right" in their foreign policy pronouncements and actions in connection with the United Nations. Without going into an elaborate verification of this statement, one might cite the examples of Portugal and the Union of South Africa, on the "right", as states who have viewed the United Nations as impinging upon their legitimate interests, and, on the "left", cite the refusal of many Communist states to pay their special assessments as evidence of disenchantment.²⁸ Also, from a doctrinal point of view, we would not expect representatives from quasi-fascist states to be enthusiastic about supranational developments, nor would we expect this from representatives from states with a strong Marxian orientation, because of their presumed view that the governments of other (capitalist) states are "aggressive" and not to be trusted. One would expect, then, that such representatives would be suspicious about the possibility of fruitful interaction with non-communist states within supranational structures, particularly if the "capitalist" states were in the majority.

Regarding "U.S.A. Relations", the closer the U.S.A.

relations, the more positive the delegates' attitudes should be. This prediction is made because of the long standing U.S. support of the United Nations, financial and otherwise²⁹. For example, the U.S. carries more than twice the economic load of any other state in regard to the regular budget and is a very heavy contributor to the budgets of the specialized agencies. It is possible that a "rub-off influence" might occur in those most closely identified with the United States.

Regarding "Bigness", the larger the state the respondent comes from, the more negative his attitudes should be. Even though "Bigness" had little explanatory power regarding attitudes towards organs, nevertheless it is reasonable to assume that this factor might operate in the same way as "Development", in the sense that representatives from large states, with big populations, may have less-felt need for the organization than representatives from smaller states.

Concerning "Party-Mobilization", those representatives whose states have the highest scores on this factor should have the most negative attitudes. This is predicted because, in the previous study, Party-Mobilization did emerge as a modest predictor of negative attitudes, and, because this dimension seems to be a strain of totalitarianism. That is, the reasons that apply in the case of "Authoritarianism" would apply here, even though this factor is statistically unrelated to "Authoritarianism".

Concerning "Density", the respondents from the least dense states should have the most positive attitudes. This prediction is made simply because "Density" emerged as a fairly important predictor of positive attitudes towards organs, although the possible reasons for this association remain obscure.

Concerning "Growth Rate", delegates from the states having the highest growth rates should have the most positive attitudes. Although "Growth Rate" emerged as a weak predictor of negative and static attitudes toward organs, this could have been accounted for in terms of random fluctuations. It is felt that, to the extent that high growth rate is viewed as a serious

problem, there should be a likelihood that delegates from such states will look toward the United Nations for solutions and, therefore, be more committed toward the organization than those from low growth rate states.

Concerning the "Racial" dimension, no predictions will be made. Of all the predictors in the previous study, it was the poorest and there doesn't seem to be any reasonable grounds for a prediction here.

Regarding "U.S. Distance", again, no prediction will be made. This is because this factor, like the "Racial Heterogeneity", had little predictive power in the previous study and reasons for a predicted direction of association are not clearly indicated.

Concerning "U.N. Pay", those coming from states making the highest payments should have the most favourable attitudes³⁰. Although "U.N. Payments" was a very weak predictor in the previous study, the associations were in the direction suggested here.

Concerning "Distance", delegates from states that are far from China and the U.S.S.R. should have positive attitudes. This is predicted because high "Distance" occurred, just next to low "Development", as the most important predictor of positive and dynamic attitudes toward organs in the previous study. The exact reasons for this were not clear and it was argued that "The importance of 'Distance' may indicate a kind of negative attitudinal 'sphere of influence' emanating from the U.S.S.R. and China, or it may simply provide a geographic reference that helps to 'locate' less positive delegate attitudes, the reasons for which are obscure. Generally speaking, this predictor seems to indicate that African and South American delegates are frequently more 'positive' and 'dynamic' in their outlook than delegates closer to the U.S.S.R. and Communist China."

METHODS

A primary method of analysis will be Spearman's

Rho. This statistic is selected because it is "conservative" in the sense that minimal assumptions need to be made about the distributions of the variables employed. The only fundamental assumption that needs to be made is that higher values indicate "more". That is, cardinal values need not be assumed. Also, the tests of significance for Spearman's *Rho* do not assume that the sample was taken from a population that is normally distributed.

Before applying the Spearman *Rho* formula, the scores on all variables are converted to rank numbers with average ranks assigned in case of ties. A higher rank number, then, in each case, is used to indicate "more" of the variable under consideration. Thus, for example, a state with a rank score of 65 on the "Development" dimension is assumed to have more economic development than a state with a rank score of 64. Similarly, a respondent with a rank score of 60 on the questionnaire is assumed to be more negative in his attitudes than a respondent with a rank score of 59.³¹

FINDINGS (PREDICTORS' SIMPLE CORRELATIONS WITH ITEMS)

TABLE IV ³² (following page)

The findings may be summarized as follows:

The higher a respondent's home state is on the "Development" factor (the more developed) the more likely it is that the respondent will:

(1) disagree that it is desirable to give the U.N. some limited taxing powers,

(2) disagree that it is desirable to amend the Charter to give the International Court of Justice absolute compulsory jurisdiction over certain categories of cases,

(3) disagree that the advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice should be respected almost as if they were decisions,

(4) disagree that the United Nations need to be strengthened in almost all aspects,

(5) disagree that it is desirable to place the remaining non-self-governing territories more firmly under the

control of the U.N.,

(6) agree that states should generally follow their national interest as they pursue policies at the U.N.,

(7) disagree that suppressing the quest to achieve national interests would generally benefit the United Nations,

(8) disagree that most states pay careful attention to United Nations resolutions in formulating their policies,

(9) agree that to expect world peace in the near future in the sense of man living harmoniously and co-operatively with man is basically utopian,

(10) disagree that the state system in many ways seems outmoded.

The higher the respondent's home state is on the Authoritarianism factor (more authoritarian) the more likely it is that the respondent will:

(1) disagree that it is desirable to give the United Nations, under suitable conditions, a permanent international military force,

(2) disagree that it is desirable to amend the Charter to give the International Court of Justice absolute compulsory jurisdiction over certain categories of cases,

(3) disagree that the advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice should be respected almost as if they were decisions,

(4) agree that each member state should decide for itself, in terms of its interests, the meaning of the Charter,

(5) agree that states should generally follow their own national interests as they pursue policies at the U.N.,

(6) agree that if large-scale war were to occur between the major powers, the United Nations would be of little use in controlling the conflict,

(7) disagree that conflict seems to be the normal state of affairs in international relations.

The higher the respondent's home state is on the U.S. Relations factor (the closer the U.S. relations) the more likely it is the respondent will:

(1) agree that it would be desirable to amend the

TABLE IV

	Factor I High Devel- opment	Factor II Author- itar- ian	Factor III Close U.S. Rela- tions	Factor IV Is Big	Factor V One Party Mobi- lized	Factor VI Low Dens- ity	Factor VII High Growth Rate	Factor VIII Racial Hetero- gen- eity	Factor IX Low Dis- tance from U.S.	Factor X High U.N. Pay	Factor XI High Distance USSR and China
WANTS (Agrees)											
1. U.N. tax	-.28	-.05	.05	-.05	-.12	-.04	.08	-.04	-.00	-.19	-.06
2. U.N. military force	-.17	-.26	.04	.02	-.08	.03	.21	.09	-.05	-.03	-.01
3. ICJ compulsory jurisdiction	-.25	-.35	.31	-.27	-.21	-.25	-.00	-.02	-.05	.02	-.19
4. Respect for ICJ opinions	-.37	-.44	.29	-.25	-.08	-.20	.06	-.08	-.12	.05	.01
5. U.N. responsible for disarmament	-.11	-.10	.04	.05	.01	.13	.42	.16	-.12	-.08	-.24
6. U.N. strengthened	-.27	.01	-.10	.11	.23	.09	-.03	-.05	-.16	-.20	-.23
7. Non-self-governing under U.N.	-.40	-.17	.15	-.13	-.17	.05	.23	-.17	-.05	-.14	-.17
8. Secretariat members selected on merit	-.01	-.14	.05	-.00	-.30	.02	.05	-.11	-.14	-.02	.08
9. States to decide Charter by self	.11	.29	-.25	-.04	.04	-.01	.12	.14	-.12	-.06	-.14
10. To follow "national interest" generally at U.N.	-.26	.28	-.09	-.09	.01	.21	.01	-.07	.13	-.07	.08
11. To follow "national interest" over "moral values"	.06	-.05	.08	.10	.06	-.05	-.02	.25	-.20	-.12	.13

TABLE IV (continued)

	Factor I High Devel- opment	Factor II Author- itarian	Factor III Close U.S. Rela- tions	Factor IV Is Big	Factor V One Party Mobi- lized	Factor VI Low Dens- ity	Factor VII High Growth Rate	Factor VIII Racial Hetero- gen- eity	Factor IX Low Dis- tance from U.S.	Factor X High U.N. Pay	Factor XI High Distance USSR and China
SEES (Agrees)											
1. U.N. creating less nationalism in persons	-.06	-.02	-.01	-.11	-.01	.06	-.10	.14	-.09	-.05	.11
2. As doubtful that U.N. will evolve into world government	.04	-.06	.02	.05	.06	-.02	-.00	.17	-.22	-.02	.11
3. Suppression of national interests as benefit to U.N.	<u>-.28</u>	-.03	-.14	.03	-.22	.01	.22	.20	.03	.09	-.07
4. Secretariat rising above national interests	-.00	-.06	.02	-.15	-.06	-.02	-.09	.18	-.01	-.15	-.04
5. U.N. as reducing conflict in world	-.07	-.00	.03	-.14	-.01	<u>.25</u>	-.15	-.13	.02	-.08	.01
6. U.N. as little use in large scale conflict	.00	<u>.25</u>	-.09	.04	-.01	.09	.09	.03	-.00	-.07	-.06
7. U.N. Having more influence 5 to 10 years ago	-.08	-.05	-.04	.09	<u>.30</u>	.19	-.05	-.03	.02	-.15	-.03
8. U.N. as capable of solving world problems	-.10	.03	-.11	.08	.03	<u>.30</u>	-.06	-.14	-.13	-.07	-.00
9. States can defy U.N. without status loss	-.09	-.15	.04	-.02	<u>-.26</u>	-.05	.07	.04	-.11	-.07	.15
10. States pay attention to U.N. resolutions	<u>-.27</u>	.04	-.14	<u>.30</u>	-.05	.13	.08	-.03	.05	-.10	.00
11. Moral values as playing large role at U.N.	-.11	-.07	-.19	-.03	-.03	.01	-.05	-.06	.04	-.21	-.11
12. Conflict is normal in international relations	-.19	<u>-.26</u>	<u>.27</u>	-.11	.02	-.14	.01	.01	-.04	-.05	<u>-.25</u>
13. World peace soon as utopian	<u>.25</u>	<u>-.24</u>	-.01	.01	-.20	-.03	.08	.19	-.05	.08	.02
14. State system as outmoded	<u>-.27</u>	-.18	.16	<u>-.34</u>	-.22	-.00	.19	.15	-.08	-.07	-.15

the Charter to give the International Court of Justice absolute compulsory jurisdiction over certain categories of cases,

(2) agree that advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice should be respected as if they were decisions,

(3) disagree that each member state should decide for itself, in terms of its own interests, the meaning of the Charter,

(4) agree that conflict seems to be the normal state of affairs in international relations.

The higher the respondent's home state is on the "Bigness" dimension (the bigger, etc.) the more likely it is the respondent will:

(1) disagree that it would be desirable to amend the Charter to give the International Court of Justice absolute compulsory jurisdiction over certain categories of cases,

(2) disagree that advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice should be respected as if they were decisions,

(3) agree that most states pay careful attention to United Nations resolutions when formulating their policies,

(4) disagree that the national state system in many ways seems outmoded.

The higher the respondent's home state is on the Party-Mobilization factor (one party-mobilized) the more likely it is that the respondent will:

(1) disagree that members of the Secretariat should be selected solely on merit (no geographic considerations),

(2) agree that the United Nations seems to have more influence on world affairs than it did 5 to 10 years ago,

(3) disagree that individual states can openly defy the United Nations with little loss of international status.

The higher the respondent's home state is on the Density factor (the less dense) the more likely the respondent will:

(1) disagree that it would be desirable to amend the Charter to give the International Court of Justice absolute compulsory jurisdiction over certain categories of cases,

(2) agree that the United Nations seems to have contributed significantly to reducing conflict in the modern world,

(3) agree that there are few international problems that the U.N., in its present form, is not capable of solving if a real effort is made to use its facilities.

The higher the respondent's home state is on the Growth Rate factor (the higher the growth rate) the more likely it is that the respondent will:

(1) agree that if the world is to disarm, it is desirable to give the U.N. major responsibility rather than some agency outside of the U.N. system.

The higher the respondent's home state is on the Racial factor (the more racially heterogeneous) the more likely it is that the respondent will:

(1) agree that it is generally preferable to pursue one's national interests instead of moral values, if they come into conflict.

No significant correlations emerged between the U.S.A. distance factor and the questionnaire items.

No significant correlations emerged between the U.N. Payment factor and the questionnaire items.

The higher the respondent's home state is on the Distance factor (the farther from the U.S.S.R. and China) the more likely it is that the respondent will:

(1) disagree that conflict seems to be the normal state of affairs in international relations.

The above results may be tabulated by ordering the predictors in terms of the number of significant correlations produced by each.

TABLE V
Predictors Ordered in Terms of the Number of
Significant Correlations (.05 level)

	Wishes	Perceptions		Total
Development	6	4	=	10
Authoritarianism	5	2	=	7
U.S.A. Relations	3	1	=	4
Bigness	2	2	=	4
Party-Mobilization	1	2	=	3
Density	1	2	=	3
Growth Rate	1	0	=	1
Distance	0	1	=	1
Racial	1	0	=	1
U.S.A. Distance	0	0	=	0
U.N. Pay	0	0	=	0
	<u>20</u>	<u>14</u>		<u>34</u>

If we compare the number of significant correlations that emerged in respect to "wishes" with the number that emerged in respect to "perceptions", we see that more occur proportionately in the case of wishes and, also, many more occur than would be expected by chance. Thus, in connection with "wishes", operating at the .05 level, we would only expect 6.5 correlations by chance (11 x 12 matrix) and in the case of perceptions, 7.5 correlations (11 x 14 matrix). In fact, in the case of wishes, 20 significant correlations emerged, 13.5 more than we would have expected by chance alone, and in the case of perceptions, 14 significant correlations emerged, 6.5 more than we would have expected by chance. Thus, the predictors seem to have more relevance, in terms of predictive power, in the case of "wishes" than in the case of "perceptions".

An interesting question that arises concerns the consistency of the predictors (in terms of the ratio of significant associations produced) when these results are compared with the "National Attribute" study cited above. It will be recalled that the latter study concerned itself with the relevance of the predictors in regard to "positive" or

"negative" delegate attitudes toward organs. To make this comparison, in each study the number of significant correlations for each predictor is divided by the number of items. Thus, in a particular study, an index of .25 would indicate that a predictor was significantly related to 25% of all questions asked.³³

TABLE VI
Power of Predictors in terms of
Frequency of Significant Associations

	This Study	National Attribute Study
Development	.40	.54
Authoritarianism	.28	.10
U.S.A. Relations	.16	.07
Bigness	.16	.10
Party-Mobilization	.12	.20
Density	.12	.16
Growth Rate	.04	.07
Distance	.04	.23
Racial	.04	.05
U.S.A. Distance	0	.16
U.N. Pay	0	.05

It can be seen that "Development" exhibits considerable "power" in both studies, relating to 40% of the items in this study and 54% of the items in the National Attributes study. "Authoritarianism" and "U.S.A. Relations" markedly "rise" in this study, but "Party-Mobilization", "Distance", and "U.S.A. Distance" fall off considerably, and a number of predictors such as "U.N. Pay", "Racial" and "Growth Rate" exhibit little power in either study. This table, however, clearly highlights the importance of "Development" for both studies, and the "rise" of "Authoritarianism" for this study.

The predictors can also be ordered in respect to their "purity". To make this analysis, the "wishes" and "perceptions" items will be lumped together, and the predictor's importance expressed in terms of its power to

consistently predict positive or negative item responses when we think in terms of high predictor scores. Thus, the "purity" (and importance) of a predictor is estimated by subtracting the number of positive predictions from the number of negative predictions and expressing the resulting difference in absolute terms. Thus, if high predictor scores tend to associate fairly equally with both the negative/positive responses, the predictor's purity index should fall toward zero. Also, of course, the fewer correlations associated with a predictor, the lower will be its index. The scoring scheme, then, takes into account both purity and importance. That is, the larger the number of significant correlations made by the predictor and the greater the tendency for higher predictor scores, the larger the predictor's index. The following table shows the results of the analysis:

TABLE VII
Predictors Ordered in Terms of their Purity and Importance

	Positive	Negative	Total
Development	0	- 10	= 10 (negative)
Authoritarianism	1	- 6	= 5 (negative)
U.S.A. Relations	3	- 1	= 2 (positive)
Bigness	1	- 3	= 2 (negative)
Party-Mobilization	2	- 1	= 1 (positive)
Growth Rate	1	- 0	= 1 (positive)
Distance	1	- 0	= 1 (positive)
Density	1	- 2	= 1 (negative)
Racial	0	- 1	= 1 (negative)
U.S.A. Distance	0	- 0	= 0 (neutral)
U.N. Pay	0	- 0	= 0 (neutral)

As indicated above, the table can be understood in terms of the kinds of responses associated with high factor scores. The analysis shows "high development" and "high authoritarianism" most consistently predict negative scores, and so on.

We can now use the purity index to make judgements concerning our hypotheses. The table that follows indicates

whether or not expectations were supported by observations. Naturally, the higher the purity index, the more relevant the predictor is. Thus, even though the expectations were supported in the case of "Distance", the purity index is so weak that we probably don't want to view this predictor, and others like it, as having much importance.

TABLE VIII
Hypotheses Supported?

Development	Yes
Authoritarianism	Yes
U.S.A. Relations	Yes
Bigness	Yes
Party-Mobilization	No
Growth Rate	Yes
Distance	Yes
Density	Yes
U.N. Payment	No

All of the above, of course, indicates just one of several possible approaches to the analytic problem. It is apparent that predictive power (in terms of the magnitude of correlation) has been fairly modest. One way to maximize predictability, although it may dilute somewhat the microscopic clearness resulting from the above analysis, is to apply the canonical correlation model.³⁴ Simply put, the canonical technique weights each variable in two sets to maximize the correlation of two sets of scores predicted by them, one from one set and one from the other. In terms of this study, then, the canonical technique answers the question of what weights must be assigned to Development, Authoritarianism, U.S.A. Relations, etc., factor dimension scores to predict a set of scores that will correlate highest with a set of scores predicted by the questionnaire scores, weighted using the same criterion of maximum correlation. Thus, the canonical technique can be viewed as a two-way multiple regression scheme with each of two sets of variables weighted to produce a maximal correlation between the values

generated from the two sets. *The weights assigned to the variables, then, tell us the importance of each variable in generating the overall relationship.* This in turn answers our research question as to what is important and what is not important in overall terms, something that can remain ambiguous when an ordinary multiple regression scheme is used, taking the dependent variables one at a time. Further and most important, the canonical technique tends to produce high correlations so that predictive power increases. To simplify interpretation, the questionnaire variables will be reduced to a smaller orthogonal set (factor scores), through factor analysis, as was the case with the original predictor variables.

The question might be raised here, why not apply the canonical technique to both sets of original variables, that is, before factor in either case? The answer is, as in ordinary multiple regression analysis, intercorrelations between the variables in either set makes it difficult to interpret predictive importance. This is because each variable is only allowed to explain unique variance and the variance that are variable *might* explain, in the absense of another highly correlated variable, *may* be "wiped out" given the presence of that other variable in the analysis, as the latter, through the weighting process, is assigned explanatory "credit". The interpretation of weights, then, remains ambiguous as long as intercorrelations are present between variables in either set.

Analysis may be facilitated by discussing certain further considerations about canonical weights at this juncture. Arbitrarily assigning X for independent canonical variate scores and Y for dependent canonical variate scores, because such scores are composite scores, it becomes important to see if the Y dimension (built out of the attitudinal factors) has the quality of relative "purity" (evidencing basically a "negative" or "positive" orientation) in terms of our judges' assessments. That is, it is desirable, for analytical purposes, to have the high or low Y scores defined primarily in terms of factor scores that imply either a "negative" or "positive" orientation. Because each dependent factor dimension is orthogonal to every

other dimension, *it is possible* that the canonical correlation technique will weigh one attitude dimension to make "positive" attitude responses contribute to high Y scores and weigh another dimension to make "negative" attitude responses contribute to high Y scores (assuming that the dimensions themselves are relatively "pure"). Should this occur, it will be difficult to *speak generally* about the negative or positive attitudinal propensities of those standing high or low on the canonical dimensions, and it will be necessary to look at each dependent factor dimension and its weight individually. On the other hand, if high (or low) Y canonical variate scores are defined *primarily* in either "negative" or "positive" attitudinal terms then broad generalizations will be possible. Thus, should this be the case, it will be possible to say, for example, that those respondents coming from highly developed states with a high growth rate, etc., *tend to score* on the ends of the questionnaire factor dimensions that generally imply either "negative" or "positive" attitudes.

As suggested above, a first step, to facilitate the canonical analysis, is to factor analyze the questionnaire variables. Table IX gives the results.

TABLE IX

Factor I (7.6% of variance)

- Disagree that: It is clear that members of the Secretariat, including the Secretary General, can rise above national and regional interests to become truly international persons. (.72) (negative)
- Disagree that: If the world is to disarm, it is desirable to give the UN major responsibility rather than some agency outside of the UN system. (.63) (negative)
- Disagree that: It seems desirable to give the U.N. some limited taxing powers. (.40) (negative)
- Disagree that: The United Nations needs to be strengthened in almost all aspects. (.40) (negative)
- Disagree that: The United Nations environment tends to make a person less nationalistic. (.32) (negative)

5 negative

Factor II (5.7% of variance)

- Agree that: States apparently can openly defy the United Nations with little loss of international status. (.78) (negative)
- Agree that: It is generally preferable to pursue one's "national interest" instead of "moral values" if they come into conflict. (.48) (negative)
- Agree that: It would be desirable to amend the Charter to give the International Court of Justice absolute compulsory jurisdiction over certain categories of cases. (.43) (positive)

2 negative, 1 positive

Factor III (9% of variance)

- Disagree that: The national state system in many ways seems outmoded. (.80) (negative)
- Disagree that: It is desirable to place the remaining non-self-governing territories more firmly under the control of the U.N. (.78) (negative)
- Disagree that: It would be desirable to amend the Charter to give the International Court of Justice absolute compulsory jurisdiction over certain categories of cases. (.50) (negative)
- Disagree that: Suppressing the quest for "national interests" would generally benefit the United Nations. (.44) (negative)
- Agree that: It is generally preferable to pursue one's "national interests" instead of "moral values" if they come into conflict. (.44) (negative)
- Agree that: States should generally follow their "national interest" as they pursue policies at the U.N. (.36) (negative)
- Disagree that: It seems desirable to give the United Nations some limited taxing powers. (.30) (negative)

7 negative

Factor IV (6.4% of variance)

- Disagree that: Each member state should decide itself, in

- terms of its own interests, the meaning of the Charter. (.77) (positive)
- Disagree that: The United Nations environment tends to make a person less nationalistic. (.53) (negative)
- Disagree that: States should generally follow their "national interests" as they pursue policies at the U.N. (.46) (positive)
- Disagree that: It is generally preferable to pursue one's "national interests" instead of "moral values" if they come in conflict. (.41) (positive)
- Disagree that: Conflict seems to be the "normal" state of affairs in international relations. (.31) (positive)
- Agree that: It seems desirable to give the United Nations some limited taxing powers. (.31) (positive)
- Agree that: Advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice should be respected almost as if they were decisions. (.30) (positive)

6 positive, 1 negative

Factor V (5.6% of Variance)

- Disagree that: If large scale war were to occur between the major powers, the United Nations would be of little use in controlling the conflict. (.75) (positive)
- Agree that: Members of the Secretariat should be selected solely on merit (no geographic considerations) (.72) (positive)
- Agree that: Suppressing the quest to achieve "national interests" would generally benefit the United Nations. (.38) (positive)

3 positive

Factor VI (8.6% of variance)

- Agree that: Moral values do play a large role in the activities at the United Nations. (.80) (positive)

- Agree that: States should generally follow their "national interests" as they pursue policies at the U.N. (.58) (negative)
- Agree that: Most states pay careful attention to U.N. resolutions in formulating their policies. (.57) (positive)
- Agree that: It seems desirable to give the United Nations some limited taxing powers. (.52) (positive)
- Disagree that: Suppressing the quest for "national interests" would generally benefit the U.N. (.46) (negative)
- Agree that: The United Nations seems to have contributed significantly to reducing conflict in the modern world. (.41) (positive)

4 positive, 2 negative

Factor VII (7.3% of variance)

- Disagree that: The United Nations seems to have more influence on world affairs than it did 5 to 10 years ago. (.77) (negative)
- Disagree that: There are few international problems that the U.N. is not capable of solving if a real effort is made to use its facilities. (.76) (negative)
- Disagree that: It is desirable to give the United Nations, under suitable conditions, a permanent international military force. (.43) (negative)
- Disagree that: The United Nations needs to be strengthened in almost all aspects. (.41) (negative)
- Disagree that: The United Nations environment tends to make a person less nationalistic. (.34) (negative)

5 negative

Factor VIII (7.5% of variance)

- Agree that: Conflict seems to be the normal state of affairs in international relations. (.78) (negative)
- Agree that: Advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice should be respected almost as if they

- Agree that: were decisions. (.63) (positive)
 It is desirable to give the United Nations,
 under suitable conditions, a permanent
 international military force. (.56)
 (positive)
- Agree that: It would be desirable to amend the Charter
 to give the International Court of Justice
 absolute compulsory jurisdiction over
 certain categories of cases. (.38) (positive)

1 negative, 3 positive

Factor IX (5.5% of variance)

- Agree that: To expect "world peace" in the near future,
 in the sense of man living harmoniously and
 co-operatively with man, is basically
 utopian. (.70) (negative) M = 12.0
- Disagree that: The United Nations needs to be strengthened
 in almost all aspects. (.46) (negative)
 M = 2.9
- Disagree that: The United Nations seems to have contributed
 significantly to reducing conflict in the
 modern world. (.44) (negative) M = 4.2

3 negative

Factor X (3.9% of variance)

- Disagree that: It is very doubtful the United Nations will
 evolve into a World Government. (.87)
 (positive) M = 5.5

1 positive

Loadings are given in brackets, i.e. (). The phrases
 "agree that" and "disagree that" indicate the kind of deviation
 from the mean value, toward either the agree or disagree
 side of the answer line, which moves a respondent up the
 factor dimension.

The 25 original variables reduce to 10 factors.
 The amount of variance explained by each factor and the
 variables loading above .30 are given in the above table.

In each case the kind of response necessary to produce a *high factor score* is indicated, and also, how that response can be characterized in "negative" or "positive" terms based on the decisions of the judges discussed earlier.³⁵ To illustrate, in the case of Factor I, a respondent with a high factor score *tends* to disagree that the Secretary General and members of the Secretariat can become international persons; disagree that the United Nations should be given major disarmament responsibilities; disagree that the United Nations should be given limited taxing powers; disagree that the United Nations environment makes a person less nationalistic. (Other factors can be similarly "interpreted!")

A person with a low factor score, of course, tends to have the opposite response pattern from that indicated above. Thus, such a subject should *tend* to agree that members of the Secretariat can become international persons; agree that the United Nations should be given major disarmament responsibilities, and so forth.

The analysis indicates that many of the factors are relatively pure, in the sense that *high or low factor scores* tend to be produced by *either* "negative" or "positive" attitudes. Thus in the case of the first factor, *high factor scores* are defined primarily in terms of *five negative* responses and, of course, *low factor scores* are defined primarily in terms of *five positive* responses. The "purity" of the second factor is two to one; the third, seven to zero; the fourth, six to one; the fifth, three to zero; the sixth, four to two; the seventh five to zero; the eighth, three to one; the ninth, three to zero; and the tenth, one to zero.

Factor analysis, then, has produced ten scales, most of which can be interpreted as measures of negative-positive attitudes. Thus, on the purer scales the signs of the factor scores (in standard score form) can be viewed as measuring, basically, "negative" or "positive" attitude orientations depending upon the direction of the scale. The scales, then, can be thought of in the following terms:

TABLE X

Factor I	Negative	(5 to 0)
Factor II	Negative	(2 to 1)
Factor III	Negative	(7 to 0)
Factor IV	Positive	(6 to 1)
Factor V	Positive	(3 to 0)
Factor VI	Positive	(4 to 2)
Factor VII	Negative	(5 to 0)
Factor VIII	Positive	(3 to 1)
Factor IX	Negative	(3 to 0)
Factor X	Positive	(1 to 0)

We can, then, characterize the respondents as having either a "negative" or "positive" orientation depending upon their location on the scales. Thus, a respondent scoring highest on Factors I, II, III, VII, and IX, but lowest on Factors IV, V, VI, VIII, and X can be viewed as evidencing basically negative attitudes. Conversely, a respondent scoring lowest on Factors I, II, III, VII and IX, but highest on Factors IV, V, VI, VIII and X can be said to be expressing basically positive attitudes.⁹

To summarize: the twenty-five original variables of the questionnaire have been condensed into ten factor dimensions which are independent of one another in the sense that the factor score location of one cannot be used to predict the factor score location of another. Most of the factor dimensions are basically "pure" in the sense that high or low factor scores are primarily defined either in terms of "positive" or "negative" attitudinal responses, as determined by the non delegate judges.

FINDINGS (CANONICAL ANALYSIS)

When the canonical technique is applied, the following relationships emerge between the variables:³⁶

TABLE XI
Canonical Correlation

<u>Independent Factors</u>		<u>Weights</u>	
I	-	.463	Development
II	-	.536	Authoritarianism
III	-	-.353	U.S.A. Relations
IV	-	.325	Bigness
V	-	.239	Party-Mobilization
VI	-	.196	Density
VII	-	-.239	Growth Rate
VIII	-	.053	Racial
IX	-	.055	U.S.A. Distance
X	-	.108	U.N. Payment
XI	-	.246	Distance

<u>Dependent Factors</u>		<u>Weights</u>	
I	-	.221	(negative)
II	-	-.277	(negative)
III	-	.650	(negative)
IV	-	-.257	(positive)
V	-	.063	(positive)
VI	-	-.010	(positive)
VII	-	-.104	(negative)
VIII	-	-.596	(positive)
IX	-	.119	(negative)
X	-	.029	(positive)

Canonical Correlation = .80

The above shows that Factors I, II, III and IV contribute most heavily to the canonical X scores (predictor side) and questionnaire Factors I, II, III, IV and VIII contribute most heavily to the canonical Y scores (questionnaire side). To facilitate discussion, the most salient relationships may be expressed in a more convenient form in the following table:

TABLE XII

II (.53)		I (.46)		III (-.35)		IV (.32)			
Undemocratic		Developed		Close U.S. Relations		Bigness			
High		High		Low		High			
IF									
Democratic		Underdeveloped		Far U.S. Relations		Smallness			
III (.65)		VIII (-.59)		II (-.27)		IV (-.25)		1 (.22)	
Negative		Positive		Negative		Positive		Negative	
High		Low		Low		Low		High	
Then									
Positive		Negative		Positive		Negative		Positive	

(a perfect prediction in terms of the high-low character of the pattern). The second highest X scorer (also from an "Eastern" state) has a pattern of .53, -.93, 1.17, .76 and -.98 respectively on the same factors (another perfect prediction). Thus, the weights in the canonical correlation, with a high degree of accuracy, describe the state characteristics of those who, in fact, have the high-low response patterns necessary to produce high canonical Y scores. In each case, except one, the predicted questionnaire factor scores are produced primarily from factor scores assumed to connote negative behaviour. For example, in the case of questionnaire Factor III, seven negative variable responses contribute most to the predicted high factor scores. Only in the case of questionnaire Factor II (which, incidentally, is a "weak" factor with a two to one purity ratio) does a predominance of "positive" variable scores contribute primarily to the predicted pattern. If the frequency of "negative" vs. "positive" responses in the salient factors are counted, then 22 negative responses and 4 positive variable responses are involved in producing the high canonical Y scores.

The question might be asked, *what is the "predictive loss" if just these heaviest weighted variables are considered in the canonical correlation?* The table that follows shows the results.

TABLE XIII
Canonical Correlation of Heaviest Weighted
Variables of Previous Analysis

Independent Factors		Dependent Factors	
I	.52 (Development)	I	.25 (negative)
II	.62 (Authoritarianism)	II	-.24 (negative)
III	-.38 (U.S. Relations)	III	.62 (negative)
IV	.33 (Bigness)	IV	-.33 (positive)
		VIII	-.64 (positive)

Only a 12% shrinking in "variance explained" between the canonical variate scores occurs if variables V through XI are "thrown out" on the independent side, and variables V, VI

VII, IX, and X on the dependent side. Thus, the predictive importance of all the lesser weighted variables is fairly small compared to those of greater weight.

DISCUSSION

This study reaffirms the importance of economic development as a predictor of delegate attitudes. In the various studies thus far carried out, high economic development has been consistently associated with negativism³⁷. In this regard, it is interesting to note that there is a considerable time spread in these studies and, therefore, a persistence is evident in regard to this negativism. Unfortunately, no samples were taken before 1956, that is, before the infusion of so many underdeveloped states into the United Nations. Therefore, there is no way of assessing whether delegate attitudes from developed states became more negative after 1956. In other words, the negativism found may be a consequence of a partial "taking over" of the organization by delegates from the more underdeveloped states, or, it may be related to the more fundamental reasons given above in the section entitled "Generating Hypotheses". That is, such negativism may have existed from the very beginning and be related to basic state capabilities. What is notable about this finding, however, is that there is a kind of contradiction between such attitudes as the actual fiscal support given to the U.N. by the states. Thus, because of the scale of contributions, the most economically developed states must give more to the organization than the underdeveloped states, and have from the very beginning. Why shouldn't this proven economic support by their home states be reflected in "commitment" by "developed" delegates toward the organization? The reasons for this may not be completely baffling. It is easy to imagine that persons who give more to their national governments may feel less commitment to the system than those who give less and, perhaps, receive more. To put it another way, even though developed states give more to the organization, in fact, the organization, as such, may give more to the underdeveloped nations. Thus, the "giving" on the part

of the more developed states may be viewed as a sort of undesirable "taxation" whereas the recipients of many U.N. related functions, i.e., as through the specialized agencies, may be expressing a real felt appreciation for such activities. Also, possibly very important in this regard, is the fact that the U.N. is basically democratic in its character. That is, the evident "power" of the more developed states, (except in the case of the Security Council), is not translated into privileges within the organization. In a sense, then, delegates from underdeveloped states enjoy a privileged position vis-a-vis the more developed and powerful states in the organization in contrast to their "weak" position in respect to such states outside the United Nations arena. In short, there may be a variety of reasons for the association that has been found here and, in any case, these findings do not in any way undercut the more theoretical propositions expressed above.

As suggested above, the association of negativism with "Authoritarianism" may be the consequence of both doctrinaire and historic factors relating to the view of persons from such systems. In a sense, authoritarian regimes, of both right and left, have been the step-children of the organization. Many of the more authoritarian regimes on the right have come under a great deal of organizational scrutiny regarding "colonies" and authoritarian regimes on the left have been criticized for violations of basic human rights. Also, of course, the U.S.S.R. as the champion of the Communist camp, at one point in the organization's history was condemned for the violation of the United Nations Charter (Hungarian crisis). What is surprising about this finding, however, is its inconsistency with the finding, in the "National Attribute study", of a weak relationship between "Authoritarianism" and positive attitudes toward organs. This does tie in with certain voting studies, however, where authoritarianism has been found to predict "positive" votes in some cases to "negative" ones in others.³⁸ In any case, these findings suggest something incompatible between support of the United Nations system, in at least some respects, and undemocratic systems.

The general lack of relationships in respect to the

rest of the predictors (with the exception of "U.S.A. Relations" and "Bigness" in the canonical correlations) is somewhat surprising, but not overly so, in view of the findings in the "National Attribute Study". Although the "direction" of correlation was accurately predicted in a number of cases, simple correlations were few and far between. Assuming that predictors treated in this study cut across many of the measurable characteristics of nation states, these findings do seem to suggest that, if one wants to account for additional variance in the questionnaire scores, one may want to move to different kinds of indices. The ones that immediately suggest themselves are ones relating to "personality structure" and "past experience" of the delegates. This suggests a fruitful area for additional research, should the delegates prove to be co-operative in regard to such probing.

At a more general level, these findings tie in well with concepts and research pioneered by R.J. Rummel under the title of "Social Field Theory". The fundamental axioms may be summarized as follows: 1)"international relations is a field consisting of all the attributes and interactions of nations and their complex interrelationships"; 2)"the international relations field can be analytically divided into attribute, A, and behaviour, B, spaces in which attributes and interactions are projected, respectively, as vectors;" 3)"the attributes and behavioural spaces are generated by a finite set of linear independent dimensions;" 4)"nations are located as vectors in attribute space and coupled into dyads in behaviour space"; 5) "the distance vectors of A-space that connect nations are social forces determining locations of dyads in B-space"; 6) "the direction and velocity of movement over time of a dyad in B-space is along the resolution vector of the forces, d , and 7)"B-space is a subspace of A-space".³⁹

The above statements give one, at the same time, a way to conceptualize the international system and suggest applications and tests of these notions in the fabric of linear algebra. Rummel has argued "the mathematical model

underlining the theory is linear algebra. This is itself the field of mathematics which in application is the architect of a number of scientific theories, thus making possible the search for scientific analogies. Moreover, because of their mathematical form, product moment correlation, multiple regression, and factor analysis, the tools often employed by social scientists, are structurally a part of linear algebra... For testing a scientific theory, the method employed should be structurally isomorphic with the mathematics of the theory. The theory elaborated here has that isomorphism with the product moment correlation, with multiple regression, and with factor analysis. These serve as its methods."⁴⁰

Applications, then, have typically involved factor analyses of attribute measures and then, separately, behavioural measures which are related, using correlational techniques, in order to test the proposition that one can account for variance in B-space from A-space. Elaboration of the fundamental notions, however, have led to two distinct models of the international system. The first, model I, is given as:

$$w_{i \rightarrow j, k} = \sum_{l=1}^p \alpha_l d_{i \rightarrow j, l}$$

where $w_{i \rightarrow j, k}$ is the behaviour of nation i to nation j on the k th dimension of behaviour space, d is the distance vector between i and j on the l th dimension of the p -dimensional space of nation attributes, and α_l is the corresponding parameter.⁴¹

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This equation asserts that if we select any particular behavioural measure, we can account for the variance on that dimension by a weighted sum of the attribute dimensions, expressed in distance vector terms. In other words, we expect a perfect correlation between the scores generated from the latter weighted sum and the former behavioural dimension scores.

Distance vectors in this formulation are obtained by computing factor score differences for the subjects on the various attribute dimensions.

The second formulation, model II, is given as ⁴²

$$w_{i \rightarrow j, k} = \sum_{l=1}^P \alpha_{i \rightarrow j, l} d_l$$

The primary difference between the two equations is that the parameter weights α are allowed to vary for each factor i in the latter model. For example, each state may receive a different weight on the distance vectors of an attribute dimension, such as "Economic Development", in predicting some behavioural dimension, such as relating primarily to exports.

These two equations may be compared with a third entitled "Attribute Theory" given:

$$w_{ik} = \sum_{l=1}^P \beta_l s_{il}$$

where w_{ik} is the *total behaviour* of nation i on the k th behavioural dimension, s_{il} is the l th attribute dimension of the p -dimensional space of nation attributes, and β_l the corresponding parameters. ⁴³

Rummel has shown that the parameters of Model I, of Social Field Theory, are deducible from Attribute Theory and vice-versa, in the sense that the α_l of Model I are

mathematically related to the β_{ℓ} of Attribute Theory. The relationship is given as $\alpha_{\ell} = \beta_{\ell} / n_{\ell}$.⁴⁴ It naturally follows that $\beta_{\ell} = \alpha_{\ell} n_{\ell}$ and $n_{\ell} = \beta_{\ell} / \alpha_{\ell}$. In short, the weights given to the attribute dimensions of Attribute Theory can be used to predict the weights given to the distance vectors of Social Field Theory, Model I, and vice-versa. For example, if ten states are treated in Attribute Theory and the weight assigned to the "Economic Development" dimension is 5, in predicting a behavioural dimension, then the weight for the "Economic Development" distance vectors in Social Field Theory, Model I, will be .5, assuming that we start with the same data and the prediction is to be without error.⁴⁵ Viewed in these terms, then, any test of Model I of Social Field Theory can be viewed as a test for Attribute Theory and vice-versa.

Rummel also demonstrates that there is no similar mathematical relationship between the parameters of Model II and those of Attribute Theory.

From the above, it might be surmised that the present project be viewed as a test of either Attribute Theory or Model I. Unfortunately, however, the relationship, asserted by Rummel, refers to, in the case of Attribute Theory, total behaviour calculated by summing individual dyadic behaviours. For example, total exports are computed for an individual nation by summing together each of its exports to all other nations. This immediately raised the question of whether some acts are fundamentally dyadic in the international system, while others are not and, therefore, not captured, at least in the formal sense, in the mathematical expressions given above. That is, all of the "behaviour" referred to above represents dyadic behaviour or a sum of dyadic behaviour (i.e. total behaviour). In discussing behaviour, Rummel argues, "interaction...is defined as a behavioural act: any action of one nation toward a specific other nation. This action then couples the two nations together. Thus, the exports of Peru to Bolivia is an action coupling the two nations. Two nations

so coupled by the actions of one are called a dyad, and the action is called dyadic behaviour."⁴⁶

Can the attitudinal information gathered in this study be considered dyadic in the way described in the above quotation? I think not. When a delegate expresses an attitude toward an attitude object, such as the Security Council, this would not seem to be a dyadic relation of the kind as when a delegate sends a threat to another nation, such as Japan. That is, subjects of Rummel's studies are nations in dyadic relationships (and their attribute distances "explain their dyadic relationships"). To include an attitude object, such as the Security Council, as an aspect of a dyadic relation, is tantamount to including non-national subjects in the study.

In the present study, then, all attitude objects would become subjects whose "attributes", to compute attribute distances, would have to be determined. When we think of dyadic relationships, of course, we normally think of actors who can actually act toward one another, i.e., the United States can act toward Japan, and Japan can act toward the United States. It should be evident that some attitude objects, such as the International Court of Justice could, conceivably, be seen as falling into an "actor" category, while others, such as attitudes toward the Charter, moral values, U.N. tax, etc., can not. The latter attitude objects appear "passive" in nature, in contrast to the former, and, of course, hosts of other passive attitude objects can easily be thought of.

If, however, one ignores the constraints that the total behaviour in Attitude Theory should represent a summation of discrete dyadic acts refer to a relationship with another nation actor, then, given this relaxation, the present work can be viewed as falling under Attribute Theory. In this latter view, attributes explain all behaviour, not just behaviour that is "dyadic" and directed toward other nations. Because behaviour, in the latter sense, is not

viewed as a summation of discrete dyadic acts, it is not possible, of course, to deduce Model I parameters from such an application of Attribute Theory. To put it another way, expressions of attitudes are not assumed to be dyadic in form unless expresses toward another nation actor, which is not the case in this study, and Model I demands "dyadic relations". At the most general level, however, that is, in respect to the notion that attributes and behaviour are linked, this work can be viewed as complementary to Social Field Theory. Most important, perhaps, is the fact that "Economic Development", as measured by energy consumption divided by population, has had considerable predictive importance in tests of both Model I and Model II.

To summarize, then, a test of Attribute Theory, as formulated by the above equation, but where the notion of behaviour is relaxed in the sense that it is not viewed as representing summation of dyadic acts toward nations, yields a partial fit between A- and B-space. Strictly speaking, however, if a true basis for A-space has been applied in this study, the universal proposition as expressed in Attribute Theory, has been falsified. That is, we do not find that we can account for all of the variation in B-space through weighted combinations of A-space. An easy rejoinder, of course, is that the attribute dimensions utilized in the study are not a true basis of A-space because of the limited number of variables employed in the analysis.⁴⁷ It might be mentioned, in this connection, that in other studies where I have used a larger number of variables, more A-space dimensions do emerge. In those studies, however, regardless of how many variables I have employed, less than 50 per cent of B-space has been accounted for by A-space. This suggests a possible recasting of some of the fundamental notions of Field and Attribute Theory in probabilistic terms. Such a suggestion, however, may raise a kind of philosophical dilemma. As long as Attribute and the Social Field Theories are cast in a deterministic mode (no error factor), "tests" may continually appear to falsify the basic equations. If a probabilistic model is adopted, where error is admitted, however, (the verbal equivalent would take the form of "some of the variation in the basis of B-space can be accounted or by variation in the

basis of A-space") such a proposition would appear to be easily and perhaps perpetually verified and cannot, as is now well understood, be falsified. In this sense, then, such a proposition almost appears trivial and is, perhaps, one of the reasons why Rummel has resisted a probabilistic approach to his fundamental notions. If, however, substantial portions of the variance of B-space can be shown to be accounted for by A-space, and, stable patterns in this regard can be uncovered, perhaps, this will be reward enough. Although the deterministic model may always be doomed to be falsified⁴⁸ and the probabilistic model to be verified, nevertheless, considering the useful information that may be generated from studies, stimulated by such notions, the end result may be pragmatically adequate in the sense of providing guidance for those who wish to rationally manipulate certain aspects of the international system.

SUMMARY

When United Nations delegates were asked to mark a questionnaire probing matters concerning the United Nations system and international affairs, different behavioural patterns emerged within a co-operative group of delegates. For the most part, delegates generally seem "positive" in regard to both their wishes and perceptions. When the questionnaire scores were related to the predictors (factors calculated from attributes concerning the respondents' home states) two factors assumed superior predictive power: "Development" and "Authoritarianism". High scores in both cases were related to negative questionnaire responses. This finding reinforces the importance of "Development" as a predictor of U.N. delegate attitudes, and suggest that another factor, "Authoritarianism" may also be of some importance. These findings also appear to have considerable relevance for notions developed under the concept of Attribute and Social Field Theory.⁴⁹

FOOTNOTES

1. I would like to thank the Research Advisory Council of Central Michigan University for its financial support of the data gathering phase of the project; the Political Science Department of Florida Atlantic University for financial support of the data analysis phase; and, the vote of the Florida Atlantic University Research Committee to support the project out of NSF Institutional Grant monies.
2. Jack E. Vincent, "National Attributes as Predictors of Delegate Attitudes at the United Nations", *American Political Science Review*, Volume 62 (1968), pp. 916-931.
3. Richard F. Pederson, "National Representation in the United Nations", *International Organization*, Vol. 15 (1961) p. 258. Along these same lines, particularly in respect to certain representatives, Keohane has maintained: "Furthermore, some representatives of small and new states have more freedom of action than delegates of large entities, particularly since they are less closely instructed by their foreign offices. In specific terms, this means that the policies of certain African and Asian states may be influenced heavily by what their representatives think." (Robert Owens Keohane, "Political Influence in the General Assembly", *International Conciliation*, No.557 (1966), p. 37)
4. Other literature stressing delegate influence includes: H.G. Nicholas, *The Evolution of the Diplomatic Method* (New York, MacMillan, 1954), p. 84; H.G. Nicholas, *The United Nations as a Political Institution* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 88-122; Sydney D. Bailey, *The General Assembly of the United Nations* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), pp. 8-18; Gary Best, *Diplomacy in the United Nations*, (Northwestern University, 1960, unpublished dissertation); and Keohane, *op. cit.*
5. In the model, exposition is facilitated by the introduction of the concept of "cause" and/or "influence". I have never

been convinced that these are necessary concepts as far as theory is concerned. That is, under the concept of "scientific theory", it may not be necessary to speak of "cause" or "influence", when precisely expressing the relationships between variables or testing hypotheses derived from such stated relationships. As an aid to speculative thinking, however, I see no great harm introduced by the inclusion of these admittedly difficult concepts.

6. From a statistical point of view, then, the instructions should "explain" the delegate behaviour in the sense that they can account for observed variance. With delegate and home state co-operation, it would be fairly easy to establish the predictive relevance of "compelling instructions" to "prescribed acts". For example, on a particular issue, instructions might either tell the delegate to vote for it, abstain, or vote against it. Rank scores generated by this three-fold split could then be correlated with actual voting behaviour. We would expect, then, a perfect correlation between our instructional rank scores and voting rank scores. Similar scoring systems, of course, could be probably worked out for other kinds of acts to ascertain their relationship to instructions.

7. Hayward R. Alker, Jr. and Bruce M. Russett, *World Politics in the General Assembly* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1965) pp. 218-219

8. One can distinguish here between the concept of attitude as something standing behind test performance, revealed by questionnaire responses, but not directly measured, and "questionnaire behaviour", which is directly observable. For the sake of the model, attempting to depict possible lines of causal influence, attitudes are treated in the former sense, although, in research, it may not be necessary to deal conceptually with more than "questionnaire behaviour". In the latter usage, then, questionnaire behaviour is synonymous with a subject's scores on a

particular test, not necessarily revealing something beyond the test, i.e., a "hidden" or "partially-hidden" attitude.

9. "Frequency" may be thought of as the number of instructions per unit of time, and "magnitude" as the average number of words per set of instructions.

10. As suggested above, the present project will only probe a sample of what might be considered the universe of delegate attitudes. One obvious path of continued research, then, in this connection, would be to probe new attitudinal areas, possibly in terms of the positive/negative cast adopted in this study. Also, although considerable delegate co-operation would be necessary, the actual dispatches of delegates to the home states might be subjected to content analysis, along negative/positive lines, and, through the proper scoring techniques, such information could be correlated with questionnaire scores. The idea of the chain of influence would greatly be enhanced if those that tend to be "negative" on various questionnaire items tend to send "negative" messages and those who are "positive" tend to send "positive" messages.

A particularly fruitful line of inquiry, if delegates are amenable, would be to run a wide range of non-genetic personal inventory data, such as rank, age, etc., against gathered questionnaire data. As more and more variables are generated, factor analysis, multiple regression, and canonical correlation techniques might prove to be the most valuable kinds of analytical tools.

11. The judges were upper division students at Florida Atlantic University with extensive training in international relations.

12. As will be seen by the correlation technique, it is movement away from the mean value, toward either the "Agree" or "Disagree" side, that defines "negative" and "positive" responses for each respondent on each statement. This approach was considered proper because the original range in every case is from 1 to 21. It should be understood, however, that when

the mean falls away from "0", say, strongly to the "agreement" side, a "negative" response is any response located toward the "disagreement" side away from the mean. Technically, then, the term, *less agreement*, should be applied to responses between the mean and the "0" point (scored 11).

13. The questionnaire avoided any reference to personal classification information in the hopes of maximizing return. Questionnaires employed in an earlier study (treated above) which included such items were frequently left partially blank, although responses were given to the non-personal items. The strategic decision to ignore such items in this study in no way implies that such items may not be extremely valuable in interpreting delegate responses.

14. It is possible that many more of the responding delegates were also Ambassadors. It may be desirable to have as many Ambassadors as possible within the group of responding delegates, but, as the project has been set up, this is not at all necessary. That is, as explained above, the major purpose of the project is to relate non-personal data to delegate response patterns. A delegate's "rank", then, is considered to fall into the same analytical category (personal) as "age", "education", etc. These are potentially fruitful lines of inquiry, but are not pursued here for reasons explained above.

In this connection, in this author's opinion, it would be wrong to believe that the only important persons at the United Nations are Ambassadors. Even though Ambassadors technically run missions, they, like the head of any complicated, bureaucratic institution, operate in terms of streams of influence. In short, they are surrounded by other persons who have impact upon outcomes, as well as they, even though the Ambassador's impact may be "larger" than that of their subordinates. This, however, is an

extremely complicated question which needs exploration. A sample limited just to the Ambassadors, of course, is a research possibility, but, in view of the fact that Ambassadors make up less than a fourth of the active participants in delegations, the more general delegate population, of which Ambassadors are a part, is viewed as worthy of study and, of course, is the focus of attention in this study.

15. The categories used in this table were taken from Arthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor, *A cross Polity Survey* (Cambridge, M.I.T. Press, 1963) pp. 54-117. Thus in the case of size, "Very Large" referred to states falling into the category of two million square miles or above; "Large" referred to states falling into the category of 300,000 to 1.9 million square miles; "Medium" referred to states falling into the category of 75,000 to 299,000 square miles; and "small" referred to the category of below 75,000 square miles. The categories used in connection with population, agricultural population, literacy rate, freedom of press and status of legislature, are fully explained in Banks and Textor. The geographic groupings are based upon delineations indicated by Banks and Textor.

16. Hans L. Zetterberg, *On Theory and Verification in Sociology* (Totowa, New Jersey: The Bedminster Press, 1963) pp. 54-55.

A true random sample is extremely difficult to obtain with this population. If a sample of, say, 40 delegates is drawn and personal letters are sent, or interviews arranged, with the 40 persons picked, there is a considerable likelihood of resistance on the part of the chosen. A delegate is likely to ask: "Why was I picked instead of someone else?" Anticipating such resistances, this researcher aimed for the "maximum," that is, to obtain responses from as many delegations as possible. As indicated above, it is felt that this may create a bias, then the researcher is left with a large enough co-operative group to make descriptive discussions profitable. After all, even if the associations shown here hold only for the co-operative group of delegates, nevertheless, this is a sizeable part of the total delegate population.

17. Banks and Textor, *op. cit.* The rationale for the selection of variables and the source of the remaining variables is fully treated in the National Attribute Study and will not be repeated here.

18. The principal component solution was employed. Unities were placed in the principal diagonal of the correlation matrix and the factor matrix was rotated, using Kaiser's varimax criterion. The minimum eigenvalue for which a factor was rotated was 1.0. See *Modern Factor Analysis* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1960); Henry R. Kaiser, "Varimax Criterion for Analytical Rotation in Factor Analysis", *Psychometrika* 23, (1958) pp. 187-200; Henry F. Kaiser, "Computer Program for Varimax Rotation in Factor Analysis", *Educational and Psychological Measurements*, Vol. 19 (1959) pp. 413-430; Dean J. Clyde, Elliott M. Cramer, Richard J. Sharin, *Multivariate Statistical Programs*, (Coral Gables, Fla.: University of Miami, 1966), pp. 15-19; Bruce M. Russett, *International Regions in International Integration* (Chicago: Rand, McNally, 1968); Rudolph J. Rummel, "Dimensions of Conflict Behaviour Within and Between Nations", *General Systems*, Yearbook for the Advancement of General Systems Theory (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1963); Arthur S. Banks and Phillip M. Gregg, "Grouping Political Systems Through Factor Analysis of A Cross Polity Survey", *The American Behavioural Scientist*, Vol. 9 (1965) pp. 3-6; Phillip M. Gregg and Arthur S. Banks, "Dimensions of Political Systems: Factor Analysis of A Cross Polity Survey", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 59 (1965) pp. 602-614; Raymond Tanter, "Dimensions of Conflict Behaviour Within and Between Nations 1958-60", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Volume 10 (1966) pp. 41-64; R.J. Rummel, "Dimensions of Conflict Behaviour Within Nations 1946-59", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 10 (1966), pp. 65-73; Jack E. Vincent, *Factor Analysis in International Relations: Interpretation, Problem Areas and an Application*, (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, forthcoming); R.J. Rummel, *Applied*

Factor Analysis, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970)
 Jack E. Vincent, "Factor Analysis as a Research Tool in International Relations: Some Problem Areas, Some Suggestions and an Application", *Proceedings of the 65th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association* (New York, 1969);
 Raymond B. Cattell, "The Measuring and Strategic Use of Factor Analysis", in Raymond B. Cattell (ed.), *Handbook of Multivariate Experimental Psychology* (Chicago: Rand, McNally & Co., 1966), pp. 174-243; and Raymond B. Cattell, "The Basis of Recognition and Interpretation of Factors", *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, Vol. 22 (1962), pp. 667-695.

19. Factor scores were calculated using the formula $F = ZA (A'A)^{-1}$, where F is an $N \times m$ matrix of factor scores, Z is an $N \times n$ matrix of scores on the original variables in standard score form, A is an $n \times m$ matrix of factor co-efficients (loadings) and N = subjects, n = variables, and m = factors. See John L. Horn and Wilbur C. Miller, "Evidence on Problems in Estimating Common Factor Scores", *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, Vol. 26 (1966), pp. 617-622; for the advantages of this formula over other possible formulas, such as $F = ZA$ (defined above) or $F = ZB$ where B is an $n \times m$ matrix in which unity is substituted for each "salient" co-efficient and zero is substituted for every other loading. The most obvious advantage of the formula employed in this study is that it produces truly orthogonal factor scores, whereas the other formulas may not. In this connection, a check correlating each set of factor scores with every other set of factor scores showed them to be truly orthogonal with correlations of .0. See also John L. Horn, "An Empirical Comparison of Methods for Estimating Factor Scores", *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, Volume 25 (1965), pp. 313-321, and Gene V. Glass and Thomas O. McGuire, "Abuses of Factor Scores", *American Educational Research Journal*, Vol. 3 (1966), pp. 297-304.

20 Alker and Russell, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-31.

21. In fact, the factor scores of the "Development" dimension correlate -.37 with this item and these variables correlate

with it -.38, -.35 and -.31 respectively.

22. The "reasons" which follow are offered as possible influences which may help account for the relationships discovered and should not be seen as offered as the explanation. In each case, they should be considered prefaced by the phrase "other things being equal". Also, it should be clear that "positive" here refers to both wishes and perceptions. The mixing of "normative" and "perceptual" items frequently occurs in attitudinal scales, such as the "Dogmatism Scale", which is assumed to tap a general orientation, i.e., "The United States and Russia have just about nothing in common" (perceptual), "It is better to be a dead hero than to be a live coward" (normative). Milton Rokeach, *The Opened and Closed Mind* (New York: Basic Books Inc. 1960), pp. 73-76. Interestingly, in the National Attribute Study, negative perceptions toward organs were frequently associated with negative wishes toward organs (called desires in that study). I suspect, but cannot prove, that if a delegate informs me, and means it, that "states can openly defy the United Nations with little loss of international status" that he may behave differently, and in a way less supportive of the U.N., than a delegate who disagrees with such an item. The same reasoning applies in the case of other perceptual items. In short, negative perceptions may have negative behavioural connotations and, of course, this is assumed in the case of "negative wishes". These propensities, however, are very hard to substantiate. The whole area of the actual relationship between "questionnaire behaviour" and "real behaviour", of course, has not been settled, even for widely used questionnaires.

23. Jack E. Vincent, *The Caucusing Groups of the United Nations: An Examination of their Attitudes Toward the Organization* (Stillwater: Oklahoma State University Press, 1965).

24. *Ibid.*, p. 44

25. *Ibid.*, p. 138.

26. Digest of "National Attributes as Predictors of Delegate Attitudes at the United Nations", in *World Affairs Digest* (Oshkosh, Wisconsin: Wisconsin State University Press, 1968).

27. See: Abraham F.I. Shihata, "The Attitude of New States Toward the International Court of Justice", *International Organization* Vol. XIV, (1965), pp. 203-222; and Francis O. Wilcox, *U.N. and the Non-Aligned Nations* (New York, Foreign Policy Association, 1962), p. 54. Shihata argues in connection with the International Court of Justice that "The record shows that some new states have adopted an attitude more favourable to the Court than that adopted by many older nations." (p. 222). Wilcox develops arguments similar to those presented above but focusses on the "need" of "non-aligned" nations for the United Nations. Khalid I. Babaa also sees a number of reasons (i.e. protection, dignity) why the "non-aligned" should view the United Nations in favourable terms. "The 'Third Force' and the United Nations", *The Annals*, Vol. 362 (November, 1965) pp. 81-91. John Karefa-Smart has maintained "...even though the Charter was written and adopted while most of the African states were still colonial territories, the Africans nonetheless hold the Charter of the United Nations in the highest esteem." John Karefa-Smart "Africa and the United Nations", *International Organisation* Vol. 19 (1965) p.766.

28. In spite of the fact that such a refusal might easily be seen as evidence of a "negative" orientation, nevertheless, as will be seen, "U.N. Payment" as such, has no significant explanatory power in respect to the questionnaire.

29. Although such support might reasonably be seen as evidence of a "positive" orientation, at this juncture, an argument will be developed later that suggests good reasons to distinguish between "financial" and "attitudinal" support. Also, the United States, because of its obvious traditional support of the United Nations, might be seen as an "exception" to

supposed effect of economic development on delegate attitudes. Perhaps an over-riding "idealism", deeply embedded in cultural elements, tends to act as a counterforce. Impressionistically, however, it seems that the U.S.A. commitment to the United Nations is somewhat less than it was prior to the recent entry into the United Nations of a number of underdeveloped states, many of which are openly critical of U.S. policies, frequently in the name of the United Nations Principles. In any case, the discussion of this variable, like the others, should be considered prefaced by the phrase, "other things being equal".

30. Ordinarily, the variable of "U.N. Pay" and "Development" should correlate strongly and therefore they should load on the same factor dimension. The year the data were collected, however, was a year when many states, both developed and underdeveloped, were balking at paying their assessments. As the factor analysis shows, the subject order of those that did pay was *basically* unrelated to the subject order on the variables loading heavily on the "Development" dimension. This peculiar circumstance gives rise to the above prediction. In ordinary times, then, United Nations payments would be submerged in the "Development" dimension which would be assumed to predict "negative responses".

31. Vincent, "National Attributes...", *op. cit.*, p. 930

32. All significant correlations have been underlined using a two-tailed test. Because N is the same in every case, all correlations greater than $\pm .25$ are significant at the .05 level or less, and all correlations $\pm .32$ or above are significant at the .01 level or less. The generalizations that follow, then, are based upon these levels of significance. That is, every relationship is significant either at the .05 level or less. If the exact level is of interest, then it may be ascertained by reference to the table to see whether the correlation lies between $\pm .25$ and $\pm .31$, or is greater than $\pm .32$. If, because the direction of correlation has been predicted, a one-tailed test is deemed acceptable,

those correlations, where the prediction was borne out, have significance levels of .50 of the indicated value. Thus, a correlation of $\pm .25$ is significant at the .025 level, using a one-tailed test.

The whole problem of significance in this study might be approached by imagining two hats, each with numbers running from 1 to 65. One hat might be seen as "representing" the predictors, and the other the items. If we were to draw numbers from one of the hats, one at a time, and place them *in the order* they came out of the hat, and then do the same for the other hat, we would expect the two orders to correlate as high as $\pm .25$ only 5% of the time, and $\pm .32$ only 1% of the time.

33. This table also allows us to see how much better a predictor does than chance expectations, if purely random responses to the items are assumed. Thus, if 65 delegates randomly responded to 100 items, we would expect that any random order of numbers, running from 1 to 65, would correlate at the $\pm .25$ level 5% of the time with such items. Any predictor with an index exceeding .05, then, exceeds chance expectations at the .05 level.

34. An additional possibility is to run in multiple regression analysis of independent factors against each of the dependent factors taken individually. This analysis would produce statements such as, "The higher a respondent's home state is on the Development factor and the Authoritarianism factor, but the lower it is on the Density factor, the higher the respondent tends to score on questionnaire Factor I." The advantage of this technique is to increase the size of the correlations and, therefore, the accuracy of the predictions, by considering numerous independent variables, but the disadvantage is the problem of assessing the overall importance of the predictors because the weights assigned to the predictors may vary, and probably will vary, from dependent variable to dependent variable (also verified).

See the following for a discussion of the canonical technique: Harold Hotelling, "Relations Between Two Sets of Variates", *Biometrika* Vol. 28 (1936), pp. 321-377; Harold Hotelling, "The Most Predictable Criterion" *Journal of Educational Psychology* Vol. 26 (1953) pp. 139-142; T.W. Anderson, *An Introduction to Multivariate Statistical Analysis* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958), Chapter 12; M.S. Bartlett, "The Statistical Significance of Canonical Correlations", *Biometrika* Vol. 32 (1941), pp. 29-38; Paul Horst, *Generalized Canonical Correlations and Their Applications to Experimental Data* (Seattle, University of Washington, 1961, mimeographed); Paul Horst, "Relations Among m Sets of Measures", *Psychometrika* Volume 26 (1961) pp. 129-149; M.G. Kendall, *A Course in Multivariate Analysis* (London: Charles Griffin & Co. 1957), Chapter 5; G. Thompson, "The Maximum Correlation of Two Weighted Batteries", *The British Journal of Psychology: Statistical Section Part I*, (1947), pp. 27-34; and Clyde, Cramer and Sharin, *op. cit.* pp. 4-8.

35. It might be objected at this point that names should be given to the resulting factor dimensions. In this connection, Alker and Russett have argued, "Factors are not born with names, but must be christened by their parents who may not be able to agree on what they should be called." (Alker and Russett, 1965, p. 36). In fact, factor names may fall short of describing all of the variables loading most heavily on the factor. A list of the heaviest loadings, then, makes it clear which are the important tests involved in producing the factor scores. Because the factor analysis in the case of the dependent variables has been used primarily to produce a set of orthogonal variables and not to search for "underlying" variables, the task of assigning appropriate names to each of the dimensions will not be attempted. For our purposes, then, a label such as Factor I is just as meaningful as a label such as "realistic idealist." To borrow from Shakespeare: "A factor with any other name would load as sweet." In the case of the independent variables, where names were more obvious, they were "christened". See

Vincent, *Factor Analysis in International Relations*, *op. cit.* for a discussion of the distinction between using factor analysis as a "search for causes" and its "data reduction" usage, as applied above.

36. Additional canonical correlations can be generated. This is usually with the restriction that the "new" canonical variate scores must not relate to the same variance test that has been explained by the previously generated canonical variate scores (on the same "side"). Thus if X^1 is the first set of canonical variate scores, X^2 , the second set, must be orthogonal to X^1 , and X^3 must be orthogonal to X^1 and X^2 , and so forth. The same holds, of course, of Y relative to Y^2 , etc. Canonical correlations can be extracted as long as there is variance in common between the two sets of variables. In the present study, all subsequent canonical correlations were significant at less than the .15 level, and thus are not presented, although, in some cases, one might want to examine all of those produced from a purely descriptive viewpoint.

37. See, in addition to the studies already mentioned, Jack E. Vincent, "The Convergence of Voting and Attitude Patterns at the United Nations", *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 31 (1969) pp. 952-983; Jack E. Vincent, "An Analysis of Caucusing Group Activity at the United Nations" *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 2 (1970) pp. 133-150; Jack E. Vincent, "An Analysis of Attitude Patterns at the United Nations", *Quarterly Journal of the Florida Academy of Sciences* Vol. 32 (1969) pp. 185-209; and Jack E. Vincent, "Predicting Voting Patterns in the General Assembly", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 65 (1971), pp. 471-498.

38. See Vincent, "The Convergence of Voting and Attitude Patterns..." *op. cit.*, "Predicting Voting Patterns in the General Assembly" *op. cit.*; and Jack E. Vincent, "An Examination of Voting Patterns in the 23rd and 24th Sessions of the General Assembly" *Research Report No. 54, Dimensionality of Nations project*, University of Hawaii, 1971.

39. For a full treatment, see the various "Dimensionality of Nations" *Research Reports*, in particular, R.J. Rummel, "The DON Project, A Five Year Research Program" *Research Report no. 9*, Dimensionality of Nations Project, University of Hawaii, 1967; R.J. Rummel, "Field Theory and Indicators of International Behaviour," *Research Report No. 29*, Dimensionality of Nations Project, University of Hawaii, 1969; David W. McCormick, "A Field Theory of Dynamic International Process", *Research Report No. 30*, Dimensionality of Nations Project, University of Hawaii, 1969; R.J. Rummel, "Field and Attribute Theories of National Behaviour: Some Mathematical Interrelationships", *Research Report No. 31*, Dimensionality of Nations Project, University of Hawaii, 1969; Tong-Whan Park, "Asian Conflict in Systematic Perspective: Application of Field Theory (1955 and 1963)", *Research Report No. 35*, Dimensionality of Nations Project, University of Hawaii, 1970; R.J. Rummel, "U.S. Foreign Relations: Conflict, Co-operation and Attribute Distances", *Research Report No. 41*, Dimensionality of Nations Project, University of Hawaii, 1970; Richard Van Atta and R.J. Rummel, "Testing Field Theory on the 1963 Behaviour Space of Nations", *Research Report No. 43*, Dimensionality of Nations Project, University of Hawaii, 1970; R.J. Rummel, "Field Theory and the 1963 Behaviour Space of Nations", *Research Report No. 44*, Dimensionality of Nations Project, University of Hawaii, 1970; Tong-Whan Park, "Measuring Dynamic Patterns of Development: The Case of Asia 1949-1968", *Research Report No. 45*, Dimensionality of Nations Project, University of Hawaii, 1970; R.J. Rummel, "Indicators of Cross National and International Patterns", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 63 (1969), pp. 127-147; R.J. Rummel, "International Pattern and Nation Profile Delineation", in Davis B. Bobrow and Judah L. Schwartz, *Computers and the Policy-Making Community* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), pp. 154-202; and R.J. Rummel, "Some Attributes and Behavioural Patterns of Nations", *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 2 (1967), pp. 196-206.

40. R.J. Rummel, "The DON Project, A Five-Year Research Program", *op. cit.*, p. 35

41. Rummel, "Field and Attribute Theory of National Behaviour ..."
op. cit., p. 6.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 15.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 7
44. *Ibid.*, p. 22.
45. That is, without an error term.
46. Rummel, "Field Theory and Indicators of International Behaviour",
op. cit., p.10.
47. The above argument, of course, could be used to attack any study which attempts falsification of the primary notion expressed by the equation, that is, that all of the variation of B-space can be accounted for by variation in A-space.
48. This is assuming that agreement can be generated on what constitutes a "test". The "basis problem"--when do we have a basis of A-space?--seems very difficult to answer. As pointed out above, any study that does "poorly", in the sense that all of the variations in the basis of B-space are not accounted for in the variation of A-space may be the result of an "inadequate" basis for A-space. In this connection, factor analysis, as presently employed, only gives an approximation of a basis for either space because of the decision to use the 1.0 eigenvalue cut-off. The factor dimension then, cannot reproduce any variable in the analysis with a communality of less than 1.0 (almost all variables will have a communality of less than 1.0 using the 1.0 eigenvalue decision). In view of this, it would be technically more correct, in the Social Field Theory and Attribute Literature, to speak of a quasi-basis or basis approximation in actual applications. In connection with this point, see Vincent, *Factor Analysis in International Relations*, *op. cit.*
49. If similar findings to the above continue, that is, the

discovery that a subspace of B-space is well accounted for by a subspace of A-space, but that substantial portions of A-space are unrelated to B-space, it may be that a reformulation of Attribute or Social Field Theories, along these lines, may be in order. Under this reformulation, we would not expect all of the variation in the basis of B-space to be accounted for by variation in the basis of A-space, but only a portion thereof. The focus would then be on the kinds of behaviour (i.e., trade, etc.) that is related (using perhaps, a deterministic model) to kinds of attributes or distances (Development, U.S.A. Relations, etc.). That is, in this latter formulation, Attribute and Social Field Theories would become partial theories, as opposed to general theories, of international behaviour. In this connection, I have already pointed out that Social Field Theory may already be "partial" because of its focus on dyadic relations. In the new formulation, if it is made, it would become partial to a *kind* of dyadic relation. Under the version of Attribute Theory, discussed above, it would also become "partial," relating to certain kinds of behaviour, whether viewed as dyadic or not.

Part 1, Section 2

DELEGATE ORIENTATIONS TOWARD THE UNITED NATIONS:

A TEN-YEAR PERSPECTIVE ¹

INTRODUCTION

The problem of identifying and accounting for U.N. delegate attitudes toward the United Nations has been a research concern for approximately 12 years.² Much time and various statistical applications have been applied to the following kinds of questions: How do delegates view the basic organs and procedures of the United Nations and additional structures, such as caucusing groups? What implications do the observed attitudes have for U.N. institutional growth and change and for theory building?³

Of the various studies relative to these questions so far undertaken, none were really approached with the idea of cross-time comparisons. That is, other objectives and a time-slice perspective have dominated the research designs. Nevertheless, certain research concerns have persisted across time, and the techniques that have been employed do make it possible to make timewise comparisons in some important areas.

The purpose of this paper is to determine what shifts, if any, have occurred in delegate perceptions of the U.N. across time and to discuss, in terms of the findings, possible implications. Because the questionnaire items that are comparable differ from sample to sample, several kinds of comparisons will be made.⁴ These are: a comparison of 1961 vs. 1965 attitudes toward organs (N's = 58, 57 respectively, 19 variables), a comparison between 1965 vs. 1970 attitudes toward organs (N's = 57, 10 variables), a comparison between 1961 vs. 1970 attitudes toward organs (N's = 58, 57 respectively, 10 variables), a comparison of 1961 vs. 1965 vs. 1970 attitudes toward organs (N's = 58, 57, 57 respectively, 8

variables) and a comparison of 1961 vs. 1968 attitudes toward caucusing group functions (N's = 55, 114 respectively, 5 variables).

First, an analysis⁵(means and discriminant functions) of the differences will be briefly presented. Then, a number of hypotheses which might account for the observed differences will be explored.

FINDINGS (1961 vs. 1965 attitudes toward organs)

The 1961 vs. 1965 data embraces the largest group of comparable variables, and the item pool allowed the delegates to evaluate the major organs in respect to general satisfaction, relative strength, voting procedures, and shifting importance, both present and future. Table I gives the means, organs concerned, and answer category code for each of the items. Organs are underlined when the mean differences are significant.

TABLE I

MEAN ATTITUDE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN 1961 & 1965 (ORGANS)

G Means

1961	1965	
2.8208	2.2281	1. Security Council, general performance, 1 = highly satisfied, 2 = fairly satisfied 3 = somewhat dissatisfied, 4 = highly dissatisfied
2.1756	1.6842	2. General Assembly
1.9632	1.5351	3. Economic and Social Council
2.0005	1.4825	4. Secretariat
1.7368	1.3333	5. Security Council, strength, 1 = weaker than it should be, 2 = as strong as it should be, 3 = stronger than it should be
2.0580	1.2807	6. General Assembly
1.8723	1.2982	7. Economic and Social Council

TABLE I (cont.)

Means		
1961	1965	
1.8722	1.9787	8. Secretariat
2.6040	2.4035	9. Security Council, voting, 1 = highly satisfied, 2 = fairly satisfied, 3 = somewhat dissatisfied, 4 = highly dissatisfied
1.8584	1.4737	10. General Assembly
1.8463	1.5439	11. Economic and Social Council
2.0906	1.6667	12. Security Council, present importance, 1 = increasing, 2 = remain the same, 3 = decreasing
1.1579	1.4561	13. General Assembly
1.4143	1.8596	14. Economic and Social Council
2.4724	1.5439	15. Secretariat
1.8526	1.2281	16. Security Council, future importance, 1 = more important, 2 = remain the same, 3 = less important
1.2489	1.5263	17. General Assembly
1.2884	1.6842	18. Economic and Security Council
1.6112	1.2982	19. Secretariat

Examining the general performance items first, it can be seen that a statistically significant shift has occurred in the direction of higher satisfaction for all organs treated. The means for the General Assembly, Economic and Security Council and Secretariat in 1961 were all very close to "2" or to the "fairly satisfied" category, whereas, in 1965, the means tend to fall between "fairly satisfied" and "Highly satisfied" with the largest shifts occurring for the Economic and Social Council and the Secretariat. The mean for the Security Council, on the other hand, in 1961, was closest to the "somewhat dissatisfied" category, but moved by 1965 quite close to the "fairly satisfied" category. Assuming the validity of the analysis, then, it can be concluded that between 1961 and 1965 a satisfaction shift occurred for the above organs in a "positive direction"⁶, that is, toward higher satisfaction. Concerning

the items which evaluate the strength of the organs, in 1961, most means were very close to the category of "as strong as it should be". In 1965, however, in all cases the means had shifted in the direction of "weaker than it should be". At first, given the above findings about general performance, this may appear puzzling. That is, why should the delegates shift in the direction of higher satisfaction at the same time they shift toward the "weaker than it should be" in respect to strength evaluation? It is possible, although there is no way of testing this possibility for the present data, that the satisfaction shift is causal in respect to the shift toward "weaker than it should be". That is, as delegates increase their satisfaction with the organs, they express the wish that they could do even more, and this is indicated by their choosing more frequently, than at a previous lower level of satisfaction, the "weaker than it should be" category.

Concerning voting, in 1961 the response for the Security Council was closest to the "somewhat dissatisfied" category, and for the General Assembly and Economic and Social Council closest to the "fairly satisfied" category. In all cases, there has been a shift in a positive direction, that is, toward higher satisfaction, although, in the case of the Security Council, the shift was not significant.

Regarding the present importance category, in 1961 the mean response for the Security Council was closest to the "remaining the same" category, while for the Secretariat, it stood between the "remaining the same" category and the "decreasing" category. In 1965 both had significantly shifted toward the "increasing" category. In contrast, the General Assembly and Economic and Social Council in 1961 were both close to the "increasing" category, but in 1965 had shifted toward the "remaining the same" category. Thus, the general positive shift, which occurred between 1961 and 1965, and which holds for all categories of analysis and organs thus far discussed, exempts the General Assembly

and Economic and Social Council in respect to the category of present importance.

Regarding future importance, in 1961 the mean evaluation for the Security Council and Secretariat was closest to the "remaining the same" category. In 1965, however, for both of these organs, the means were closest to the "more important" category. In contrast, the General Assembly and Economic and Social Council means were closest to "more important" in 1961 but closest to "remaining the same" in 1965. Thus, again, these two organs were exempted from the general positive shift in respect to this category which occurred between the two years.

If a discriminate function analysis is computed between the two years, the resulting discriminate function scores predict the variables as follows: General Performance--Security Council (.40), General Assembly (.36), Economic and Social Council (.36), Secretariat (.45); Strength--Security Council (.32), General Assembly (.60), Economic and Social Council (.49), Secretariat (.63); Voting--Security Council (.11), General Assembly (.29), Economic and Social Council (.22), Present Importance--Security Council (.29), General Assembly (-.26), Economic and Social Council (-.32), Secretariat (.59); Future Importance--Security Council (.49), General Assembly (-.22), Economic and Social Council (-.30) and Secretariat (.28).

Those with the highest discriminate function scores (mostly 1961 subjects, on the average) then, tend to be more dissatisfied with the general performance of the Security Council, more dissatisfied with the general performance of the General Assembly, etc. The squares of these correlations show the proportion of variance in common between the discriminate function scores and the variables. Thus, the greatest variance in common occurs between Secretariat strength and the discriminate function scores.

The average discriminate function score of those classified as 1961 subjects is 2.49, while the average of those classified as 1965 is 1.07. There is less than one chance out of ten thousand that this difference could have occurred by chance.

The discriminate function analysis, then, reinforces the previous conclusion of a "positive shift" between 1961 and 1965, excepting the General Assembly and Economic and Social Council, in respect to the categories of present and future importance. In addition, the likelihood that the positive shift can be accounted for by chance variation is extremely small.

FINDINGS (1961 vs. 1970 attitudes toward organs)

The following table shows the differences in means between 1961 and 1970:

TABLE II

MEAN ATTITUDE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN 1961 & 1970 (ORGANS)

G Means		
1961	1970	
2.8208	2.8226	1. Security Council, general performance, 1 = highly satisfied, 2 = fairly satisfied 3 = somewhat dissatisfied, 4 = highly dissatisfied
2.1756	2.3022	2. General Assembly
1.9632	2.0690	3. Economic and Social Council
2.1215	2.1322	4. Trusteeship Council
2.0005	1.8776	5. Secretariat
1.7368	1.4035	6. Security Council, strength, 1 = weaker than it should be, 2 = as strong as it should be, 3 = stronger than it should be
2.0580	1.3333	7. General Assembly
1.8723	1.2105	8. Economic and Social Council
1.9030	1.8947	9. Trusteeship Council
1.9787	1.6667	10. Secretariat

In respect to general performance, there is no significant difference between the two years for any of the organs. All organs are closest to the "fairly satisfied" category in both years, with the exception of the Security Council, which is closest to the "somewhat dissatisfied" category.

Concerning strength items, all 1970 evaluations are significantly different from the 1961 evaluations, with the exception of Trusteeship Council. The shift in all cases is in the direction of "weaker than it should be" and away from "as strong as it should be". Thus, there was a "positive shift" between 1961 and 1970, but only in the category of strength and for the organs indicated.

If a discriminate function analysis is performed between the two years, the item correlations with the discriminate function scores are as follows: General Performance--Security Council (-.00), General Assembly (-.17), Economic and Social Council (-.16), Trusteeship Council (-.01), Secretariat (.16); Strength--Security Council (.35), General Assembly (.78), Economic and Social Council (.81), Trusteeship Council (.00), and Secretariat (.34).

Thus, the category of strength, for the Economic and Social Council, reveals the most shared variance with the discriminate function scores.

The 1961 subjects' mean on the discriminate function scores is 1.46, while the mean for 1970 is .62. We predict, therefore, that 1961 subjects will have the highest scale scores (indicating more negative responses) on the highest positively correlating items (such as strength for the Economic and Social Council). The likelihood that chance could have produced such mean differences in the discriminate function scores between the years is less than one out of ten thousand.

FINDINGS (1965 vs. 1970 attitudes toward organs)

TABLE III

MEAN ATTITUDE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN 1965 & 1970 (ORGANS)

G Means

1965	1970	
2.2281	2.8226	1. Security Council, General Performance, 1 = highly satisfied, 2 = fairly satisfied, 3 = somewhat dissatisfied, 4 = highly dissatisfied
1.6842	2.3022	2. General Assembly
1.5351	2.0690	3. Economic and Social Council
1.4825	1.8776	4. Secretariat
1.5614	2.7259	5. International Court of Justice
1.3333	1.4035	6. Security Council, strength, 1 = weaker than it should be, 2 = as strong as it should be, 3 = stronger than it should be
1.2807	1.3333	7. General Assembly
1.2982	1.2105	8. Economic and Security Council
1.2982	1.6667	9. Secretariat
1.2632	1.3860	10. International Court of Justice

In 1965, the Security Council was located closest to "fairly satisfied", in terms of the delegates' mean response, but it shifted closest to "somewhat dissatisfied" in 1970, in respect to the general performance category. For the other organs, the shift was from a mean location between "highly satisfied" and "fairly satisfied" to fairly close to "fairly satisfied" with the exception of the International Court of Justice, which shifted closest to "somewhat dissatisfied".

A negative shift, then, is evident for this category of evaluation.

Only one significant shift occurred in respect to the strength items, with the mean evaluation of the Secretariat shifting away from "weaker than it should be" toward "as strong as it should be". All other organ means continued to be closest to "weaker than it should be".

A discriminate function analysis revealed the following correlations: General Performance--Security Council (.45), General Assembly (.59), Economic and Social Council (.50), Secretariat (.40), International Court of Justice (.89); Strength--Security Council (.06), General Assembly (.05), Economic and Social Council (-.10), Secretariat (.32) and International Court of Justice (.12).

The discriminate function scores averaged 1.7 for 1965 and 3.03 (indicating more negative responses) for 1970 and this difference could have occurred by chance less than one time out of ten thousand.

The 1965-1970 shift, then, was in the direction of negativism, in respect to general performance, for all organs, and, in respect to strength, for the Secretariat.

FINDINGS (1961 vs. 1965 vs. 1970 attitudes toward organs)

The analytic results are given in Table IV.

Concerning the category of general performance, the evaluative mean of all organs has shifted toward "satisfaction" from 1961 to 1965 and toward "less satisfaction" from 1965 to 1970. This, of course, could have been anticipated from our previous results.

Concerning strength evaluations, all organs with the exception of the Economic and Social Council have shifted toward the "weaker than it should be" category from 1961 to 1965, back toward the "as strong as it should be" category from 1965 to 1970. In the case of the Economic and Social Council, the

shift has steadily been in the direction of the "weaker than it should be" category.

TABLE IV

MEAN ATTITUDE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN 1961, 1965 & 1970 (ORGANS)

G Means			
1961	1965	1970	
2.8208	2.2281	2.8226	1. Security Council, general performance, 1 = highly satisfied
			2 = fairly satisfied, 3 = somewhat dissatisfied, 4 = highly dissatisfied
2.1756	1.6842	2.3022	2. General Assembly
1.9632	1.5351	2.0690	3. Economic and Social Council
2.0005	1.4825	1.8776	4. Secretariat
1.7363	1.3333	1.4035	5. Security Council, strength,
			1 = weaker than it should be,
			2 = as strong as it should be,
			3 = stronger than it should be
2.0580	1.2807	1.3333	6. General Assembly
1.8723	1.2982	1.2105	7. Economic and Social Council
1.9787	1.2982	1.6667	8. Secretariat

A discriminate function analysis reveals the following correlations with the discriminate function scores: General Performance--Security Council (.50), General Assembly (.46), Economic and Social Council (.43), Secretariat (.55); Strength Security Council (.40), General Assembly (.76), Economic and Social Council (.65) and Secretariat (.65). The 1961 subjects have a discriminate function mean of 5.20; the 1965, a mean of 3.69; and the 1970, a mean of 4.36. Thus, the 1961 responses are most negative, the 1965 responses the most positive, and the 1970 responses fall in between. These differences are likely due to chance less than one time out of ten thousand.

A second set of discriminate function scores⁷, orthogonal to the first, generates the following correlations: General

Performance--Security Council (.41), General Assembly (.57), Economic and Social Council (.52), Secretariat (.25); Strength--Security Council (-.15), General Assembly (-.39), Economic and Social Council (-.53), and Secretariat (.09). The groups in this case are given the following average discriminate function scores: 1961, .86; 1965, .80; and 1970, 1.50.⁸

Because the discriminate function scores are orthogonal, the variance extracted by them in the items is unique. It is, therefore, permissible to sum the squares of the above correlations to determine the total variance extracted by the two sets. Thus, for example, the item pertaining to General Assembly strength has 72.97 per cent of its variance extracted by these two sets of discriminate function scores ($.76^2 + .39^2 = 72.97$).

FINDINGS (1961 vs. 1968 Caucusing group items)

It is possible to compare 1961 and 1968 caucusing group data in respect to five items. The results are given in Table V.

TABLE V

MEAN ATTITUDE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN 1961 & 1968 (CAUCUSING GROUPS)

G Means		
1961	1968	
2.1710	2.2195	1. Caucusing Group Meeting Impact Upon Government's Instructions, 1 = Considerable, 2 = Some, 3 = Hardly Any, 4 = None
2.7772	2.7027	2. Decisions in caucusing group meetings should be binding upon member delegates, 1 = highly desirable, 2 = desirable, 3 = undesirable, 4 = highly undesirable

TABLE V (cont.)

1961	1968	
2.5195	2.6696	3. Caucusing group will have more impact in the future on government policy, 1 = highly probable, 2 = probable, 3 = improbable, 4 = highly improbable
2.5082	2.3577	4. Caucusing group will tend to vote more as a unit in the future, 1 = highly probable, 2 = probable, 3 = improbable, 4 = highly improbable
2.1783	1.7724	5. Caucusing groups have helped the United Nations, 1 = highly probable, 2 = probable, 3 = improbable, 4 = highly improbable

In 1961 and 1968, in response to a question concerning the group meeting's impact upon national government's instructions, the mean response was close to "some"; in response to the question of whether the group meetings should be binding upon member delegates, the means were closest to "undesirable"; in response to the question of future impact on government policy, the means tended to split the difference between "probable" and "improbable"; and in response to the question of whether the groups are likely to vote more as a group in the future, the means fell between "probable" and "improbable". None of these means were significantly different. Only on the question of whether the caucusing groups have helped the United Nations do we find a significant shift. In 1961, the mean was closest to "probable" whereas in 1968, although still close to "probable" the mean had shifted in the direction of "highly probable", which can be considered a positive shift.

A discriminate function analysis shows item correlations of $+.07$, $.11$, $-.28$, $.25$, and $.84$ (items 1-5 respectively) with the discriminate function scores. The

mean discriminate function score for 1961 was 1.01 and for 1968, .58, indicating 1961 was more negative. As would be anticipated, the main discriminating item is the fifth one, concerning whether the caucusing groups have helped the United Nations and this item shares 69.46 per cent of its variance with the discriminate function scores.⁹

HYPOTHESES TO BE EXPLORED

The above results suggest that in many important areas delegates shifted in a positive direction in respect to their orientations in 1961 to 1965, but then shifted, in some areas, in a negative direction from 1965 to 1970. Six hypotheses, at least, can be generated from these findings. Each will be discussed in turn.

The first will be called the "Sample Function Hypothesis". This refers to the possibility that the characteristics of the samples between the time periods account for the observed differences. For example, on the average, the 1961 and 1970 sample might contain more delegates from developed states than in the case of the 1965 sample. Because it has been demonstrated that delegates from developed states tend to have more negative attitudes toward the United Nations than delegates from underdeveloped states¹⁰, the apparent shift in attitudes, then, could be explained by differences between the samples. To test this kind of hypothesis, each sample was located on the first four factor dimensions of a factor analysis of 91 variables¹¹. That is, means were computed, using factor scores, of each sample on each dimension.

The first dimension was titled "Underdeveloped" and it accounts for 21.1 per cent of the variance in the original 91 variables. Its primary loaders were:¹² Very low newspaper circulation per 1,000 population (.96), Few radios per 1,000 population (.91), Large number of inhabitants per physician (.90), Large percentage illiterate in population age 15 and over (.87), Very low per capita gross national product (.87), Non-western (.86), Small percentage of primary and secondary

pupils as a percentage of population aged 5-19 (.85), Large number of inhabitants per hospital bed (.83), Traditional bureaucracy(.83), Few students enrolled in higher education per 100,00 population (.80), Large agricultural population (.78), Very low economic development status (.77), Asian region (.72), Low urbanization (.71), Large percentage of labour force employed in agriculture (.70), Not politically modern (.68), Considerable interest articulation by Non-associational groups (.67), Votes for self-determination (.65) Negligible interest articulation by associational groups (.65), Few Christians as a percent of total population (.61), Large percent of Moslems as a percent of population (.57), Very low international financial status (.55), Late date of independence (.53), Small Gross National Product (.52), Unstable government (.50).

The second factor was called "Democracy" and accounted for 14.9 per cent of the variance in the original 91 variables. Its primary loaders were: Effective constitutional limitations (.96), Current electoral system is competitive (.89), Current regime is representative (.86), Freedom of group oppositions (.86), Considerable horizontal power distribution (.85), Effective current legislature (.85), Weak executive (.83), Police not politically significant (.80), Free Press (.78), Considerable interest aggregation by legislature (.77), Limited interest articulation by institutional groups (.71), Non-elitist political leadership (.70), Military neutral in political affairs (.67), Non-communist (.61), Infrequent interest articulation by anomic groups (.52), Considerable interest articulation by associational groups (.50).

The third factor dimension was titled "U.S. Relations" and it accounted for 5.5 per cent of the variance of the original 91 variables. Its primary loaders were: Large Percentage Imports of total imports from U.S. A. (.82), Large percentage exports of total exports to U.S. (.77), Large imports from the United States (.65), Large exports to the United States (.61), Allied with the United States (.55).

The fourth factor was entitled "Smallness" and it accounted for 6.9 per cent of the variance of the original 91 variables. Its primary loaders were: Small population (.86), Small gross national product (.74), Small number of men under arms (.72), Very low international financial status (.68), Small area in square kilometers (.62), Small imports from U.S.S.R. (.57), Small exports to U.S.S.R. (.55).

To answer the question of whether the samples are different in respect to their attributes, a discriminate function analysis was employed, comparing 1961 vs. 1965, 1961 vs. 1970, and 1965 vs. 1970 samples in respect to the above four factor dimensions¹³. The exact probabilities that the mean differences on the dimensions between the years could be due to chance were .21 in the first case, .50 in the second, and .91 in the third. Thus, these factor dimensions *cannot* discriminate between these samples at the .05 level or less. In addition, none of the F ratios were significant at the .05 level.

Considering the results of the analysis, then, the sample function hypothesis must be rejected. One cannot account for the differences which occurred between 1961 and 1965, and 1965 and 1970, on the basis of sampling characteristics, at least in respect to these dimensions. (It might be pointed out, in this connection, that these four factor dimensions account for almost 50 per cent of the variance in the original 91 variables considered).¹⁴

The second hypothesis is the "Scaling Function Hypothesis" or the notion that the observed differences are the result of changes in questionnaire format. Earlier it was pointed out that the 1965 21-point scale was converted into four and three-point scales for the purposes of comparison. Is it possible that the delegates reacted differently to the two scale formats, and this accounts for the apparent shift in attitudinal orientations? To approach this question, all of the above discriminate function runs were re-done using purely

dichotomous categories. For example, the "highly satisfied" and "fairly satisfied" categories were converted to "satisfied" and the "somewhat dissatisfied" and "highly dissatisfied" categories were converted to "dissatisfied". Thus, all gradations of satisfaction or dissatisfaction were discounted in the new analyses.

It was found that all discriminate function analyses remained significant and the probability of the observed differences arising in all cases were less than one in ten thousand. Focussing on correlations of $\pm .60$ or above, *the important discriminating items were identical in all cases with the previous analyses.*¹⁵

It seems reasonable, therefore, to reject the scaling function hypothesis. That is, the discriminate function analyses remain significant and the primary discriminating items identical. In respect to the individual F-tests (see footnote 15) although some differences do emerge, the shifts, for the most part, are in the predicted direction and the failure to achieve significance on the items in question seems to be a function of the small N in the "Dissatisfied" category, when the questionnaire information in respect to satisfaction is dichotomized.

Another scaling modification problem was also analyzed. In 1965, on three-part questions, delegates were asked to mark a zero-point on an answer line if an organ was neither increasing nor decreasing in importance, etc. In 1961 and 1970, however, they were asked to pick the nominal categories, such as "remaining the same", to represent the middle position. The question then arises as to whether significant differences still emerge if such answer response categories are eliminated from the analysis. In this case an F-test, with a missing data option, was employed, and all those picking the middle category in 1961 and 1970 and those picking the zero-point in 1965 were eliminated. The tests agreed perfectly with previous F-tests for the 1961 vs. 1965, 1961 vs. 1970 and 1965 vs. 1970

runs, with only two exceptions.¹⁶

The third hypothesis is the "Particular Shift Hypothesis". It accepts the reality of the above reported shifts, but then attempts to account for them in terms of attributes. That is, it argues that not all delegates are shifting, but only a fraction thereof, and that these belong to some categorical type. For example, considering the general performance of the Security Council, it may be found that underdeveloped states have made a positive shift between 1961 and 1965, while developed states have not. The underdeveloped shift, then, would account for the differences in the means (for this attribute category) between the two time periods.

The fourth hypothesis is the "General Shift Hypothesis". Conclusions in this regard will be derived directly from the above analysis. If, in the cases of significant shifts, both the developed and the underdeveloped, or the undemocratic and democratic, etc., are significantly shifting in the same direction, this lends support to the notion that the shifts are not related to the attributes of the responders' states. This would suggest, then, that some kind of stimuli, internal or external, has acted upon the delegates between 1961 and 1965, and 1965 and 1970. Should results support this hypothesis, additional reasoning becomes speculative. That is, numerous events have occurred relevant to the United Nations between 1961 and 1965, and 1965 and 1970, that might be viewed as causative. For example, the progress between 1961 and 1965 in respect to the Congo crisis might account for the positive shift, and frustration over Vietnam between 1965 and 1970 for the negative shift. In any case, it should be understood that this research encourages such speculations, but hardly resolves them in terms of the limitations of the present design. That is, it is the intention of this research to pin down the shifts that have occurred, while admitting the extreme difficulty of explaining exactly why they have occurred.

The fifth hypothesis is the "No General Shift, Attribute Shift Hypothesis". Previously we have concentrated

upon organs and categories where mean shifts have occurred between various years. In this case, we focus upon categories and organs where no significant mean shifts have occurred. We ask the question, "Even though the means between two years for a particular organ under a particular category may be insignificantly different, is it possible that shifting has occurred which is related to attributes?" For example, underdeveloped states may make a positive shift, while developed states may make a negative shift, and although the net result is not a significant difference in respect to the means, nevertheless, important shifting has occurred. It is also possible that, although the total mean has not significantly shifted, the mean of a sub-category, such as underdeveloped, has significantly shifted, although not enough to pull the total mean (that is the mean of both developed and underdeveloped) far enough to produce a significant shift.

The sixth hypothesis is called the "No General Shift, Stable Attribute Hypotheses". This is a residual category generated from the above analysis. If none of the sub-categories of the attributes (such as developed) have shifted, in a situation of "no shift" between total means, this hypothesis will be considered confirmed.

Table VI simultaneously tests the above hypotheses.

Table VI may be interpreted as follows: Each cell in the matrix indicates what has happened between two time periods in respect to both shifting and attributes. For example, the first cell compares 1961 with 1965 for the Security Council in respect to the category of general performance and indicates that there was a positive shift between the two years, but that the developed states were exempted from this shift. That is, the underdeveloped states evidenced a positive shift but the developed states did not. In addition, all of the other attribute categories, such as Democratic, Non-Democratic, evidenced a positive shift. Had the developed also evidenced a positive shift,

Table 6 Shift Patterns over Time

	GENERAL PERFORMANCE			
	1961, 1965	1961, 1970	1965, 1970	1961, 1965
Security Council	Hypothesis 3 Positive Shift Exempt Developed (NS) Democratic (NS)	Hypothesis 6 NS General	Hypothesis 3 Negative Shift Exempt Developed (NS) Democratic (NS)	Hypothesis 3 Positive Shift Exempt Close U.S. (NS) Big (NS)
General Assembly	Hypothesis 3 Positive Shift Exempt Far U.S. (NS)	Hypothesis 5 NS Exempt Non-Democratic (negative) Small (negative)	Hypothesis 4 Negative Shift General	Hypothesis 4 Positive Shift General
Economic and Social Council	Hypothesis 3 Positive Shift Exempt Far U.S. (NS)	Hypothesis 5 NS Exempt Small (negative)	Hypothesis 3 Negative Shift Exempt Far U.S. (NS)	Hypothesis 4 Positive Shift General
Trusteeship Council	X	Hypothesis 6 NS General	X	X
International Court of Justice	X	X	Hypothesis 4 Negative Shift General	X
Secretariat	Hypothesis 4 Positive Shift General	Hypothesis 5 NS Exempt Close U.S. (positive)	Hypothesis 3 Negative Shift Exempt Non-Democratic (NS) Close U.S. (NS)	Hypothesis 4 Positive Shift General

NS = No Shift

Hypothesis 3 - "Particular Shift Hypothesis"
Hypothesis 4 - "General Shift Hypothesis"

Table 6 Shift Patterns over Time

STRENGTH 1961, 1970		VOTING 1961, 1965	PRESENT IMPORTANCE 1961, 1965	FUTURE IMPORTANCE 1961, 1965
Hypothesis 3 Positive Shift Exempt Developed (NS) Democratic (NS) Close U.S. (NS) Big (NS)	Hypothesis 6 NS General	Hypothesis 6 NS General	Hypothesis 3 Positive Shift Exempt Underdeveloped (NS) Non-Democratic (NS) Small (NS)	Hypothesis 4 Positive Shift General
Hypothesis 4 Positive Shift General	Hypothesis 6 NS General	Hypothesis 3 Positive Shift Exempt Non-Democratic (NS) Far U.S. (NS) Small (NS)	Hypothesis 3 Negative Shift Exempt Underdeveloped (NS) Non-Democratic (NS) Close U.S. (NS) Small (NS)	Hypothesis 3 Negative Shift Exempt Underdeveloped (NS) Non-Democratic (NS) Close U.S. (NS) Small (NS)
Hypothesis 4 Positive Shift General	Hypothesis 6 NS General	Hypothesis 3 Positive Shift Exempt Underdeveloped (NS) Non-Democratic (NS) Small (NS)	Hypothesis 3 Negative Shift Exempt Underdeveloped (NS) Non-Democratic (NS) Close U.S. (NS)	Hypothesis 3 Negative Shift Exempt Underdeveloped (NS)
Hypothesis 5 NS Exempt Underdeveloped (positive) Developed (negative)	X	X	X	X
X	X	X	X	X
Hypothesis 3 Positive Shift Exempt Developed (NS) Non-Democratic (NS) Far U.S. (NS) Big (NS)	Hypothesis 3 Negative Shift Exempt Developed (NS) Close U.S. (NS)	X	Hypothesis 4 Positive Shift General	Hypotheses 3 Positive Shift Exempt Developed (NS) Far U.S. (NS) Small (NS)

Hypothesis 3 - "No General Shift, Attribute Shift Hypothesis"

Hypothesis 6 - "No General Shift, Stable Attribute Hypothesis"

this cell would have contained the word "general" indicating that all categories had made the positive shift. Exempt, then, refers to the category or categories which did not shift. Because the shift was not general, hypothesis 3 is considered confirmed in this case and this is indicated.

Interpretation may be further illustrated by examination of the cell representing the General Assembly's general performance between the years 1961 and 1970. Our previous analysis has shown that there was no shift between the two years in respect to the total mean. When the sample is sub-divided into attribute categories, however, the non-democratic and the big states show a negative shift between the two years. Thus they are exempted from the characterization of "no shift". Although the entire mean did not shift significantly, these attribute sub-categories did, although their shift was not strong enough to cause a total mean negative shift. Had these two categories not shifted, the term "general" instead of "exempt" would have been found in this cell, indicating that the no-shift, stable attribute hypothesis had been confirmed. Because there were attribute shifts, however, hypothesis 5 is considered confirmed.

Out of the 37 cells in which the analysis was possible, 18 support hypothesis 3, or the Particular Shift Hypothesis, 10 support hypothesis 4, or the General Shift Hypothesis, 4 support hypothesis 5, or the No General Shift, Attribute Shift Hypothesis, and 6 support hypothesis 6, or the No General Shift, Stable Attribute Hypothesis. From a descriptive point of view, then, shifting, whether general or particular, is more prevalent than non-shifting, 28 occurrences to 10, and particular shifting is more frequent than general shifting, 18 occurrences to 10.

In this connection, however, a word of caution must be introduced in the interpretation. Although, in a number of cases, some attribute category, such as developed, did not achieve a significant shift, whereas the mean as a whole did significantly shift, in almost every case a non-significant shift in the appropriate direction occurred.

For example, considering the first cell in the matrix once again, the mean as a whole in this case shifted from 2.8 in 1961 to 2.2 in 1965. The underdeveloped shifted from 2.8 to 2.0 and there were only two chances out of ten thousand that their shift could have occurred by chance. In the case of the developed, they shifted in the appropriate direction, but not far enough, from 2.8 to 2.4, and the probability that this could have occurred by chance was 12 chances out of 100. This is not to imply that every case came as close as this one to our significance cut-off point. For example, considering the Secretariat, in respect to the future importance category, between 1961 and 1965, the developed shifted from 1.6 to 1.1, whereas the underdeveloped only shifted from 1.5 to 1.4. The exact probability in the first case was .002, and in the second, .56. For this attribute category, then, the vast bulk of the total mean shift from 1.6 to 1.2 can be attributed to a shift by the developed states. In short, the situation varies from organ to organ and category to category, although, as indicated above, simple inspection shows that the means (such as developed vs. underdeveloped) almost always shift in the same direction. It is just that an exempted category, such as underdeveloped, does not shift far enough to achieve significance. It should be apparent then, that in all cases where shifts have occurred and some attribute category is exempted, the corresponding matching category, such as developed in the case of the underdeveloped category, *must shift considerably* to pull the entire mean far enough to make a significant difference for the total mean. With these interpretations and qualifications in mind, we can now move to a discussion of the table.

DISCUSSION

The Security Council cells are basically dominated by the Particular Shift Hypothesis constituting 5 confirmations out of 9 cells. In the general performance

1961-1965 comparison, the shift was attribute-free in the positive direction, except for the developed, which, as already indicated, in our above illustration, did not shift far enough to achieve a significant shift. Looking at the 1965-70 entry, we see that the developed are again exempted from the negative shift. For this attribute category, it was the underdeveloped which pulled the mean first one way and then the other in terms of significance. The net result was that there was no significant shift between 1961 and 1970. Thus, the underdeveloped became more positive toward the Security Council in the mid-1960's, but then returned to their previous position, while the developed held to the same position, from a statistical point of view, through the entire period.

The same pattern is evident in the case of democratic states. Undemocratic states had to compensate for the lack of significant shift on the part of democratic states between 1961 and 1965, and then between 1965 and 1970. The mean was pulled primarily one way and then the other by the change in the attitude of the undemocratic states. Putting these two sets of findings together, we can say that the first shift that occurred in respect to the Security Council, over the decade, was primarily the result of a shift in the underdeveloped, undemocratic states, first one way, and then the other. To put it another way, developed and democratic states were more constant in their attitudes toward this organ over the time period examined than their counterparts in respect to general performance.

Moving to the category of strength evaluation, there was a positive shift between 1961 and 1965 in the sense of having a greater tendency to rate the organ "weaker than it should be" in 1965 than in 1961, with the exception of those with close U.S. relations and big states. More concretely, those with close U.S. relations only shifted 2/10ths of a scale point between 1961 and 1965, while those with far U.S. relations shifted 7/10ths of a point. Big states only shifted between

2 and 3/10ths, while small states shifted 5/10ths. For the other attribute categories, however, the degree of shift was roughly the same. For example, developed states shifted 4/10ths, while underdeveloped states shifted 5/10ths. When a comparison is made between 1961 and 1970, however, developed and democratic states are added to those exempted from the positive shift. The explanation is that although developed and democratic states made a positive shift between 1961 and 1965, along with underdeveloped and undemocratic states, when they were sampled in 1970 both had drifted back toward the 1961 levels by roughly 2/10ths of a point. Although this shift was not far enough to be a significant shift in respect to the 1965-70 analysis, where we have a "No General Shift, Stable Attribute" situation, it was just far enough, for these attribute categories, to eliminate the statistical distinction between the 1961 and the 1970 means.

In every attribute category, those opposite to those exempted had to make sizeable shifts to make the 1970 mean significantly different from the 1961 mean. The big positive shifters, then, between 1961 and 1970 were the underdeveloped, undemocratic, small states, with far U.S. relations. Conversely, of course, more stable in their opinion over the decade, were the developed, democratic, large states, with close U.S. relations.

In the category of voting, no significant shift was detected, either for the total mean, or any of the attribute categories between 1961 and 1965 and, hence, the "No General Shift, Stable Attribute Hypothesis" appears confirmed.

The "Particular Shift Hypothesis" is confirmed for the category of present importance between 1961 and 1965, with underdeveloped, nondemocratic, far U.S. relations states all lagging behind the positive shift evidenced by their counterparts. Thus, the developed, democratic,

large states, with close U.S. relations were more inclined than their counterparts to see the Security Council increasing in importance in 1965, compared to 1961, but less inclined to find it as "weaker than it should be" (from our previous findings). Those that were inclined to see it as increasing, then, were more inclined to see it as strong as it should be, whereas those more inclined to see it remaining the same were more inclined to see it "weaker than it should be" (the underdeveloped, undemocratic, etc. states).

In contrast, for the category of future importance, the positive shift between 1961 and 1965 was unrelated to attributes, and hypothesis 4 is confirmed.

Considering the General Assembly, in the category of general performance, it can be seen that the shift was positive for all categories except Far U.S. relations. States with close U.S. relations, therefore, had to shift considerably to compensate. In fact, states with far U.S. relations only shifted approximately 2/10ths of one point, while those with close U.S. relations shifted 6/10ths of a point. The negative shift in 1970, however, was general, going back even beyond the 1961 figure (2.3 in 1970, 2.2 in 1961). Even though the 1961 or 1970 figures are no longer significantly different, nevertheless, important shifting did occur, confirming hypothesis 5. Both non-democratic and small states became significantly more negative between the two dates, although not enough so as to effect the total means.

With respect to the strength category, the positive shift between 1961 and 1965 was general, with no attribute category holding back, and held through 1970, so that no significant difference occurs between 1965 and 1970. The General Assembly, then, stands in contrast to the Security Council, where various categories of attributes were exempted from a positive shift between 1961 and 1970, forcing their attribute counterparts to make large compensatory shifts in general performance evaluation.

Another contrast with the Security Council is apparent for the voting category, where hypothesis 6 is confirmed for the Security Council and hypothesis 3 for the General Assembly. In the case of the General Assembly, the democratic large states with close U.S. relations had to make large shifts to compensate for the exemption of their counterparts from the positive shift. It is a shame that data is not available for 1970, in respect to this category, to see if there was a reversion to the 1961 level by 1970.

Regarding present importance, the whole negative shift was resisted by the underdeveloped, non-democratic, close U.S. relations and smaller states, in the sense that their counterparts had to compensate in order to make the total negative shift significant. Exactly the same kind of pattern occurs in respect to future importance. Again, a contrast with the Security Council is evident. There was a positive shift in respect to both present importance and future importance for the Security Council with the underdeveloped, undemocratic, far U.S. relations and small states resisting. The shift for the General Assembly in both categories is negative, with the same classes of states resisting, with the exception of the close-far U.S. relations dichotomy. Close U.S. relations states resisted the negative shift in respect to the General Assembly, while far U.S. relations states resisted the positive shift in respect to the Security Council. To put it another way, those shifting most positively in respect to the Security Council and most negatively in respect to the General Assembly (the compensators) were the developed, democratic and bigger states, with far U.S. relations states resisting the Security Council present importance shift and close U.S. relations states resisting the General Assembly present and future importance shifts. These data suggest that, although the Security Council was generally being upgraded between 1961 and 1965 and the General Assembly downgraded, there was resistance to this in the attribute categories enumerated above.

The Economic and Social Council, like the General Assembly and Security Council, experienced a positive shift in respect to general performance between 1961 and 1965. Like the General Assembly, the one attribute category exemption was Far U.S. relations, which was also exempt from the negative shift between 1965 and 1970. Close U.S. relations states, then, were primarily responsible for moving the mean in a positive direction between 1961 and 1965, and in a negative direction between 1965 and 1970 in respect to this attribute category. Other attribute categories tended to swing together, first positive and then negative, except that when the 1961 session is compared with the 1970, small states are significantly more negative in the latter years than in the former.

Like the General Assembly, there was a general positive shift between 1961 and 1965 for strength evaluation, which held through 1970. Thus, there was no significant difference in this category between 1965 and 1970. The tendency to say that the General Assembly is "weaker than it should be", then, significantly shifted over the decade and this shift was unrelated to the attribute categories treated here.

The positive shift in respect to voting was resisted by the underdeveloped, non-democratic and small states, forcing their attribute counterparts to make larger shifts to produce a significant difference between 1961 and 1965.

The negative shift in respect to present importance was resisted by the same attribute categories as in the case of the General Assembly, with the exception of small states. In contrast to the General Assembly, only the underdeveloped resisted the negative shift in respect to future importance. The developed, then, were primarily responsible for the difference in the total means between 1961 and 1965 in respect to the future importance category and were joined, in this respect, by the democratic and far U.S. relations states in respect to the present importance category.

Comparative data was available for the Trusteeship Council only in respect to two categories, general performance and strength, between 1961 and 1970. In respect to general performance, hypothesis 6 is confirmed, with no significant shift between the two years and no significant shifts are related to attributes. For strength, however, hypothesis 5 is confirmed in that although no general shift occurred between the two years, two attribute categories did make significant shifts. The underdeveloped became more positive toward the organ, while the developed became more negative.

For the International Court of Justice, comparable data was only available for general performance between 1965 and 1970. A general negative shift occurred between the two periods.

The general positive shift which occurred for the Security Council, General Assembly, and Economic and Social Council, in respect to general performance between 1961 and 1965, also appears confirmed for the Secretariat. Likewise, no significant shift occurred between 1961 and 1970, with the one exception that those with close U.S. relations became more positive toward the organ. The negative shift between 1965 and 1970, observed for the other three organs, is also apparent, with the exemption of the non-democratic. Thus, the non-democratic states remained relatively positive compared to the other attribute categories between 1965 and 1970.

As in the case of the General Assembly and Economic and Social Council, a general positive shift occurred between 1961 and 1965 in respect to strength, but the shift between 1961 and 1970, instead of being general, exempts the developed, non-democratic, far U.S. relations, and big states. Thus the underdeveloped, democratic, close U.S. relations and small states had to make relatively large

shifts between the two years to create the significant total mean differences. Also, the negative shift between 1965 and 1970 exempted the developed and those with close U.S. relations. The Secretariat, then, stands in contrast to the Security Council, General Assembly and Economic and Social Council for this questionnaire category. In the case of those organs, there was no significant difference between the 1965 and the 1971 category for strength. That is, the positive assessment made in 1965 compared to 1961 basically held for 1970. For the Secretariat, on the other hand, there is a tendency to revert to the original 1961 position, although the tendency was not so strong as to eliminate a significant difference between 1961 and 1970. For the Secretariat, the evaluations in respect to strength are more similar to the swings in evaluation in respect to general performance, for the above three organs, than the pattern of evaluation in respect to strength. The Secretariat's pattern in this regard, however, is unique in the sense that the negative shift between 1965 and 1970 tends to split the difference between the positive shift between 1961 and 1965, whereas the reversion was complete, from a statistical point of view, for the general performance category for the other organs.

The Secretariat shares with the Security Council positive shifts in respect to the present importance and future importance categories, between 1961 and 1965, and both stand in contrast to the General Assembly and Economic and Social Council where negative shifts occurred. The present importance shift was general, while the future importance shift was particular, exempting the developed, those with far U.S. relations and the smaller states. Thus, the underdeveloped, those with close U.S. relations, and larger states had to make the fairly large shifts in the positive direction to create the significant difference observed for the total mean between 1961 and 1965.

AN ANALYSIS OF EXCEPTIONAL SHIFTS

The above patterns, as complex as they are, may be

simplified somewhat by focussing upon exceptional negative or positive shifts, that is, attribute shifts which occurred in a condition of "no shift", when total means are compared, and large compensating shifts when one of the attribute categories does not shift in a shift situation. Table VII analyzes the results in these terms.

Table 7
Analysis of Attribute Shift Patterns

	P O S I T I V E			N E G A T I V E				
	Shift	Big Shift	Total	Shift	Big Shift	Total	Total Shifts	Positive Net
Developed		2	2	1	4	5	7	-3
Under-Developed	1	4	5		2	2	7	3
Democratic		4	4		4	4	8	0
Non-Democratic		2	2	1	1	2	4	0
Close U.S.	1	6	7		1	1	8	6
Far U.S.		2	2		5	5	7	-5
Big		4	4		2	2	6	-2
Small		3	3	2		2	5	1

"Shift" in the table refers to a situation where a negative or positive shift occurred, even though the total means compared were not significantly different. Thus, the developed made one negative shift out of all those situations where there was no significant difference between total means. "Big shift" refers to a large compensating shift in a situation where the other part of the attribute dichotomy did not make a significant shift in a shift situation. For example, developed states made two large positive compensating shifts in a situation where there were total mean positive shifts and the underdeveloped *did not* make significant positive shifts. This kind of analysis allows the computation of totals in respect to positive shifts, negative shifts, total shifts and a positive net figure (arrived at by subtracting the negative total from the positive total).

Several generalizations can be derived from this table. The first is that attribute shifting in the no shift position is a relatively infrequent event compared to the number of compensating shifts in a shift condition. Most of the positive and negative shift figures, then, are generated from compensatory shifting, or shifting that has occurred when one part of an attribute dichotomy has failed to significantly shift in a shift condition.

In gross terms, the underdeveloped and those with close U.S. relations made the most positive shifts over the time period considered. The developed and those with far U.S. relations made the most negative shifts. The developed, non-democratic, and those with far U.S. relations made the least positive shifts, while those with close U.S. relations made the least negative shifts. The democratic and those with close U.S. relations were the most unstable in their attitude patterns, making the largest number of total shifts, and the non-democratic were the most stable.

The positive net figure is perhaps the one of the most interest. It indicated whether shifting tended to cancel out

or decidedly move one way or the other. The underdeveloped and those with close U.S. relations tended to be positive shifters, that is, moving in a net positive direction when all time periods are considered. The shifts of the small states tended to cancel out, the shifts of the democratic and non-democratic states exactly cancelled out, while the shifts of the developed, far U.S. relations and big states all migrated to a more negative position.

This table then, gives an overview in respect to the shift patterns over the decade. A great deal of shifting has occurred which is both organ and time period specific. When the decade is viewed as a whole, the shifts of the underdeveloped and those with close U.S. relations have migrated in a positive direction, while the developed, far U.S. relations, and bigger states have all migrated in a negative direction.

These results complement and qualify previous ones where the primary purpose was to determine the efficacy of certain predictors for time-slice data. This study points up the complexity of shifting orientations at the United Nations and suggests that future studies, along these lines, may help establish whether such shifts are cyclical in nature. These data suggest that an apparent rise in positive perception in orientations toward certain of the major organs of the United Nations between 1961 and 1965 generally fell back toward the 1961 level as the decade ended. The overall shifts, however, did not cancel out for all categories and a positive net is apparent in some cases and a negative net in others. It is suggested that future studies ought to utilize the format applied in these studies to maximize comparability.

SUMMARY

United Nations delegate responses were compared across three time periods, 1961, 1965 and 1970 to determine the degree and character of shifts in respect to

various organs and analytical categories. For a number of organs a positive shift apparently occurred between 1961 and 1965 for certain categories of analysis, but tended to return to the 1961 levels by 1970. The shift patterns were quite complex and several different hypotheses were confirmed, showing considerable organ and time specificity. For the attribute categories treated, such as developed, underdeveloped etc., all had some predictive power in respect to these patterns. The net shift index shows (over the decade) the underdeveloped states and those with close U.S. relations had more positive shifts, and the developed, far U.S. relations and big states, more negative shifts. Neither scaling considerations nor sampling (in terms of attributes) were able to account for the observed differences. It is suggested that new studies with similar formats be undertaken to determine whether such swings in orientations are cyclical, and therefore predictable, through extrapolation, from a time perspective.

FOOTNOTES

1. I wish to thank Roger Baker as research assistant, Carol Jones as computer programmer and Myrtle Cassel for her typing assistance.
2. Pioneer effort was undertaken by Gary Best in his "Diplomacy in the United Nations" (Northwestern University Ph.D. dissertation, 1960). Best systematically compared UN diplomacy with capital diplomacy. Other publications of possible interest include: Jack E. Vincent, *The Caucusing Groups of the United Nations: An Examination of their Attitudes Toward the Organization* (Stillwater: Oklahoma State University Press, 1965); Jack E. Vincent, "National Attributes as Predictors of Delegate Attitudes at the United Nations", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 62 (1968) pp.916-931; Jack E. Vincent, "The Convergence of Voting and Attitude Patterns at the United Nations", *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 31 (1969) pp. 952-983; Jack E. Vincent, "An Analysis of Caucusing Group Activity at the United Nations", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 2 (1970) pp. 133-150; Jack E. Vincent, "An Analysis of Attitude Patterns at the United Nations", *Quarterly Journal of the Florida Academy of Sciences*, Vol. 32 (1969) pp. 185-209; Jack E. Vincent, "Predicting Voting Patterns in the General Assembly" *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 65 (1971), pp. 471-498; Jack E. Vincent, "Testing Some Hypotheses About Delegate Attitudes at the United Nations and Some Implications for Theory Building", *Research Report No. 52*, Dimensionality of Nations Project, University of Hawaii, 1971; Jack E. Vincent, "An Examination of Voting Patterns in the 23rd and 24th Sessions of the General Assembly" *Research Report No. 54*, Dimensionality of Nations Project, University of Hawaii, 1971; and Jack E. Vincent, "An Application of Attribute Theory to General Assembly Voting Patterns and Some Implications", *International Organization*, Vol. 26 (1972) pp. 551-582.
3. Theory building has been stressed in Vincent, "Predicting Voting Patterns..." *op. cit.*; Vincent, "Testing Some Hypotheses about..." *op. cit.*; Vincent, "An Application of Attribute Theory..." *op. cit.*

4Details of questionnaires used are treated at length in the above articles. Some scale adjustments are necessary to allow comparability. Ordinal scales were used in 1961 built out of nominal categories such as highly satisfied, fairly satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, highly dissatisfied. That is, the numbers 1 - 4 were assigned to the nominal categories with the highest number representing the most dissatisfaction. In 1965 an answer line was placed under the nominal categories so that the delegates could mark gradations between, say, highly satisfied and fairly satisfied. To make the scales comparable, scales of greater gradation were reduced to scales of smaller gradation. For example, the line under fairly dissatisfied and highly dissatisfied was divided in half with all marks below the division point scaled 3 and marks above the division point scaled 4 to make them comparable with the 1961 scale. The same kind of procedure was applied to three-point scales as well. For example, in 1965, delegates marked a line under increasing, to indicate the degree of increasing; a zero-point if the organ was neither increasing nor decreasing; and, a line under decreasing, to indicate the degree to which the organ was decreasing. In 1961, numbers were assigned to the nominal categories as follows: increasing = 1, remaining the same = 2, decreasing = 3. To make all scales comparable, all marks under increasing in 1965 were assigned a 1, all marks on zero assigned a 2, and all marks under decreasing assigned a 3. The possibility that such scaling differences could account for observed differences is fully explored above.

5. For a discussion and explanation of discriminate function analysis, see: William W. Cooley and Paul R. Lohnes, *Multivariate Procedures for the Behavioural Sciences* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1962); T.W. Anderson, *An Introduction to Multivariate Statistical Analysis* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1958); J.G. Bryan. "The Generalized Discriminate Function: Mathematical Foundation

and the Computational Routine", *Harvard Educational Review* Vol. 21 (1951) pp. 90-95; C.R. Rao, *Advanced Statistical Methods in Biometric Research* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1952); Maurice M. Tatsuoka and David V. Tiedeman, *Discriminate Analysis: Review of Educational Research*, (Washington, D.C.: American Educational Research Association 1954); William W. Cooley, *Career Development of Scientists: An Overlapping Longitudinal Study* (Cambridge, Mass.: mimeo, 1958); P.J. Rulon, "Distinctions Between Discriminate and Regression Analysis: A Geometric Interpretation of the Discriminate Function" *Harvard Educational Review*, Vol. 21 (1951) pp. 80-90; M.G. Kendall, *A Course in Multivariate Analysis* (London: Charles Griffin & Co., 1957) pp. 105-116.

6. A panel of judges was used in the previous studies to identify which end of the questionnaire scales could be considered positive (viewpoint supportive of the U.N.), as opposed to negative responses. The details in this regard are given in the above cited articles. The most positive responses by category were as follows: General Performance, highly satisfied; Strength, weaker than it should be; Voting, highly satisfied; Present Importance, increasing; Future Importance, more important; Impact Upon Instructions, considerable; Binding Decisions, highly desirable; More Future Impact, highly probable; Vote More as a Unit, highly probable; Help the U.N., highly probable. The opposite category, for example, highly dissatisfied, in respect to the ordinal scale of measuring satisfaction was picked as the least positive. Four-point scales, then, have two intermediate steps between the least and most positive response, while three-point scales, such as increasing, remaining the same, and decreasing, have only one step between the most and least positive response. U.N. resolutions have also been treated in the same terms. This is reported in Vincent, "An Application of Attribute Theory..." *op. cit.*, and Vincent, "Predicting Voting Patterns...", *op. cit.*

7. There can be as many sets of discriminate function scores as there are numbers of categories of comparison, minus one. Because 1961 is compared with 1965 and 1970, there can be two sets of discriminate function scores.

8. The second way of looking at the data links negative shifts for general performance with positive shifts for strength. (Note the negative correlations (predicting small numbers for those with large discriminate function scores, or positive responses) in respect to strength for all organs except the Secretariat.) The previous discriminate function scores link negativism in respect to general performance with negativism in respect to strength (all the correlations were positive). This indicates that there are two different types of delegates within the framework of this analysis: one type which shifted positively between 1961 and 1965, and then negatively in 1970 in respect to these categories and organs as revealed by the first discriminate function scores; and a second type which shifted positively in respect to general performance but negatively in respect to strength between 1961 and 1965, and then negatively in respect to general performance and positively in respect to strength between 1965 and 1970. The details of what categorical types are related to such shifts, such as developed vs. underdeveloped, will be brought out by a subsequent analysis.

9. Because of the considerable labour involved in the analysis which is to follow relating attribute categories to shifts, and because of the limited changes which have occurred in respect to the caucusing group items, such items will be dropped from subsequent analysis.

10. See the various studies in Footnote 2.

11. See: Jack E. Vincent, "Scaling the Universe of States on Certain Useful Multivariate Dimensions", *The Journal of Social Psychology* Volume 85 (1971) pp. 261-283, for details

in respect to the factor analysis. The first four dimensions were employed because they are the largest, in terms of variance explained in the original variables, accounting for almost 50% of the original information, and are reliable in the sense that such variable clusters repeatedly appear in cross-national studies. See: Jack E. Vincent, *Factor Analysis in International Relations: Interpretation, Problem Areas and an Application* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1971).

12. Variables are named in terms of the characteristics of those with high variable scores. Thus, those with high factor scores on the first dimension tend to have very low newspaper circulation per 1,000 population, few radios per 1,000 population, etc. The square of the loading indicates the variance in common between the variable and the factor score. Thus, the first variable, Very low newspaper circulation per 1,000 population, has 92% of its variance in common with the dimension called Underdevelopment ($.96^2 = .92$).

13. The question we are asking is whether the samples are different in respect to these attributes. That is, is the development of the 1961 sample different from the development of the 1965 sample, the degree of democracy different, etc.? Because the samples are not significantly different in respect to these variables, there is no need to present the correlational analysis and discriminate function scores presented earlier in connection with the questionnaire.

14. Vincent, "Scaling the Universe of States..." *op. cit.* p. 270.

15. The individual F-tests, however, did show some differences between the latter runs and the former. These differences may be summarized as follows: In the 1961 vs. 1965 run, significant differences did not occur in respect

to the General Assembly, Economic and Social Council, and Secretariat in respect to general performance, and General Assembly and Economic and Social Council in respect to voting. In the 1965 vs. 1970 run, significant differences did not occur in respect to the General Assembly, Economic and Social Council, and Trusteeship Council in respect to general performance. In the 1961 vs. 1965 vs. 1970 run, significant differences did not occur in respect to the General Assembly, Economic and Social Council and Secretariat in respect to general performance. (The F-tests were identical in respect to the 1961 vs. 1970 run.)

These differences can be partially explained by the small pool of potential shifters in the "dissatisfied" category for these organs. For example, in 1961, only 21 per cent of the delegates were dissatisfied with the General Assembly, whereas, in contrast, 69 per cent were dissatisfied with the Security Council. Further, only 10 per cent were dissatisfied with the Economic and Social Council and 16 per cent dissatisfied by the Secretariat. In respect to voting satisfaction, only 14 per cent were dissatisfied with the General Assembly voting system and 11 per cent with the voting system of the Economic and Social Council. In 1965, in respect to general performance, 13 per cent were dissatisfied with the General Assembly, 9 per cent with the Economic and Social Council, and 4 per cent with the Secretariat. As for voting dissatisfaction, 11 per cent were dissatisfied with the General Assembly and 12 per cent with the Economic and Social Council.

Most important, with the exception of the voting satisfaction item for the Economic and Social Council, all of the shifts, then, were in the "right direction" (that is, in the expected negative or positive direction from the previous analysis). Given the small numbers involved, however, statistical significance, at the .05 level, could not be achieved. Thus, these discrepancies in respect to the individual F-tests seem to be a function, at least in part,

of the small number of potential shifters for these organs in respect to these items, when the information is dichotomized. To put it another way, the shifting reported in the previous analysis is mostly in categories such as fairly satisfied to highly satisfied, or vice versa, for these organs, something that can't be picked up, of course, when the data is dichotomized to satisfied vs. dissatisfied.

16. The first exception concerned failure of the Secretariat to achieve a significant difference in respect to the category, "future importance", in the 1961 vs. 1965 run. In both 1961 and 1965, 9 per cent of the sample fell within the "less important" category. The other difference occurred within the 1961 vs. 1970 run in respect to Security Council strength. The percentage in 1965 was 11 per cent in the "stronger than it should be" category, whereas in 1970, this had increased to 19 per cent. It can be seen that this shift is in the right direction (a negative shift between 1965 and 1970) but is not significant because of the small numbers involved compared to the other categories.

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The subscription rate is \$20.00 per Volume of six issues, or \$14.00 per Volume if payment is sent with order.

Editorial Office: 25 Dundana Ave., Dundas,
Ontario L9H 4E5, Canada

Co-Editors: Dr. Alan G. Newcombe &
Dr. Hanna Newcombe

Editorial Assistant; Kate Allan
Typing: Kate Allan
Printing; Mervin Davidson

PUBLISHED MAY 1978

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QUANTIFYING AND PREDICTING DELEGATE BEHAVIOUR AT THE UNITED NATIONS¹

Jack E. Vincent
Florida Atlantic University

Part 1, Section 3

INTRODUCTION

There is considerable speculation on the role and impact of delegates in regard to the United Nations process, but little in the way of real evidence and systematic study. Richard F. Pederson, for example, stresses delegate freedom and impact in arguing:

"Other characteristics of the UN which uniquely influence negotiations include the fact that all UN negotiation is, in effect, multilateral, as is also the 'openness' of UN activity, e.g., the fact that at any moment any one of the negotiators may make a public test of negotiating strengths by taking an issue out of private talks and into the public forum...they (the delegates) have a large measure of discretion in tactics...There are exceptional cases when issues must be decided immediately and UN delegations are compelled to vote without instructions from their governments; such votes may establish governmental policy...a UN delegation in its advisory capacity may exert significant influence on national policy...Some delegations, in fact, receive only general instructions, allowing them the latitude to make many decisions themselves...Information and the consequent assessment of it by delegations are often crucial elements in final governmental policy decisions."²

A similar theme is presented by Robert Keohane regarding delegates from underdeveloped states:

"Furthermore, some representatives of small and new states have more freedom of action than delegates from large entities, particularly since they are less closely instructed by their foreign offices. In specific terms, this means that the policies of certain African and Asian states may be influenced heavily by what their representatives think."³

Even in regard to a highly developed state, like the United States, certain delegates are asserted to have considerable influence. Concerning former United Nations ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, it has been argued he:

"frequently got his instructions changed and 'usually wins his point' in differences with the State Department... 'Sometimes the instructions he gets from Washington are verbatim playbacks of what he wrote himself' in part because developments 'happen too fast to rely upon specific instruction'."⁴

Although these impressions, by knowledgeable persons, are probably accurate, there has been little in the way of systematic study to validate what could be considered a host of propositions about delegate behaviour in the United Nations forum. The purpose of this study is to present an empirically based picture of United Nations delegate functions and home government restraints in regard to those functions and then ask, once such patterns have been identified, whether they are predictable from other kinds of information, particularly that related to the characteristics of states from which the delegates are derived.⁵

Obtaining the information necessary for such a study has proven to be very difficult. There is considerable resistance (among delegates) to the idea that an outsider (an academician) should acquire and analyze information falling

into subject areas that they regard as "sensitive". Because of this resistance, the present study is limited to a modest sample size ($N = 58$). On the positive side, this sample size is roughly as large as certain previous studies dealing with delegate attitudes toward major organs and United Nations voting.⁶

The present sample represents over a year of steady effort, including four visits to the United Nations, and is probably the maximum obtainable sample, given reasonable methods of persuasion within the time boundaries set for the study.⁷ Fortunately, the sample distributes well geographically and, if analyzed in terms of the percentage of delegations responding, out of the total number available by a caucusing group, we get the following results: African group, 47 per cent; Afro-Asian group, 50 per cent; Arab group, 75 per cent; Asian group, 46 per cent; European Community group, 40 per cent; Latin American group, 48 per cent; Scandinavian group, 40 per cent; Soviet group, 66 per cent; and Western European and Others group, 50 per cent.⁸ Such groups of course, have virtually complete geographic coverage.

At first it was hoped to limit the study to responses from the Ambassadors from Permanent Missions, because many of the questions pertain to matters about which the Ambassadors are likely to be most knowledgeable. After approximately nine months of labour, it became clear that it would not be possible to simply deal with Ambassadors if the sample was to approach 60, which was a minimum target figure. The restriction of the study to Ambassadors, then, was relaxed and "others" in Missions, which the Ambassadors viewed to be knowledgeable in such matters, were allowed to complete the questionnaire. The end result was that, of the total sample, 60 per cent constitute Ambassadors and 40 per cent "others".

In previous studies, such as the attitudinal ones,

Ambassador responses were mixed with "other" responses because the total delegate population was the focus of attention. It was hoped, in this regard, that the distinction between Ambassadors and "others" was not a confounding intervening variable in respect to the interpretation of results. The present study provided an excellent opportunity to test this hypothesis. The sample, then, was divided into two groups, Ambassadors and "others", and means calculated on each questionnaire item. A test was then performed to see whether the Ambassadors and "others" were likely derived from different populations, operating at the .05 level.⁹ Because 38 questionnaire items were treated, we would expect roughly 1.5 significant means at that level. In view of the fact that only one item produced means that were significantly different, these tests may be used as evidence to support the proposition that the Ambassadors vs. "others" distinction is not a confounding variable in respect to the interpretation of the results.


As in the previous studies of this nature, in order to elicit the freest possible responses, it was promised not to reveal the results on a national basis. This allows a wide variety of analyses, however, such as correlational ones.

In summary, the study can be conceptualized in a two-fold sense. One purpose is purely descriptive, that is, to provide information about delegate behaviour, because evidence in this regard has been slim.¹⁰ The second purpose is to examine such patterns, in the sense of ascertaining whether they correlate with the national attributes of the states from which the respondents are derived.

To facilitate an understanding of these purposes, the delegates' role at the United Nations, and the various points at which this role might be examined, are depicted in Figure 1.¹¹

Figure 1, then, may be thought of as a simplified model relating to delegate influence and action at the United

FIGURE 1
A MODEL FOR THE EXPLORATION OF DELEGATE INFLUENCES AT THE UNITED NATIONS



Nations, as well as a possible program of systematic study. Beginning on the left of the model, it suggests that an important ingredient in delegate action relates to home government instructions. Clearly, when instructions are compelling and specific, the delegate is basically a creature of his home government.

As the above quotation from Pederson indicates, however, home governments frequently allow delegates considerable latitude. This is supported by Alker and Russett, who have pointed out:

"The usual mechanism for transmitting...policies

into resolutions, speeches and votes in the Assembly is the diplomatic communication from the national foreign offices. When a delegate is not specifically advised...he relies on more general instructions, his own personal initiatives and obligations, and a number of national, regional and caucusing group loyalties and attitudes. Some idea of the degree of personal freedom exercised by the delegates themselves can be obtained on an impressionistic basis by interviewing them...The specific influence of personal interpretations and national instructions on each of the issues in the Assembly is, however, difficult to uncover systematically as is the content of each diplomat's official correspondence."¹²

Going back to the model, there are a number of acts that a delegate must engage in that are little conditioned by his attitudes, that is, those acts that the delegate must perform when he is following specific and compelling instructions. In the model, these are designated as "prescribed" acts and are shown as emerging from the delegate without going through the "zone of attitudes".

As indicated above, however, not all instructions are specific and compelling. Many instructions may be of a more general character, allowing considerable delegate interpretation and freedom in respect to application. Acts related to such instructions are viewed as falling in the "semi-prescribed" category. A delegate probably can't completely flaunt the intention of the general instructions, but their application in a concrete case is assumed to be influenced by his feelings, perceptions, etc.

Finally, we have a range of delegate activity which we might call "unprescribed" in the sense that the delegate is given no instructions--general or otherwise--for this kind of activity. This is not to say that the delegate can do anything that he wants in such activity areas. He, like

everyone else, is hemmed in by a variety of social and cultural restraints. Rather, it is simply to indicate, for the sake of the model's completeness, that there may be a number of delegate acts for which instructions are irrelevant. Again, we assume, for such activities, that the delegate's personal attitudes will have a considerable bearing on his action.

The flow--instructions→delegate→action--however, is complicated by the fact that the delegate himself is a source of information for the home government and this information may be used in the formulation of instructions. This circuitous flow of causality is indicated in the model by the "information arrow" pointing back at the home government. Thus, even though instructions that are specific and compelling are depicted as "going around" delegate attitudes during their translation into action, in the sense that the delegate presumably must engage in prescribed acts on the receipt of such instructions, nevertheless the information upon which those instructions were formulated may have come in great measure from the delegate himself. Thus, delegate attitudes may "stand behind" or influence even specific and compelling instructions.

The summation of all delegate acts, prescribed, semi-prescribed, and unprescribed, together, equal, in the model, United Nations activity. That is, U.N. outcomes, such as budgets, resolutions, conferences, etc., are viewed as the end product of delegate acts. Non-delegate personnel, in this formulation, are presumed to perform roles supportive of such acts, i.e. secretariat personnel are assumed to implement the various goals that are articulated by delegate acts, although some others are given, of course, by the Charter and gentlemen's agreements between states. Such U.N. outcomes, in turn, are assumed to have international relations impact. That is, United Nations outcomes may have international relations consequences in the sense that relationships and activity between states are altered as a result of such outcomes. Home governments,

of course, anticipate and react to such U.N. outcomes and this is indicated by the arrow from international relations impact back to home government. Again, the potential relevance of delegates is made clear if it is agreed that at least a portion of United Nations activity may be derived from semi-prescribed and unprescribed acts which help fashion these outcomes. (and even the prescribed acts, if delegate attitudes are presumed to "stand behind" some specific and compelling home government instructions). Also, of course, even instructions that are formulated without reference to delegate information, but in terms of anticipated and actual U.N. outcomes, may have relevance to delegate attitudes, to the extent the delegates helped shape U.N. outcomes.

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

In a sense, this project may be conceived of as an effort to do some fleshing out in respect to the model. Relevant predictors will be related to the degree of constraint delegates face in respect to primary organs such as the Security Council and General Assembly, variables generated from the interaction process at the United Nations connected with delegate functions (such as the nature and extent of conversations with other delegations) and variables relating to the preparation and initiation of resolutions and formal statements before U.N. bodies.

As indicated above, these tasks place this study in a series where the basic objective has been to relate attitudinal or structural patterns to national attribute information and then draw conclusions from the degree and kind of associations. In this connection, such studies have used a fairly consistent group of predictors to maximize comparability (the basic set used in this study is listed in Appendix A). The usual procedure has been to factor analyze¹³ such variables (for the sample) and use the resulting factor scores as predictors. It was decided to use the same technique in the present case.

FACTOR ANALYTIC RESULTS--PREDICTORS

When the attribute variables are factor analyzed, they yield the following rotated dimensions:

Economic Development: Large Percent Literate of Population Age 15 and Over, .89; Many Radios per 1,000 Population, .88; Large Per Cent Primary and Secondary Students as a Percentage of Population, .87; Large Number of Students Enrolled in Higher Education, .82; Large Per Cent Christians as a Percentage of Total Population, .78; Very Low Agricultural Population, .68; Negligible Interest Articulation by Non-Associational Groups, .62; Large Per Cent Roman Catholics as a Percentage of Total Population, .61; Negligible Leadership Charisma, .52; Late Date of Independence, -.50; Long Distance from the U.S., -.57; Pre-transitional Politically, -.60; Linguistic Heterogeneity, -.63; Low Urbanization, -.64; Very Underdeveloped Economic Development Status, -.65; Negligible Interest Articulation by Associational Groups, -.65; Large Per Cent Moslems as a Percentage of Population, -.68; Large Per Cent of Labour Force Employed in Agriculture, -.68; Traditional Bureaucracy, -.74; Very Low Per Capita Gross National Product, -.78; *Very Low Newspaper Circulation per 1,000 Population, -.84; Large Number of Inhabitants per Hospital Bed, -.84; Large Number of Inhabitants per Physician, -.88. *Non-Western, -.83.

Authoritarian: No Effective Constitutional Limitations, .91; Wholly Ineffective Legislature, .90; Negligible Interest Aggregation by Legislature, .87; Non-Competitive Electoral System, .86; Unrepresentative Regime, .85; Negligible Horizontal Power Distribution, .85; Censorship, .81; Opposition Groups Not Tolerated, .78; Negligible Interest Articulation by Political Parties, .71; Negligible Interest Articulation by Associational Groups, .53; Non-communist Bloc, -.55; Neutral Military, -.57; Limited Interest Articulation by Institutional Groups, -.66; Police Not Politically Significant, -.68; Non-Elitist Political Leadership, -.69; Weak Executive, -.76.

Bigness: Large Gross National Product, .82; Large Number in Permanent Missions at the U.N., .80; Large Number of Men Under Arms, .71; Large Dollar Exports to the U.S.A., .71; Large Dollars Imports from the U.S.A., .69; Very Low International Financial Status, -.78; Small Population, -.79.

Negligible Communist China Economic Relations: Large Dollar Exports to Communist China, -.81; Large Dollar Imports from Communist China, -.86.

Density: Large Population per 1,000 Hectares of Agricultural Land, .90; Large Population per Square Kilometer, .88; Large Area in Square Kilometers, -.72.

Militarism: Large Per Cent Military Personnel as a Per Cent of Population age 15-64, .81; Large Per Cent Military Personnel as a Per Cent of Total Population, .76; Large Defence Expenditures as a Per Cent of GNP, .74; Large Number of Men Under Arms, .50; Long Distance from China, -.60.

Instability: Unstable Government, .87; Unstable Party System, .86; Very Infrequent Interest Articulation by Anomic Groups, -.52; Negligible Personalissimo, -.70.

Unitarism: Unitarism, .79.

Negligible Leadership Charisma: Negligible Leadership Charisma, .69; Negligible Interest Aggregation by Executive, .52.

Racial Homogeneity: Racial Homogeneity, -.79.

Distance from U.S.S.R.: Long Distance from U.S.S.R., .60; Large Per Cent of Total Exports to U.S.A., .53; Large Per Cent Export of Total Exports from U.S.A., .45; Allied with the U.S.S.R., -.61.

U.S.S.R. Economic Relations: Large Dollar Imports from the U.S.S.R., .75; Large Dollar Exports to the U.S.S.R. .72.

Large Annual Per Cent Rate of Increase in Population: Large Annual Per Cent Rate of Increase in Population, .49.

Religious Heterogeneity: Religious Heterogeneity, .73.

Mobilized System Style: Non-mobilizational System Style, -.77.

Collectively, the factors account for 86 per cent of the original variance and the variables are well accounted for in the sense that 78 per cent of them have 80 per cent or more of their variance accounted for, while the variable *least* accounted for, Bi-Cameral Legislature, has 70 per cent of its variance accounted for.

States are located on the dimensions through the computation of factor scores. The loadings may be directly interpreted as Pearson *r* correlation coefficients of the variables with the factor scores. Thus, in the case of the positive loadings, the nations have the characteristics that are indicated, while, in the case of negative loadings, they have the opposite characteristics. For example, on the first factor dimension, nations with high factor scores tend to have a large per cent literate of population age 15 and over, but tend to have a small number of inhabitants per physician (a negative loading).

The original attribute variables, then, have been reduced to a convenient set of predictors which can be related to the questionnaire items.

FINDINGS¹⁴

One important concern of the study was to determine

the degree to which delegates are instructed on certain important organs of the United Nations, namely, the Security Council, the General Assembly, and Economic and Social Council. The delegates were asked to estimate the fraction of the agenda items upon which they receive direct and specific instructions from their home governments. The results indicate that the delegates are instructed to a far greater extent than this researcher would have estimated. In respect to the General Assembly, the average number of items upon which instructions are direct and specific was 65 per cent, although the range varied all the way from 2 to 100 per cent. If the sample is viewed as a random one, there is a 95 per cent chance that new samples will have means falling between the fiducial limits of 57 and 74 per cent.¹⁵ The only factor significantly related¹⁶ to the variation in delegate responses was Bigness (.34) with the bigger states¹⁷ instructing their delegates on a larger number of items than the smaller states. Surprisingly, neither Economic Development (.15) nor Authoritarianism (-.21) were significantly correlated with this variable. A visual inspection of the questionnaire responses showed that many of the underdeveloped states instruct their delegates directly and specifically on almost all agenda items.¹⁸ No obvious geographic patterns were evident in this respect.

As might be expected, the delegates are even more closely instructed in respect to the Security Council, with 85 per cent of the items being the sample average. If repeated samples are taken, we would expect the average to fall between 79 and 91 per cent. The range in the case of the Security Council was virtually as broad as in the General Assembly, falling between 4 and 100 per cent. Surprisingly, none of the predictors significantly related to the variation in responses.¹⁹

The average percentage of items upon which there are direct and specific instructions falls off somewhat for the Economic and Social Council, but is still remarkably high, given this researchers previous expectations. The sample average is 63 per cent and repeated samples should have averages

falling between 54 and 72 per cent. The range in the case of the Economic and Social Council goes from 0 to 100 per cent. Bigness (.33) as in the case of the General Assembly, emerged as the only significant predictor of the observed variation, with "big" states instructing their delegates on more items.

These results, then, lead us to some rather surprising conclusions. On three of the major organs of the United Nations, the General Assembly, Security Council, and Economic and Social Council, delegates are instructed in a direct and specific manner on more than 50 per cent of the items considered. A possible assumption, that the more developed states constrain their delegates more than the underdeveloped states, was not borne out in this data (from simple correlational analysis). State characteristics seem to be unrelated to the pattern of constraints in respect to the Security Council, while Bigness appears to be the only relevant predictor in respect to the General Assembly and Economic and Social Council.

These results are contrary to the researcher's own expectations. It was felt that the number of items upon which direct and specific instructions are given would be much less and that Economic Development would be a significant predictor. These results seem to suggest that non-attribute variables may have considerable relevance in accounting for these constraint patterns.²⁰

Another concern of the study was the frequency of communication with the home government and the nature of such instructions. The frequency of communication showed amazing variation, from 900 times to 5 times per session, with the average being 89 times per session. If repeated samples are taken, their averages should fall between 54 and 124 times. Here, attributes proved to be more relevant as predictors, with economically developed states (.46) and big states (.33) communicating more frequently with their delegates during a typical session.

As for the character of the instructions, they ranged from basically general instructions to lengthy and detailed instructions, with the average being 2.91, using a 4.0 scale²¹ (fiducial limits 2.76-3.06). In other words, the average was virtually identical with, "specific on some items, but allowed considerable freedom of action on others". None of the attributes were significantly related to the variation on this item.

Also probed was the effect of cross-national pressure regarding U.N. matters and the frequency, setting and character of such pressure.

Apparently, the delegations have substantial impact on one another. When asked, "How often do positions taken by other governments seem to affect your own delegation's position?" "36 per cent of the time" emerged as the sample average response (fiducial limits 28-44 per cent). The range embraces the entire spectrum of possible responses, 1 to 100 per cent. Again, however, none of the attribute predictors were significantly associated with the responses.

Regarding the frequency of involvement with other delegations on official matters, during an average week at the General Assembly, the sample average is quite high--21 times, with fiducial limits of 15-26 times and a range of 1 to 100 times. Economic Development (.46) is the only relevant predictor in this case. The delegates from developed states are more likely than delegates from underdeveloped states to make such contacts.

Concerning the setting in which such conversations take place, 84 per cent were reported to be informal as opposed to formal (16 per cent) while, in terms of all the meetings that take place, 24 per cent were described as social, as opposed to other (76 per cent) kinds of meetings.

When asked about the kinds of meetings that produced

the most fruitful exchanges, using the categories of "formal meetings", "informal meetings", "discussions between individuals", and "all of the above about equally" (which could be chosen independently of one another)--"all of the above about equally" received the largest plurality (41 per cent), "discussions between individuals" the second largest plurality (38 per cent), "informal meetings" the third largest (33 per cent), and "formal meetings" the least (3.5 per cent).²²

Apparently such contacts have considerable impact in that, on the average, the delegates indicate that their initial personal opinion on matters is modified 19 per cent of the time from such meetings (fiducial limits 14-24 per cent). The range in this regard is quite remarkable, going all the way from 1 to 95 per cent of the time.

Considerable position flexibility during the discussions is also reported, with 22 per cent on the average (fiducial limits 16-28 per cent) finding it necessary to alter their positions during discussions in order to make progress.²³ The range in this case goes all the way from 1 to 100 per cent. Again, none of the attribute measures were significantly related to variation on these matters, with one exception. Delegates coming from less stable systems (Factor 7) tended to alter their initial personal position less frequently during discussions than delegates coming from more stable systems (.33).

As to the character of delegation meetings, all the respondents in the sample indicated that their delegations have "formal meetings" and, given the categories of "frequent" or "infrequent", "regular" or "irregular", to describe such meetings, 81 per cent chose "frequent" and "regular", and 19 per cent "infrequent" and "irregular", as descriptive terms. None of the attribute measures, however, were significantly related to these response patterns.

Also of interest was the allocation of delegates' time in respect to such matters as "preparation of resolutions", "meetings with other delegates", etc. Apparently only a very small fraction of the delegates' time is actually spent on preparation and initiation of resolutions, with six (fiducial limits 5-7) reported as the average number of hours in a typical week. The same can be said in respect to the preparation and making of formal statements before U.N. bodies, which, on the average, takes up 8.68 hours per week (fiducial limits, 7-10). In contrast, meetings with other delegates take up 12.33 hours (fiducial limits, 10-14) and administrative duties 12.46 hours (fiducial limits, 10-15). The average delegate, then, works about 39 hours on these matters.

The ranges are quite revealing in this respect, going from 1 to 20 hours for the preparation and initiation of resolutions, 1 to 28 hours for the preparation and making of formal statements before a U.N. body, 1 to 40 hours for meetings with other delegations, and 1 to 45 hours for administration of staff.

Only one attribute measure, "Bigness", is significantly related to these response patterns. Delegates from big states tend to spend more time on the preparation and initiation of resolutions than delegates from smaller states (.34).

Also of interest was the percentage of time (as opposed to number of hours) spent on such matters, comparing in this respect Mission office work and U.N. Building activities.

In respect to Mission office work, the average delegate spends 15 per cent of his time on the telephone (fiducial limits, 12.62-17.42), 40 per cent of his time on paper work (fiducial limits, 38.08-44.23), 27 per cent of his time in conferences (fiducial limits, 24.31-31.30), and 23.78 per cent of his time on other activities (fiducial limits, 21.21-26.36).²⁴

The ranges again were considerable, going from 2 to

40 per cent for the telephone, 10 to 85 per cent for paper work, 4 to 75 per cent for conferences, and 3 to 55 per cent for other activities.

Only two attribute measures were significantly related to these response patterns. Delegates from authoritarian states (.42) and those from states with negligible leadership charisma (.33) tended to spend more time in "other activities".²⁵

Regarding the percentages of time spent at the U.N. Building, the average delegate spends 19.99 per cent of his time in formal presentations before U.N. organs (fiducial limits, 15.42-24.55), 26.91 per cent of his time in formal meetings related to U.N. functions (fiducial limits, 22.94-30.88), 28.17 per cent of his time in informal meetings and exchanges related to U.N. functions (fiducial limits, 24.32-32.02), 20.28 per cent of his time in social functions (fiducial limits, 17.22-23.33), and 15.68 per cent of his time in "other activities" (fiducial limits, 13.74-17.62).

The same rather amazing ranges persisted for these items, with a range of 1 to 80 per cent in regard to formal presentation before U.N. organs, 5 to 60 per cent in respect to formal meetings related to U.N. functions, 3 to 80 per cent in respect to informal meetings and exchanges related to U.N. functions, 5 to 80 per cent in respect to social functions (only one respondent picked 80 per cent, the next lowest percentage was 45 per cent, and the next lowest after that 40 per cent), and 5 to 35 per cent in respect to "other activities".²⁶

Apparently, at times, experts outside of the delegates' own delegation, such as from the home state, are utilized as sources of information, with the average delegate reporting that he makes such utilization 9.23 per cent of the time (fiducial limits, 5.51-12.96, range, 1-75 per cent).

Also, considerable discussion and negotiation takes place outside the U.N. Building, with the average delegate reporting that 29.70 per cent of all negotiation and discussion fall into this category (fiducial limits 23.56-35.83, range 1 to 90 per cent). The atmosphere of such discussions for the average delegate is informal luncheons (20.69 per cent), meetings in other delegation offices (12.07 per cent), social functions (22.41 per cent), and a balancing of informal luncheons, meetings in other delegation offices and social functions (60.34 per cent).

The overall importance of the telephone in respect to negotiation can be estimated by the average mean falling at 2.48 (between "little" and "some") when the response patterns of "much", "some", "little", and "none" are coded 4, 3, 2, and 1 respectively (fiducial limits of 2.29-2.67). A percentage breakdown on these categories yielded "much" (8.62 per cent), "some" (34.48 per cent), "little" (51.72 per cent) and "none" (5.17 per cent).

Attributes again proved to be relatively poor predictors of the above variables. Some relationships, however, did emerge. Delegates from smaller states (.42) are more inclined to spend a larger percentage of their time in "other activities" at the U.N. Building, compared to delegates from larger states. Delegates from more authoritarian states (.34) were more inclined to use the mechanism of informal luncheons, compared to delegates from non-authoritarian states, in respect to negotiation and discussion outside the U.N. Building, and were less inclined (.40) to use the three mechanisms in balance, that is, informal luncheons, meetings in other delegation offices, and social functions.

The above concludes the initial description of delegate activities in terms of means, fiducial limits, ranges, and simple correlations.

FACTOR ANALYTIC RESULTS--QUESTIONNAIRE

An important question that can be asked in respect to

the responses is whether there is a tendency for them to fall into clusters or patterns. Factor analysis is well suited for the identification of such clusters and can consolidate the above questionnaire information to facilitate additional forms of correlational analysis.

In line with this objective, the questionnaire information was factor analyzed. Interpretation proceeded in a manner similar to that concerning the factor analysis of the attribute information. The following rotated dimensions were computed:²⁷

Factor 1: Frequent Delegation Meetings, .83; Direct and Specific Instructions on Many Items for the Security Council, .68; Regular Delegation Meetings, .54.

Factor 2: Frequently Communicate with Home Government during a General Assembly Session, -.51; At U.N. Building, Much Percentage of Time Taken in Formal Meetings, -.57; Often Find It Necessary to Alter Position in Order to Proceed in Discussions, -.78; Initial Personal Position is Often Modified after Hearing the Point of View of Other Delegates, -.81.

Factor 3: Outside U.N., Discussion Takes Place Equally in Delegation Offices, Informal Luncheons and Social Functions, .84; Outside U.N., Negotiation Discussion Takes Place in Informal Luncheons, -.76; Outside U.N., Negotiation Discussion Takes Place in Social Functions, -.85.

Factor 4: During General Assembly Sessions, Conversations Take Place Mostly in Social Functions, .89; Much Percentage of Time Taken in Other Activities at U.N. Building, .85; During General Assembly Sessions, Much Conversation Takes Place at Formal Meetings, .66.

Factor 5: Most Fruitful Exchanges Take Place Between Individuals, .78; Most Fruitful Exchanges Take Place at Informal Meetings, .50; Most Fruitful Exchanges are Equal Between Individuals, Informal Meetings, and Formal Meetings, -.90.

Factor 6: At U.N. Building, Much Percentage of Time in Informal Meetings, .84; Many Hours Spent Meeting with Other Delegates, .61.

Factor 7: During a General Assembly Session, the Most Fruitful Exchanges Take Place at Formal Meetings, .71; Many Hours Spent in Administration of Staff, .61.

Factor 8: At Mission Office, Much Percentage of Time Spent in Conference, .87; At Mission Office, Much Percentage of Time Spent in Other Activities, -.87.

Factor 9: During General Assembly Session, Most Fruitful Exchanges are in Formal Meetings, -.54; Many Hours Spent Preparing Formal Statements Before U.N. Bodies, -.63; Many Hours Spent Preparing and Initiating Resolutions, -.82.

Factor 10: At U.N. Building, Much Percentage of Time in Social Functions, .51; At Mission Office, Much Percentage of Time on Paper Work, -.75.

Factor 11: At U.N. Building, Much Percentage of Time in Formal Presentations Before U.N. Organs, .77; At Mission Office, Much Percent of Time on Telephone, .70; Much Negotiation Takes Place on Telephone, -.50.

Factor 12: Direct and Specific Instructions on Many Items for the Economic and Social Council, .94; Direct and Specific Instructions on Many Items for the General Assembly, .93; Direct and Specific Instructions on Many Items for the Security Council, .33.

Factor 13: Often Secure Help from Experts Outside Own Delegation, .86.

Factor 14: Much Discussion and Negotiation Outside U.N. Building, .80.

Collectively, the factors account for 78.39 per cent of the original variance. For the most part, each of the individual questionnaire items were well accounted for, with 25 of the 38 items (65 per cent) having more than 75 per cent of their variance accounted for by the 14 factors. The lowest communality is .58 and concerns the number of hours spent on a weekly basis in respect to administration of staff.

The analysis, then, has reduced the questionnaire data to 14 orthogonal dimensions which "represent" the original information. In this form, the new variables (factor dimensions) lend themselves to additional tests concerning the relationship of the attributes to the questionnaire data and allow viewing such tests as having a bearing upon certain theoretical elaborations pertinent to international relations.

A THEORETICAL INTERPRETATION

The theory referred to is Attribute Theory. In equation form it may be succinctly stated as:

$$w_{ik} = \sum_{l=1}^p \beta_{il} s_{lth}$$

where w_{ik} is the *total behaviour* of nation i on the k th behavioural dimension, s_{lth} is the l th attribute dimension of the p -dimensional space of nation attributes, and β_{il} ²⁸

the corresponding parameters.

Axioms developed in connection with Social Field Theory and relevant to the above formulation distinguish between A-space and B-space, referring, respectively, to attributes and behaviour.


The axioms are: (1) "international relations is a field consisting of all of the attributes and interactions of nations and their complex interrelationships", (2) "the international field can be analytically divided into attribute, A, and behaviour, B, spaces in which attributes and interactions are projected, respectively, as vectors",

(3) "the attribute and behavioural spaces are generated by a finite set of linear independent dimensions", (4) "nations are located as vectors in attribute and behaviour space", (5) "the vectors in A-space...are...forces determining the location of... (nations)...in B-space", and (7) "B-space is a subspace of A-space".²⁹


That is, we expect the dimensions of behaviour to be accounted for, from a correlational point of view, by the dimensions generated from the attributes.

It should be evident that the preceding analysis of attributes and the questionnaire data (viewed as behaviour) sets up or allows a test of the theory.³⁰

In this connection, some questions have been raised elsewhere³¹ about attribute theory in its present form. Schematically, the theory seems to assert that:



where A represents A-space and B represents B-space. The diagram captures the notion that all of B-space will be accounted for by A-space and that A-space has as many or more dimensions than B-space. Efforts at testing, using other data, in particular, U.N. voting and delegate attitude data, suggest that a more fruitful model might posit:



which suggests that only certain dimensions of A-space will be related to certain portions of B-space. This is tantamount to asserting that attribute theory is "incomplete" in the sense that, when cast in this form, there is no expectation that all of B-space variance is going to be accounted for by A-space variance. Thus, it fosters a search for those dimensions of A-space that are best related to whatever B-space domain is under consideration in a particular study. In this connection, it has been asserted:

Economic Development *may be* a primary determinant of international behaviour. If a large number of variables pertaining to the national attributes of states are factor analyzed, an Economic Development dimension should emerge. If it is related to other measures of international phenomena, it should show superior predictive relevance, compared to other factor dimensions. Regarding the United Nations, if an assessment can be made of the phenomena of concern in negative-positive terms, as when the content is attitudinal, voting, etc., then high development will predict negative orientations. More concretely, it should predict oppositional behaviour, dissatisfaction, static perceptions and generally non-progressive orientations. Although other predictors should

show some predictive relevance, their importance should be considerably less than that of Economic Development. The most important other predictors appear to be Democracy and U.S.A. Relations, which probably will also emerge from any cross-sectional factor analysis of national attribute variables. These latter factors should predict, in U.N. studies, negative orientations in respect to some phenomena and positive in respect to others, if such negative-positive assessments can be made. All remaining factors should be of minor consequence. Finally, the relative importance of the three major predictors, in terms of their relationship to various international phenomena, should assume roughly the following balance: Economic Development, .7, Democracy, .4, U.S.A. Relations, .3.³²

as: This elaboration stems from an earlier one given

States differ in their economic development. States with higher economic development generally have higher capabilities to supply needs regardless of international organization affiliation than states with lower economic development. International organizations may be considered devices which augment in a limited way the capabilities of states. Because the capabilities of developed states are already high the contributions of international organizations to their capacities are generally less significant as a fraction of total capabilities than in the case of states with lower development. Because statesmen may value an augmentation of capabilities to the extent that it is a significant increment, representatives from underdeveloped states may generally value international organizations more than representatives from developed states. This may be particularly true if representatives from underdeveloped states are in a position to have a considerable voice in the organization (i.e.,

have a majority where majority rule is used). Thus, attitudinal differences might be expected among statesmen towards the United Nations and the international system relating to their home states' economic development. One might expect, for example, that representatives from economically underdeveloped states would be more inclined to wish to bolster the position of the organization than representatives from developed states.³³

The alterations in respect to the earlier statement stemmed from various projects probing attitudinal and voting behaviour.

It seems reasonable, therefore, to examine the present data in terms of these guiding notions. In line with the procedures employed in the most recent previous tests, the two sets of factor dimensions, one, attribute, conceptualized as representing A-space, and the other, questionnaire, conceptualized as representing a domain of B-space, were correlated, using the canonical correlation technique.³⁴ A correlation of .84 was revealed between the two sets, with Economic Development given the largest weight (.63), but the correlation was not significant at the .05 level (producing a Chi square of 240 with 210 degrees freedom).

This suggests a rejection of the model of attribute theory that posits that all of B-space (or a domain of B-space) will be accounted for by A-space (in other than random terms).³⁵ However, because there are a large number of predictors used in this study compared to the number of subjects, a very high canonical correlation is required to achieve significance. To put the matter in other terms, if the sample size had been considerably larger, it is possible that a correlation of this magnitude would be significant, given the number of variables treated in the two sets.³⁶

Above it was suggested that the most fruitful explorations may concern Economic Development, Authoritarianism, and U.S.A. Relations, rather than all attribute

FIGURE 2.

First Canonical Correlation (.70)

Democretic	Class U.S. Relations	Attribute Canonical Variates Scores	Questionnaire Canonical Variates Scores	F3	F8	F10
Effective Constitutional Limitations	.95	Large Percentage Imports of Total From U.S. .92		Outside UN discussion takes place equally in delegation offices, informal luncheons and social functions .84	At Mission office, much percent of time spent in conference .97	Much discussion and negotia- tion outside UN Building .90
Current Electoral System Competitive	.89	Large Percentage Exports of Total to U.S. .77			At Mission office, much percent of time spent in other activities -.87	
Current Regime is Representative	.86	Large Dollar Imports From U.S. .65				
Freedom of Group Opposition	.86	Large Dollar Exports to U.S. .61		Outside UN negotiation discussion takes place in informal luncheons -.76		
.91	+ .42	Allied with U.S. .58		.81	+ .50	+ .28
				Outside UN negotiation discussion takes place in social functions -.85		
Authoritarian	For U.S. Relations					

Second Canonical Correlation (.69)

Under-developed	Class U.S. Relations	Attribute Canonical Variate Scores	Questionnaire Canonical Variate Scores	F2	F5	F12	
Very low Newspaper Circulation Per 1000 Population	.96	Large Percentage Imports of Total from U.S. .82		Frequently communicate with home government during a General Assembly Session	At UN building, much percent of time spent in informal meetings .66	Direct and specific instructions on many items for the Economic and Social Council .94	
Few Radio Per 1000 Population	.91	Large Percentage Exports of Total to U.S. .77			-.51	Many hours spent meet- ing with other delegates .61	Direct and specific instructions on many items for the General Assembly .93
Large number of Inhabitants Per Physician	.90	Large Dollar Imports from U.S. .85		At UN building, much percentage of time taken in formal meet- ings	-.57		
.93	-.35	Large Dollar Exports to U.S. .61		Often find it necessary to alter position in order to preceed in discussions	+.28	+.39	
Large Percent- age Illiterates in Population Age 15 & Over	.87	Allied with U.S. .55			-.78		Direct and specific instructions on many items for the Security Council .33
Very Low Per Capita Gross National Product	.87			Initial personal position is often modified after hearing the point of view of other delegates	-.81		
Non-Western	.86						
Developed	Far U.S. Relations						

dimensions. In line with this, it was decided to correlate only those dimensions which most closely approximate those stated in the formulation. This creates certain problems, however, in that, in all previous analyses of this type, U.S.A. Relations has emerged as a fairly "clean" dimension in the sense that the title, "U.S.A. Relations", can be given to one of the factor dimensions without much argument. In the present study, many of the variables loading on the previously obtained "U.S.A. Relations" dimension loaded instead on a dimension titled "Distance from U.S.S.R." (because that variable had the heaviest loading on the dimension--Factor 11).³⁷ For this reason, it was decided to correlate Factor 11, along with Factors 1 and 2, (which closely match Economic Development and Authoritarianism, respectively, as defined in previous studies) with the questionnaire dimensions. In this case, the canonical technique produces one significant correlation (.70) with weights given to the predictors as follows: Economic Development (.28), Authoritarianism (.93), U.S.S.R. Distance (-.19). The second (not significant) correlation (.63) weighted the dimensions as follows: Economic Development (.75), Authoritarianism (-.09), and U.S.S.R. Distance (.65).

After examination of these results, it was decided to see if interpretation could be improved somewhat by using the scale values (for the present sample) obtained from a previous project, where the "U.S.A. Relations" dimension emerges as "clean" as the "Economic Development" and "Authoritarianism" dimensions.³⁸ The obtained results are given in Figure 2.

Considering the first canonical correlation, the vertical lines symbolize sets of scores. For example, the first line with polar extremes of Democratic and Authoritarian represents Attribute Factor 2.³⁹ Variables which load heaviest on the dimension are also given. For example, the variable, Effective Constitutional Limitations, correlates .96 with Factor 2; Current Electoral System Competitive, .89, and so forth. States with high scores on the dimensions, then, tend to have these characteristics.⁴⁰ The second line symbolizes

the U.S.A. Relations dimension and may be interpreted in the same terms. These two dimensions are primarily responsible for the distribution of scores titled Attribute Canonical Variate Scores. (The weight assigned to the Economic Development dimension is .03, and so its effect on the distribution of attribute canonical variate scores is virtually nil.) That is, if we combine these two dimensions by the weights given, .91, in the case of the Democratic--Authoritarian dimension, and .42 in the case of close U.S.A. Relations--Far U.S.A. Relations, we get, for all practical purposes, the canonical variate side.⁴¹ These scores are correlated .70 (the canonical correlation) with the questionnaire canonical variate scores, which in turn are derived primarily from Factors 3, 8, and 14, generated from the factor analysis of the questionnaire. Those states that are both democratic and have close U.S.A. Relations, then, tend to divide their outside U.N. discussions equally between delegation meetings, informal luncheons, and social functions; spend much time at the Mission office in conferences, but not "other activities"; and engage in much negotiation and discussion outside the U.N. Building. To put it another way, if a delegation possesses all of the above behavioural characteristics, then it is likely to be a delegation that is derived from a country that is democratic and has close U.S.A. relations. Because of promises made to the delegates concerning keeping their responses secret, it is not possible to list the canonical variate scores for the sample.⁴² To conceal the respondents while still honouring the pledge, it is possible to list the canonical variate scores for the universe of states (assuming these weights would be generated by an analysis based on the universe.) In such a case, we get the listing given in Table 1.

To put it another way, if all delegates participated in the survey, and the weights arrived at in this sample were to hold for the universe, the list gives the canonical variate scores on the attribute side. It is not

possible to compute the questionnaire canonical variate scores, of course, because the non-sample delegations are not located on the questionnaire factor score dimensions. States at the top of the list, then, tend to be democratic, with close U.S.A. relations, and tend to possess the behavioural characteristics enumerated above.⁴³

The second canonical correlation may be treated in exactly the same terms as the first, although it deals with variance left over, that is, not accounted for, in the previous analysis. Here, underdeveloped states, with far U.S.A. relations, tend to be at the top of the attribute canonical variate scores distribution and they tend not to modify their position after hearing other delegates, not alter their position to proceed in discussions, not spend a great deal of time in formal meetings in the U.N. Building, not communicate frequently with their home governments during a General Assembly session, not spend a large percentage of time in informal meetings in the U.N. Building, not spend many hours meeting with other delegates, and receive direct and specific instructions on few items for the Economic and Social Council, General Assembly and Security Council. As before, to put it in other terms, if we find a delegation which has these characteristics it is likely to be a delegation from an underdeveloped state, with far U.S.A. relations. Conversely, of course, developed states, with close U.S.A. relations, tend to have the opposite characteristics. (Again, the attribute canonical variate scores are made up almost entirely of a linear combination of two dimensions, in that the Democratic, Authoritarian dimension in the second canonical correlation only receives a weight of .13.) If the universe of states are scaled, as in the previous case, according to these weights, we get the list shown on page 33.

Thus, we can see what the universe of attribute canonical variate scores would look like if the same weights hold for an analysis done on the universe of respondents.

TABLE 1

Canonical Correlation Variate Scores of Universe of States, Applying Weights Generated by an Analysis of
Sample of States (First Correlation = .70)

99	TRINIDAD	1.7P	9	BRAZIL	0.61	11	BURMA	-0.41
30	DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	1.43	17	CEYLON	0.60	86	RWANDA	-0.42
82	PHILIPPINES	1.42	35	FRANCE	0.59	18	CHAD	-0.44
35	JAMAICA	1.39	119	MALTA	0.57	87	SAUDI ARABIA	-0.48
109	VENEZUELA	1.38	40	GREECE	0.53	98	TOGO	-0.48
126	MALAYSIA	1.34	117	LESOTHO	0.53	66	MALI	-0.49
47	INDIA	1.31	70	MOROCCO	0.52	36	GABON	-0.52
5	AUSTRALIA	1.29	6	AUSTRIA	0.51	42	GUINEA	-0.58
15	CANADA	1.22	129	TAIWAN	0.50	107	UPPER VOLTA	-0.60
56	JAPAN	1.13	121	ZAMBIA	0.43	57	JORDAN	-0.61
101	TURKEY	1.11	115	GAMBIA	0.41	1	AFGHANISTAN	-0.62
52	ISRAEL	1.10	26	CYPRUS	0.40	32	EL SALVADOR	-0.63
105	UNITED KINGDOM	1.09	81	PERU	0.39	112	YEMEN	-0.67
64	LUXEMBOURG	1.08	4	ARGENTINA	0.37	13	CAMBODIA	-0.68
72	NETHERLANDS	1.05	120	TANZANIA	0.36	33	ETHIOPIA	-0.69
65	MALAGASY REP	1.02	14	CAMEROON	0.32	28	DAHOMEY	-0.76
77	NUHMAY	1.01	116	KUWAIT	0.32	80	PARAGUAY	-0.77
73	NEW ZEALAND	0.98	23	CONGO (LEO)	0.23	111	SOUTH VIETNAM	-0.83
46	ICELAND	0.97	44	HONDURAS	0.22	39	GHANA	-0.84
19	CHILE	0.96	74	NICARAGUA	0.21	93	SUDAN	-0.88
128	BARBADOS	0.96	90	SOMALIA	0.19	16	CENTRAL AFRICAN REP	-0.88
125	GUYANA	0.94	118	MALAWI	0.17	22	CONGO (BRA)	-0.91
94	SWEDEN	0.94	114	BOTSWANA	0.16	104	U.A.R.	-0.96
89	SIERRA LEONE	0.93	106	UNITED STATES	0.14	3	ALGERIA	-1.08
38	WEST GERMANY	0.91	127	MALDIVES ISLANDS	0.14	113	YUGOSLAVIA	-1.21
76	NIGERIA	0.91	67	MAURITANIA	0.12	71	NEPAL	-1.24
108	URUGUAY	0.89	61	LEBANON	0.11	84	PORTUGAL	-1.31
95	SWITZERLAND	0.88	91	SOUTH AFRICA	0.04	92	SPAIN	-1.35
53	ITALY	0.85	123	W. SAMOA	0.03	103	U.S.S.R.	-1.41
7	BELGIUM	0.84	12	BURUNDI	0.03	2	ALBANIA	-1.73
124	SINGAPORE	0.84	41	GUATEMALA	-0.02	25	CUBA	-1.78
24	COSTA RICA	0.83	48	INDONESIA	-0.18	83	POLAND	-1.79
29	DENMARK	0.81	78	PAKISTAN	-0.21	27	CZECHOSLOVAKIA	-1.90
102	UGANDA	0.80	62	LIBERIA	-0.26	10	BULGARIA	-1.99
63	LIBYA	0.72	100	TUNISIA	-0.27	69	MONGOLIA	-2.07
21	COLOMBIA	0.71	60	LACS	-0.27	110	NORTH VIETNAM	-2.08
31	ECUADOR	0.66	54	IVORY COAST	-0.29	85	ROMANIA	-2.15
8	BOLIVIA	0.65	97	THAILAND	-0.33	45	HUNGARY	-2.22
34	FINLAND	0.63	59	SOUTH KOREA	-0.34	58	NORTH KOREA	-2.24
68	MEXICO	0.63	96	SYRIA	-0.36	37	EAST GERMANY	-2.36
51	IRELAND	0.62	50	IRAQ	-0.39	20	CHINA, PR	-2.40
122	KENYA	0.62	88	SENEGAL	-0.40			
79	PANAMA	0.62	49	IRAN	-0.40			
			43	HAITI	-0.41			
			75	NIGER	-0.41			

These results, then, are consistent with the theoretical formulation given above concerning the potential importance of these three factors in explaining international behaviour. That is, attribute theory in its unqualified form tends to be refuted in the sense that no significant canonical correlation emerges when all of the attribute dimensions are utilized. On the other hand, when the three attribute dimensions mentioned in the theoretical formulation are employed, two significant canonical correlations emerge, and the two most important predictors, in terms of the magnitude of the weights are Development and Authoritarianism. An interesting finding in this regard is the up-grading of Authoritarianism vis-a-vis Development. That is, the relative importance of the factors as given in the theoretical formulation based on previous studies, obviously does not hold here. Economic Development, however, clearly exists as an important predictor in respect to these matters, while Authoritarianism seems to assume a greater importance than would have been predicted on the basis of past findings. (It is possible in this connection that the behaviour space notion ought to be thought of in terms of "partitions" or "subspaces" in which the relative importance of the factors varies as one moves from one subspace to the other.) This study suggests that in the domain of delegate instructions and delegate behaviour at the U.N., the Authoritarianism factor assumes greater importance than it does, say, in the domain of delegate attitudes or in respect to certain organizational factors.

SUMMARY

The purpose of this paper was to provide some concrete descriptions of delegate behaviour at the United Nations and to relate indices gathered in this regard to national attribute measures, as a further test of Attribute Theory in the United Nations setting. The results suggest that Attribute Theory can be conceptualized in "partial terms". That is, only certain attribute dimensions appear to have primary

TABLE 2 Canonical Correlation Variate Scores of Universe of States, Applying Weights Generated by an Analysis of Sample of States (Second Correlation = .69)

115	GAMBIA	1.75	34	IVORY COAST	0.52	31	ECUADOR	-0.58
117	LESOTHO	1.74	38	NORTH KOREA	0.50	38	WEST GERMANY	-0.58
122	KENYA	1.66	20	CHINA, PR	0.50	24	COSTA RICA	-0.62
71	NEPAL	1.63	16	CENTRAL AFRICAN REP	0.50	41	GUATEMALA	-0.64
89	SIERRA LEONE	1.52	97	THAILAND	0.46	74	NICARAGUA	-0.73
114	BOTSWANA	1.50	48	INDONESIA	0.45	72	NETHERLANDS	-0.76
13	CAMBODIA	1.44	126	MALAYSIA	0.38	85	ROMANIA	-0.77
102	UGANDA	1.43	100	TUNISIA	0.33	113	YUGOSLAVIA	-0.78
76	NIGERIA	1.42	101	TURKEY	0.28	51	IRELAND	-0.80
65	MALAGASY REP	1.42	125	GUYANA	0.27	44	HONDURAS	-0.81
66	MALI	1.39	39	GHANA	0.24	64	LUXEMBOURG	-0.82
75	NIGER	1.34	96	SYRIA	0.18	116	KUWAIT	-0.85
127	MALDIVE ISLANDS	1.32	87	SAUDI ARABIA	0.14	95	SWITZERLAND	-0.87
14	CAMEROON	1.32	111	SOUTH VIETNAM	0.13	34	FINLAND	-0.88
107	UPPER VOLTA	1.32	42	GUINEA	0.10	81	PERU	-0.88
120	TANZANIA	1.32	3	ALGERIA	0.09	109	VENEZUELA	-0.90
90	SOMALIA	1.30	8	BOLIVIA	0.04	108	URUGUAY	-0.91
112	YEMEN	1.29	78	PAKISTAN	-0.02	32	EL SALVADOR	-0.92
18	CHAD	1.23	59	SOUTH KOREA	-0.10	10	BULGARIA	-0.92
11	RUSSIA	1.19	43	HAITI	-0.11	19	CHILE	-0.92
118	MALAWI	1.14	82	PHILIPPINES	-0.17	129	TAIWAN	-0.94
60	LAOS	1.15	40	GREECE	-0.17	77	NORWAY	-0.97
28	CAHONEY	1.13	9	BRAZIL	-0.19	79	PANAMA	-1.00
1	AFGHANISTAN	1.12	128	BARBADOS	-0.20	84	PORTUGAL	-1.01
93	SUDAN	1.10	26	CYPRUS	-0.21	80	PARAGUAY	-1.03
98	TUGO	1.04	62	LIBERIA	-0.21	35	FRANCE	-1.03
121	ZAMBIA	1.03	2	ALBANIA	-0.22	94	SWEDEN	-1.07
33	ETHIOPIA	1.02	36	GABON	-0.22	4	ARGENTINA	-1.07
63	LIBYA	1.01	53	ITALY	-0.22	7	BELGIUM	-1.11
86	RWANDA	0.95	124	SINGAPORE	-0.27	29	DENMARK	-1.18
70	MOROCCO	0.93	55	JAMAICA	-0.28	83	POLAND	-1.24
67	MAURITANIA	0.90	30	DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	-0.20	45	HUNGARY	-1.27
47	INDIA	0.88	6	AUSTRIA	-0.29	105	UNITED KINGDOM	-1.31
23	CONGO (LEO)	0.82	106	UNITED STATES	-0.31	103	U.S.S.R.	-1.32
88	SENEGAL	0.80	61	LEBANON	-0.37	86	ICELAND	-1.35
49	IRAN	0.78	119	MALTA	-0.45	27	CZECHOSLOVAKIA	-1.40
17	CEYLON	0.75	21	COLOMBIA	-0.48	92	SPAIN	-1.42
123	W. SAMOA	0.72	68	MEXICO	-0.49	15	CANADA	-1.53
22	CONGO (BRA)	0.64	104	U.A.R.	-0.52	52	ISRAEL	-1.55
110	NORTH VIETNAM	0.63	99	TRINIDAD	-0.52	37	EAST GERMANY	-1.58
57	JORDAN	0.60	56	JAPAN	-0.55	5	AUSTRALIA	-1.72
12	BURUNDI	0.56	69	MONGOLIA	-0.55	91	SOUTH AFRICA	-1.80
50	IRAQ	0.53	25	CUBA	-0.55	73	NEW ZEALAND	-2.20

relevance to United Nations behaviour so far treated. In the present case, although several simple correlations were simple correlations were significant when attribute dimensions were correlated with individual questionnaire items, a significant canonical correlation *could not* be achieved when all attribute dimensions were considered at once. Limiting consideration to the three attribute dimensions (identified by prior studies as being possibly of paramount importance in explaining IR behaviour) produced two significant canonical correlations. The previous assumptions about the relative balance of the predictive weights, however, was not borne out, in the sense that Authoritarianism assumed a considerably greater importance in this domain of behaviour than it has in domains previously explored. On the other hand, Economic Development maintained its previously established predictive relevance. Attribute Theory, then, still retains its viability, when conceptualized in the "partial sense" developed above (at least for this domain of behaviour) although the previous assertions concerning the balance between Economic Development, Authoritarianism, and U.S.A. Relations appear qualified by these results.

FOOTNOTES

1. I would like to thank Nancy Watts, as research assistant; Carol Jones, as programmer; Myrtle Cassel, as typist; and the FAU Research Committee for its funding out of NSF monies.
2. Richard F. Pederson, "National Representation in the United Nations", *International Organization*, 15 (1961) p. 258.
3. Robert O. Keohane, "Political Influence in the General Assembly" *International Conciliation*, 555(1966) p.37.
4. Cecil B. Crabb, Jr., *American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age* (Elmsford, N.Y.: Row, Peterson and Company, 1960) p. 442f.
5. This effort is part of the research series which attempts to test "Attribute Theory" or the idea that knowledge concerning the attributes of states allows predictions in respect to their behaviour (or their actors). An equation and a set of axioms formally developing this primary notion will be given later.

The primary publications in the research series are: Jack E. Vincent, *The Caucusing Groups at the United Nations: An Examination of their Attitudes Toward the Organization* (Stillwater: Oklahoma State University Press, 1965); Jack E. Vincent, "National Attributes as Predictors of Delegate Attitudes at the United Nations", *American Political Science Review*, 62 (1968) 916-931; Jack E. Vincent, "The Convergence of Voting and Attitude Patterns at the United Nations", *Journal of Politics*, 31 (1969) 952-983; Jack E. Vincent, "An Analysis of Caucusing Group Activity at the United Nations", *Journal of Peace Research*, 2 (1970) 133-150; Jack E. Vincent, "An Analysis of Attitude Patterns at the United Nations", *Quarterly Journal*

of the Florida Academy of Sciences, 32 (1969) 185-209; Jack E. Vincent, "Predicting Voting Patterns in the General Assembly", *American Political Science Review*, 65 (1971) 471-498; Jack E. Vincent, "Testing Some Hypotheses about Delegate Attitudes at the United Nations and Some Implications for Theory Building", *Research Report No. 52*, Dimensionality of Nations Project, University of Hawaii, 1971; Jack E. Vincent, "An Examination of Voting Patterns in the 23rd and 24th Sessions of the General Assembly", *Research Report No. 54*, Dimensionality of Nations Project, University of Hawaii, 1971; and Jack E. Vincent, "An Application of Attribute Theory to General Assembly Voting Patterns and Some Implications", *International Organization*, 26 (1972) 551-582.

6. For example, Vincent, *The Caucusing Groups of the United Nations*, *op. cit.*, used a sample of 61; Vincent, "National Attributes as Predictors of Delegate Attitudes..." *op. cit.*, used a sample of 68; Vincent, "The Convergence of Attitude and Voting Patterns..." *op. cit.* used a sample of 68; and Vincent, "Testing Some Hypotheses about Delegate Attitudes..." *op. cit.*, used 65.

7. Data was collected from October 1969 to January 1971.

8. See: Vincent, "An Analysis of Caucusing Group Activity..." *op. cit.*, for an analysis of these groups.

9. For a description of the tests, see: G. Milton Smith, *A Simplified Guide to Statistics for Psychology and Education* (New York: Rinehart and Company, 1946) 55-60; also see: Norman H. Anderson, "Scales and Statistics: Parametric and Non-Parametric", *Psychological Bulletin* 58 (1961) 305-316 for a justification of using a means test in conjunction with ordinal scale measurements.

10. A pioneer effort in this regard was Gary Best, "Diplomacy in the United Nations", (Northwestern University Ph.D. dissertation, 1960). Best systematically compares U.N. diplomacy with capital diplomacy and concludes:

There ~~are~~ channels of communication available in New

York that are not available in national capitals. There is information accessible at the United Nations which is not accessible in national capitals. The processes for the negotiation of issues do vary in the two types of diplomacy in ways which may promote or hinder particular foreign policy goals. These differences, in addition to being important in and of themselves, are related to some other basic problems in international relations, for example, the choice of diplomatic methods in the management of conflict. Best, *Diplomacy in the United Nations*, op. cit., p. 200.

For the most part, Best's efforts have not been followed up, partially because of the extreme difficulty in using delegates as a source of information.

11. An earlier and less detailed version of this model was first given in Vincent, "The Convergence of Voting and Attitude Patterns..." op. cit., p.976.

12. Hayward R. Alker Jr., and Bruce M. Russett, *World Politics in the General Assembly* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965) 218-219.

13. For discussions and applications of factor analysis, see: Harry H. Harman, *Modern Factor Analysis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960); Henry F. Kaiser, "The Varimax Criterion for Analytical Rotation in Factor Analysis" *Psychometrika* 23 (1958) 187-200; Henry F. Kaiser, "Computer Program for Varimax Rotation in Factor Analysis", *Educational and Psychological Measurements*, Vol. 19, (1959) 413-430; Dean J. Clyde, Elliott M. Cramer, Richard J. Sharin, *Multivariate Statistical Programs* (Coral Gables, Florida: University of Miami, 1966) 15-19; Bruce M. Russett, *International Regions in International Integration* (Chicago: Rand, McNally 1968); R.J. Rummel, "Dimensions of Conflict

Behaviour Within and Between Nations", *General Systems*, Yearbook for the Advancement of General Systems Theory (Ann Arbor, Mich: 1963); Arthur S. Banks and Phillip M. Gregg, "Grouping Political Systems Through Factor Analysis of A Cross Polity Survey," *The American Behavioural Scientist*, Vol. 9 (1965) 3-6; Phillip M. Gregg and Arthur S. Banks, "Dimensions of Political Systems: Factor Analysis of A Cross Polity Survey", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 59 (1965) 602-614; Raymond Tanter, "Dimensions of Conflict Behaviour Within and Between Nations, 1958-1960" *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 10 (1966), 41-64; R.J. Rummel, "Dimensions of Conflict Behaviour Within Nations 1946-1959". *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 10 (1966) 65-73; Jack E. Vincent, *Factor Analysis in International Relations: Interpretation, Problem Areas and an Application* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1971); R.J. Rummel, *Applied Factor Analysis* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970); Jack E. Vincent, "Factor Analysis as a Research Tool in International Relations: Some Problem Areas, Some Suggestions and an Application", *Proceedings of the 65th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association* (New York, 1969); Raymond B. Cattell, "The Meaning and Strategic Use of Factor Analysis", in Raymond B. Cattell (ed.) *Handbook of Multivariate Experimental Psychology* (Chicago: Rand, McNally & Co., 1966) 174-243; Raymond B. Cattell, "The Basis of Recognition and Interpretation of Factors", *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, Vol. 22 (1962) 667-695.

The principal component solution was employed. Unities were placed in the principal diagonal correlation matrix and the factor matrix was rotated, using Kaiser's varimax criterion. The minimum eigenvalue for which a factor was rotated was 1.0. The purpose of the factor analysis in this study and those studies previously cited in the research series has been to reduce a large number of indices with varying degrees of correlation to a smaller set of indices which are orthogonal. The advantages of such an approach are treated in detail in Vincent, *Factor Analysis in International Relations...*, *op. cit.* The recommended formula for the computation of factor scores in this regard was employed, that is $F=ZA(A'A)^{-1}$ where F is an $N \times m$ matrix of factor scores, Z is an $N \times n$ matrix

of scores on the original variables in standard score form, A is an $n \times m$ matrix of factor co-efficients (loadings) and N =subjects, n = variables, and m = factors.

14. All questionnaire items are treated in detail in the following section so the questionnaire itself has not been reproduced to save space.

15. Fiducial limits refer to the range within which the means are expected to fall, given a particular confidence level. The .05 level is used throughout the study. The setting of fiducial limits assumes that the distribution of sample means, if repeated samples are taken, will be normally distributed. It does not assume that the sample or universe distributions are perfectly normal. See: Smith, *A Simplified Guide to Statistics...op. cit.*, pp. 54-55.

16. It was decided to operate at the .01 level so that from a descriptive standpoint correlations are larger. Correlations must reach .33 to be significant at the .01 level, given this N . If it is argued that a test of significance is not meaningful because a true random sample has not been employed (where the characteristics of a universe are estimated from a sample) *it is still possible to compare the observed correlation with the probability of getting it, if we had started with random numbers.* In this connection, all numbers are converted to rank numbers before the application of the test (that is, the correlations are Spearman's *Rho* correlations). Thus, if two sets of rank numbers from 1 to 58 are randomly matched, the probability of obtaining a correlation of a magnitude of .33 is .01.

17. I use terms such as "bigger states" to indicate what kind of states I am referring to in respect to the factor dimensions. Thus, in this case, I am referring to states which stand high on the "Bigness" dimension (3rd factor dimension in the rotated analysis of attributes). In

such usage, it should be clearly understood that the factor dimension refers to a set of scores, i.e., factor scores, with predictive power back to the original variables as given by the loadings. Thus, for example, the Bigness factor scores can account for $.82^2$ or 67% of the variance of the variable, Large Gross National Product, etc.

18. It was expected that delegates from underdeveloped states would be instructed less than delegates from developed states, which, of course, was suggested by Keohane in the earlier citation (footnote 3). It will be seen later, however, that this interpretation in terms of simple correlations must be modified when an advanced form of correlational analysis--canonical correlation-- is employed.

19. The above comment concerning the General Assembly also applies in the case of the Security Council (see footnote 18).

20. It must be stressed again that these statements pertain only to the simple correlational analysis. When more advanced techniques are employed, Development is enhanced as a predictor. Both modes of analysis are given in this paper because one mode, that is, simple correlation, enables us to focus upon individual items, whereas canonical correlation, which will be explained in detail later, as applied here, generates correlational fit at a higher level of abstraction.

21. Answer categories were coded as follows: Lengthy and detailed = 4.0; specific on some items but allows considerable freedom of action on others = 3.0; basically general instructions = 2.0; and few instructions = 1.0.

22. The percentages given above are for the category under consideration vs. all other categories lumped together. Because each category could be chosen independently of the others, the percentages do not necessarily sum to 100. The same is true of similar analyses which follow.

23. It should be noted that this question taps alteration in position whereas the previous question taps alteration in personal opinion (and not necessarily alteration in position).

24. Each category is averaged independently of the others and hence the categories do not necessarily sum to 100.

25. The phrase "other activities" evoked a variety of responses, including receiving other ambassadors, staff and policy co-ordination, entertainment, appointments and contacts, study and visitors.

26. "Other activities" included writing speeches, giving instructions to junior officers, newspapers, documentation, reporting and lectures.

27. The same methods were employed as in the case of the attribute measures. It was most convenient in this case to simply name the factors, using the titles of Factor 1, Factor 2, etc. As indicated previously, substantive names can neither add to nor subtract from what is basic about the analysis, that is, the relationship of the original variables to the factor scores, which is given by the loadings. Such procedures are consistent with those employed in Vincent, "Testing Some Hypotheses about Delegate Attitudes..." *op.cit.*, and a fully developed argument in this regard is given in Vincent, *Factor Analysis in International Relations*, *op. cit.*

28. See: R.J. Rummel, "Field and Attribute Theories of National Behaviour: Some Mathematical Interrelationships", *Research Report No. 31*, Dimensionality of Nations Project, University of Hawaii, 1969, p.7.

29. See R.J. Rummel: "Field Theory and Indicators of International Behaviour", *Research Report No. 29*,

Dimensionality of Nations Project, University of Hawaii, 1969, pp. 10-17. Rummel has only presented axioms worded in such a way as to be appropriate for Social Field Theory. The above axioms have been re-worded to make them consistent with Attribute Theory as applied in this study. The axioms jump from 5 to 7 because axiom 6 of Social Field Theory is dropped in its entirety.

30. For the purposes of the test, it is assumed that delegate behaviour can be equated with national behaviour. This is consistent with previous work by Rummel, where, for example, protests by officials, as recorded in the *New York Times*, are viewed as creating an index of national behaviour.

31. Further discussion upon this point can be found in Jack E. Vincent, "Comments on Social Field Theory", *Research Report No. 58*, Dimensionality of Nations Project, University of Hawaii, 1972; and Vincent, "An Application of Attribute Theory to General Assembly Voting Patterns..." *op. cit.*

32. Vincent, *Ibid.*

33. This was first presented in Vincent, "National Attributes as Predictors of Delegate Attitudes..." *op. cit.*, p. 930.

34. Canonical correlation may be viewed as a special kind of two-way multiple regression analysis. Its primary value is in showing what is important from a predictive point of view when one set of variables is used to predict another set of variables. Subjects can be given canonical variate scores in the application of such procedures and these scores have certain useful properties. They can be computed by the formula, $C = SW$, where C is an $N \times 1$ vector of canonical variate scores, S is an $N \times n$ matrix of the subjects standard scores on the original variables, and W is an $n \times 1$ vector of canonical weights, where N = subjects and n = variables.

See: Harold Hotelling, "Relations Between Two Sets

of Variates", *Biometrika*, 28 (1936) 321-377; Harold Hotelling, "The Most Predictable Criterion", *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 26 (1953) 139-142; T.W. Anderson, *An Introduction to Multivariate Statistical Analysis* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958), Chapter 12; M.S. Bartlett, "The Statistical Significance of Canonical Correlations", *Biometrika*, 32 (1941) 29-38; Paul Horst, *Generalized Canonical Correlations and Their Applications to Experimental Data* (Seattle: University of Washington, 1961, mimeographed); Paul Horst, "Relations Among m Sets of Measures", *Psychometrika*, 26 (1961), 129-149; M.G. Kendall, *A Course in Multivariate Analysis* (London: Charles Griffin and Co., 1957), Chapter 5; G. Thompson, "The Maximum Correlation of Two Weighted Batteries", *The British Journal of Psychology: Statistical Section*, Part 1 (1947) 27-34; Clyde, Cramer and Sharin, *op. cit.* pp. 4-8; and Jack E. Vincent, *Factor Analysis in International Relations... op. cit.*

35. It is possible to get a fairly high canonical correlation with random numbers if N is fairly small. The significance level tells us the likelihood of obtaining a particular magnitude of canonical correlation from random associations, and this, of course, can be compared with the observed value to make an assessment of its meaningfulness.

36. This is not known, however, and therefore, it is safer to proceed with fewer variables as carried out below.

37. This finding is not peculiar or unusual, given this sample size. To put it another way, the factors generated in the sample do not correspond perfectly with those generated in the universe, although most dimensions are highly similar.

38. See: Jack E. Vincent, "Scaling the Universe of States on Certain Useful Multivariate Dimensions", *The Journal of*

Social Psychology, 85 (1971), 261-283. The project reported in the above article locates 129 states on 19 dimensions generated from an analysis of 91 variables. In effect, then, the above analysis uses the location of the co-operative sample on the known universe of values, to fix location on the dimensions, instead of their location on factor structure as determined by an analysis of the sample.

In order to see whether the universe locations (as opposed to sample location) would affect the interpretation of simple correlational analysis, all 19 dimensions were run against the questionnaire data. No substantial differences in interpretation obtained from the results previously reported. In this connection, U.S.A. Relations does not do well as a predictor (no significant correlations) on a simple correlational basis.

39. It should be noted that in the study based on the universe of states, Development and Authoritarianism scale *in the opposite direction* to the one presented before based on the co-operative sample of states.

40. It should be stressed that only the heaviest loading variables are given here. See: Vincent, "Scaling the Universe of States...", *op. cit.*, pp. 270-272 for a complete list of loadings.

41. The term, "for all practical purposes", is used because in the actual computations the exact weights are employed, i.e., Economic Development is weighted $-.03$.

42. The power of the canonical technique can be illustrated by going to concrete cases and comparing predicted values with actual values in the analysis. For example, by arbitrarily selecting a country which has a high questionnaire canonical variate score, we would make the following kinds of predictions: On the questionnaire side, it should have strong positive deviations from the mean in respect to Factors 3, 8 and 14,

Further, it should have a high attribute score which implies that it should have positive deviations from the mean in respect to Democracy and U.S.A. Relations. It is not possible to reveal the attribute scores without revealing the identity of the subject chosen, but the prediction proved to be remarkably accurate, except for the degree of deviation in respect to U.S.A. Relations. That is, the subject in question has close to one standard deviation of deviation toward the positive side in respect to the attribute canonical variate scores and toward Democracy in respect to the Democratic-Authoritarian continuum and has about average U.S.A. Relations. On the questionnaire side, its deviations from the mean on Factors 3, 8 and 14 were .73, 1.4, and 1.65 respectively. In short, there was perfect agreement between predicted and observed results in respect to the questionnaire factor dimensions. Choosing now a subject with an extremely strong negative attribute canonical variate score, we would make the following predictions: Strong negative deviations toward Authoritarianism and Far U.S.A. Relations, a negative deviation in respect to the questionnaire canonical variate scores, which in turn implies negative deviations in respect to Factors 3, 8 and 14. In this case, the subject deviated toward Authoritarianism by almost two standard deviations, deviated toward U.S.A. Relations by approximately a standard deviation and a half, possessed a questionnaire canonical variate score of -2.80 and had deviation scores of -.93, -1.07, and -1.15 on Factors 3, 8 and 14, a perfect fit between expectations and actual scores. If one picks examples more toward the centre of the canonical variate distributions, of course, deviations in the predicted direction should not be as pronounced, and in some cases should actually go contrary to the predicted direction, given the probabilistic nature of the model.

43. It should be noted that the above universe list also includes non-U.N. members. Should they become U.N. members, and hold to the patterns established here, of course we

would predict they would exhibit the kinds of questionnaire characteristics treated above.

APPENDIX A (VARIABLES AND SOURCES)

1. Military personnel as a percentage of total population (1)
2. Population per 1,000 hectares of agricultural land (1)
3. Inhabitants per physician (1)
4. Gross National Product (1)
5. Inhabitants per hospital bed. (1)
6. Percentage of labour force employed in agriculture (1)
7. Annual percentage rate of increase in population (1)
8. Moslems as a percentage of population (1)
9. Roman Catholics as a percentage of total population (1)
10. All Christians as a percentage of total population (1)
11. Population per square kilometer (1)
12. Area in square kilometers (1)
13. Radios per 1,000 population (1)
14. Defence Expenditures as a percentage of Gross National Product (1)
15. Votes in national elections as a percentage of voting age population (1)
16. Military personnel as a percentage of population age 15-64 (1)
17. Students enrolled in higher education per 100,000 population (1)
18. Primary and secondary school pupils as a percentage of population age 5-19 (1)
19. Percentage literate rate of population age 15 and over(1)
20. Percentage literate of population age 15 and over, average annual increase (1)
21. Percentage export of total exports to U.S.A. (3)
22. Percentage import of total imports from U.S.A. (3)
23. Number in permanent missions at the United Nations (4)
24. Year entered the United Nations (5)
25. Military alliances (9)
26. Imports from the United States (7)
27. Exports to the United States (7)
28. Exports to the U.S.S.R. (7)

29. Imports from the U.S.S.R. (7)
30. Exports to Communist China (7)
31. Imports from Communist China (7)
32. Population (2)
33. Urbanization (2)
34. Agricultural population (2)
35. Per capita Gross National Product (2)
36. International financial status (2)
37. Economic development status (2)
38. Freedom of the press (2)
39. Newspaper circulation per 1,000 population (2)
40. Religious homogeneity (2)
41. Racial homogeneity (2)
42. Linguistic homogeneity (2)
43. Date of independence (2)
44. Westernization (2)
45. Political modernization (2)
46. System style (2)
47. Constitutional status of present regime (2)
48. Governmental stability (2)
49. Representative character of current regime (2)
50. Current electoral system (2)
51. Freedom of group opposition (2)
52. Political inculturation (2)
53. Sectionalism (2)
54. Interest articulation by associational groups (2)
55. Interest articulation by institutional groups (2)
56. Interest articulation by non-associational groups (2)
57. Interest articulation by anomic groups (2)
58. Interest articulation by political parties (2)
59. Interest aggregation by executive (2)
60. Interest aggregation by legislature (2)
61. Stability of party systems (2)
62. Personalissimo (2)
63. Political leadership (2)
64. Leadership charisma (2)
65. Vertical power distribution (2)
66. Horizontal power distribution (2)

67. Current status of legislature (2)
68. Character of Legislature (2)
69. Current status of executive (2)
70. Character of Bureaucracy (2)
71. Political participation by military (2)
72. Role of police (2)
73. Communist bloc (2)
74. Distance from U.S.A. (8)
75. Distance from U.S.S.R. (8)
76. Distance from China (8)
77. Military strength (6)

The following are primary sources (following above code): (1) Bruce M. Russett, *et. al.*, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964); (2) Arthur S. Banks and Robert Textor, *A Cross-Polity Survey* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1963); (3) Dan Golenpaul, ed., *Information Please Almanac 1968* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967); (4) *Permanent Missions to the United Nations*, United Nations document, March 1968; (5) Golenpaul, *op. cit.*; (6) *Reader's Digest Almanac and Yearbook 1968* (New York: Reader's Digest Association, 1967); (7) *Direction of Trade Annual 1962-66* (Washington: International Monetary Fund and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1967); (8) Great circle distance on a standard globe used. States with common border originally coded 0; (9) S.H. Steinberg, ed. *The Statesmen's Yearbook, 1966-67* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966). States coded "1" allied with U.S.A., "2" neutral, and "3" allied with U.S.S.R.

Additional resources include: Louis Barron, ed., *Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations: Africa* (New York: Worldmark Press Inc., 1963); Louis Barron, ed., *Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations: Africa; Asia; Australasia; Europe; the Americas* (New York: Worldmark Press, Inc., 1965); British Information Services, *Botswana*, (London: Curwen Press, 1963); British Information Services, *Kenya*,

(London: F. Mildner & Sons, 1963); British Information Services, *Lesotho*, (Norwich, England: Page Bros., Ltd., 1966); British Information Services, *Malta* ((Manchester, England: H.M. Stationery Office Press, 1964); British Information Services, *Zambia*, (Wilts, England: Swindon Press, Ltd., 1964); *Gallatin Business Intelligence: Africa; Asia; Oceania; the Americas*, (New York: Copley International Corporation, 1967); Norton Ginsberg, *Atlas of Economic Development* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 1964); Colin Legum, ed., *Africa: Handbook to the Continent* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1966); *Information Please Almanac and Yearbook 1967*, 22nd edition (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1966); *The Europa Yearbook 1967*, Volume 1, 11 (London: Europa Publications, Ltd., 1967); *The Gallatin Annual of International Business* (New York: American Heritage Publishing Co., Inc., 1965); *The Middle East*, 10th ed., (London, Europa Publications Ltd., 1963); *The U.S. Book of Facts, Statistics, and Information* (New York: Washington Square Press, Inc., 1966); United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *United Nations Statistical Yearbook*, (New York: U.S. Statistical Office, 1967); United Nations Office of Public Information, *Everyman's United Nations*, 7th ed. (New York, U.N. Office of Public Information, 1964); United States Department of State Publications, *Background Notes* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967); *Whitaker's Almanac 1967 and 1968* (London: William Clowes and Sons Ltd., 1966, 1967); *World Almanac and Book of Facts 1967 and 1968* (New York: Newspaper Enterprise Association, Inc., 1966, 1967); *World Economic Atlas*, 3rd edition, (London: Oxford University Press, 1965); *The Annual Register: World Events in 1966* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967); *The International Yearbook and Statesmen's Who's Who* (London: Burke's Peerage, Ltd., 1967).

Part 1, Section 4

ANALYZING U.S.--U.S.S.R. SUPPORT PATTERNS IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

INTRODUCTION¹

A research design requires some kind of conceptual base, that is, a set of organizing concepts around which the research effort is pursued. In this case, the primary notion is to identify the degree of support by states for the U.S.A. vs. U.S.S.R. in respect to their voting preferences in the General Assembly.² In addition, an effort will be made to "explain" such patterns, in correlational terms, using national attributes.³

For almost three decades the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. have been highly motivated actors in the General Assembly and the General Assembly has provided a forum in which the two super powers have vied for support in world affairs. This is not to say the only cause of voting by other states is such U.S.A. vs. U.S.S.R. influence. Nevertheless, considerable effort has been exerted by these two powers to get the other powers to agree with their position, and patterns have tended to be established in this regard. This has been fairly clearly established by Alker and Russett in their *World Politics and General Assembly*, where a persistent east vs. west dimension of General Assembly voting has been identified.⁴

No previous works, however, including that of Alker and Russett, approach the problem of U.S.A. vs. U.S.S.R. support in the General Assembly in such a way as to fully canvass the total spectrum of support patterns. Nor have the suggested modes of attack on General Assembly voting really been satisfactory in this regard.

For example, in 1960, Rieselbach suggested the

use of bloc analysis to identify similarly voting states (for grouping purposes) and indices such as the Index of Interagreement and Rice's Index of Cohesion to get at the problem of voting cohesiveness.⁵ Although these suggestions are potentially useful for certain types of problems, such methods do not adequately handle the research problem posed here.

Lijphart, in 1963, criticizes various attempts to identify voting groups in the General Assembly, especially methods put forward by Hovet, Furey and Riggs, and then supports the Rice-Beyle Method as being relatively free of what he views as shortcomings in the other methods.⁶ As useful as the Rice-Beyle Method is in identifying voting groups, i.e., to identify similarly voting states on large numbers of issues, it still does not directly attack the problem as conceptualized in this paper.

Rowe, in 1969, comes close to the thrust of the present project where he examines the voting success of various member states between the years 1945 and 1966 and compares the relative success of the United States and Soviet Union.⁷ Such an analysis, however, still does not provide a clear indication of the alternative U.S.A. vs. U.S.S.R. support patterns, nor a statistical explanation of them in terms of attributes.

In 1970, Newcombe, Ross and Newcombe attempted a factor analytic approach to U.S. General Assembly voting patterns, based on 1946-1963 data, in part replicating Alker and Russett's factor analytic applications to 1947, 1952, 1957, and 1961 data.⁸ The results supported the notion that increasing bi-polarization has occurred over time, with the Soviet and Afro-Asian on one side and the Latin American and Western nations on the other. As in the case of Alker and Russett, however, the analytical focus proposed here was not attempted.

In terms of focus, Rowe's 1971 effort is perhaps closest. Rowe compares the United States and the Soviet Union in respect to the 2nd through 21st Assembly Session, *on just*

Cold War issues, in terms of support. Rowe applied Lijphart's Index of Agreement to get at the problem of voting similarity. He treats all Cold War votes simultaneously, however, and did not apply the six-fold classification that will be suggested below. In addition, the only attribute-related data related to the support patterns were date of membership and geographic region.

A somewhat more tangential study was reported in 1971 by Clarke, O'Leary and Wittkopf.¹⁰ They attempted to relate 13 attribute measures, such as Years of Independence by End of 1963 and Gross Domestic Product, to *support for the United Nations*, as measured by indices such as Percentage of Votes Missed and Support Level for Supranational Issues.

RESEARCH DESIGN

The point of the above discussion is to indicate that, although some authors have indirectly approached the central problem of this research, none has directly approached it, in the sense of analyzing the voting support patterns in terms of the six possible categories of support the General Assembly voting scheme allows. In this connection, all votes in which the United States and the Soviet Union agree, that is, either vote "Yes" together, abstain together, or vote "No" together, will not be treated.¹¹ The central problem is to identify the patterns of support *when they are in disagreement*.

When the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. vote and are in disagreement, the following outcomes are possible: U.S.A. for, U.S.S.R. against; U.S.A. for, U.S.S.R. abstain; U.S.A. against, U.S.S.R. abstain; U.S.S.R. for, U.S.A. against; U.S.S.R. for, U.S.A. abstain; and U.S.S.R. against, U.S.A. abstain.

When the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. fall in any of the

above categories, other states must make up their minds as to how to vote.¹² To get at the problem of their voting distance from the U.S.A. or U.S.S.R. over a cluster of issues, the city block distance measure will be employed. That is, the distance from one nation to the U.S.A. in one category, such as U.S.A. for, U.S.S.R. against, is defined as:

$$\left| US_1 - i_1 \right| + \left| US_2 - i_2 \right| + \left| US_3 - i_3 \right| + \dots + \left| US_n - i_n \right| ,$$

where US refers to United States, i the state in question, and 1 to n refer to the votes in the category, i.e., 1 the first vote, 2 the second vote, etc.¹³ (The distance of a state from the U.S.S.R., of course, will be determined by substituting the U.S.S.R. into the formula.) Thus, if a state votes with the United States every time the U.S.S.R. votes against the United States, the distance of that state from the United States will be zero.

Votes will initially be coded: 3= yes, 2= abstain, and 1= no.¹⁴ All voting data will then be ranked and then z-scored (standardized) for the analytical advantages described by Alker and Russett.¹⁵ In other words, the distance formula will be applied to the rank z-scores generated in each of the above categories (U.S.A. for, U.S.S.R. against, etc.) for each session.

The distance measures will generate a great deal of useful information hitherto unreported. For example, the percentage of states voting with the United States, when the United States is for an issue and the U.S.S.R. against it, can be compared to the percentage of states voting with the U.S.S.R. when the U.S.S.R. is for an issue and the United States against it. Similar percentages can be generated for the other categories and numerous comparisons in this regard can be made. Also, each session can be compared with every other session in this regard. Thus, the shifting patterns of

support, by category, can be identified.

To make comparisons across sessions meaningful, the ~~distances~~ scores will be standardized. For example, the United States will have the highest negative z-score in the category of U.S.A. For, U.S.S.R. Against.¹⁶ All of the states with the same z-score (largest negative) will have voted identically with the United States on the issues in that category. In addition, all states with negative z-scores can be categorized as U.S.A. Leaning, while all those states with positive z-scores can be categorized as U.S.S.R. Leaning, and those states with the same score as the U.S.S.R. (largest positive z-score) will have voted identically with the U.S.S.R. (on those issues).¹⁷

In this way, precise blocs, i.e., identically voting states, for each issue cluster, can be identified, while all those outside the bloc can be characterized as either U.S.A. or U.S.S.R. Leaning, except in the case of a zero z-score (neither U.S.A. nor U.S.S.R. Leaning). In short, precise definitions of bloc and U.S.A. or U.S.S.R. Leaning can be generated for each of the categories for the sessions treated. Thus, the magnitude of the bloc sizes and those classified as U.S.A. vs. U.S.S.R. Leaning can be compared across the sessions.

In addition to the above tasks, an explanatory model relating national attributes to the voting pattern will be established. To facilitate this objective, a factor analysis of 77 attribute variables¹⁸ will be performed to reduce them to 13 factors.¹⁹ The 13 dimensions (factor scores) will be correlated with the six voting categories and a correlation matrix, as given in Figure 1, will be generated to establish the basis for the predictive model.

Because the factor dimensions employed are orthogonal, each of the correlation co-efficients generated in the above matrix will be equivalent to a beta weight in a multiple regression equation.²⁰ Thus, it will be possible

Figure 1

	D ₁	D ₂	.	.	.	D ₆
P ₁	X	X				X
P ₂	X	X				X
.						
.						
.						
P _N	X	X				X

where P₁ to P_N are predictor factor dimensions, D₁ to D₆ the voting distance measures and X correlation coefficients.

to sum the squares of the correlations and get the equivalent of multiple R² for each of the categories. That is, the column sum of squares will be mathematically equivalent to R² and, therefore, the total percentage of variance accounted for by each category will be ascertained by these procedures. For example, it may be found that the category of U.S.A. for, U.S.S.R. against, is much better accounted for than the category of U.S.A. against, U.S.S.R. abstain. This will allow the categories to be compared in respect to the degree to which they are accounted for by the attributes. Also, the magnitude of the correlation will indicate the unique predictive importance of each attribute measure. Thus, it may be found that Democracy is a more significant predictor of the category

of U.S.A. for, U.S.S.R. against than Economic Development, but, in regard to the category of U.S.A. for, U.S.S.R. abstain, U.S.A. Relations is the most salient predictor. In any case, the entire matrix will be viewed as a set of parameters to be applied to the attribute measures, in varying combinations, to account for the various categories of votes.

A 23rd, 24th Session matrix will be compared with a similar matrix generated for the 26th Session.²¹ A difference matrix will be computed and the signs generated in this matrix will indicate how the attributes have shifted in respect to their predictive importance. A Chi-square test will be employed to determine whether or not the observed differences are statistically significant.²² If they are not statistically significant, the simple correlation model will be viewed as holding for the 26th Session. The sessions will also be compared using a canonical correlation model (explained below).

GENERATING PREDICTIONS

A broad spectrum (77 variables) of national attribute data²³ was factor analyzed using the principal component solution, with unities in the principal diagonal of the correlation matrix. The principal components were computed out to 1.0 eigenvalue and Kaiser's varimax criterion was used for rotation. Table 1 interprets the resulting loadings matrix.

Factor analysis, as a useful technique, is now fairly well known.²⁴ Elsewhere I have distinguished between the use of factor analysis as a search for causes and its usefulness for data reduction.²⁵ Its latter use alone is employed in this project. Such usage enables the investigator to reduce a large number of correlated variables to a smaller set of uncorrelated variables, called factors. Factor scores which represent the factor dimensions then

correlate with the original variables exactly to the extent the variables load on the dimensions. This kind of application of factor analysis should become clear, if not already, in subsequent discussions.

TABLE 1
INTERPRETATION OF LOADINGS OF PREDICTOR VARIABLES

Factor 1 Economic Development		
13.	Many radios per 1,000 population	0.89
19.	Larger % literate of population age 15 and over	0.84
18.	Large % primary and secondary students as a % of population	0.82
17.	Large number of students enrolled in higher education	0.76
56.	Negligible interest articulation by non-associational groups	0.71
34.	Very low agricultural population	0.71
10.	Large % Christians as a % of total population	0.69
64.	Negligible leadership charisma	0.52
43.	Late date of independence	-0.52
74.	Long distance from the U.S.A.	-0.53
08.	Large % Moslems as a % of population	-0.61
54.	Negligible interest articulation by associational groups	-0.61
06.	Large % of land force employed in agriculture	-0.66
45.	Pre-transitional politically	-0.68
33.	Low urbanization	-0.71
37.	Very underdeveloped economic development status	-0.73
70.	Traditional bureaucracy	-0.74
05.	Large number of inhabitants per hospital bed	-0.83
44.	Non-western	-0.83
35.	Very low per capita gross national product	-0.83
39.	Very low newspaper circulation per 1,000 population	-0.84
03.	Large number of inhabitants per physician	-0.88
Factor 2 Democracy		
69.	Weak executive	0.82
72.	Police not politically significant	0.75

TABLE 1 Factor 2 (cont.)

55.	Limited interest articulation by institutional groups	0.71
63.	Non-elitist political leadership	0.66
71.	Neutral military	0.60
73.	Non-communist bloc	0.57
54.	Negligible interest articulation by associational groups	-0.50
58.	Negligible interest articulation by political parties	-0.69
60.	Negligible interest aggregation by legislature	-0.74
38.	Censorship	-0.81
51.	Opposition groups not tolerated	-0.83
66.	Negligible horizontal power distribution	-0.83
49.	Unrepresentative regime	-0.84
67.	Wholly ineffective legislature	-0.86
50.	Non-competitive electoral system	-0.86
47.	No effective constitutional limitations	-0.92

Factor 3 U.S.A. Relations

21.	Large % exports of total exports to U.S.A.	0.71
22.	Large % imports of total imports from U.S.A.	0.69
27.	Large dollar exports to U.S.A.	0.52
25.	Allied with U.S.S.R.	-0.69

Factor 4 Smallness

32.	Small population	0.85
36.	Very low international financial status	0.76
12.	Large area in square kilometers	-0.50
27.	Large dollar exports to the U.S.A.	-0.52
28.	Large dollar exports to the U.S.S.R.	-0.54
26.	Large dollar imports from the U.S.A.	-0.59
23.	Large number in Permanent Missions at the U.N.	-0.67
77.	Large number of men under arms	-0.74
04.	Large gross national product	-0.79

Factor 5 Militarism

16.	Large % military personnel as a % of population aged 15-64	0.77
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TABLE 1 Factor 5 (cont.)

14.	Large defence expenditures as a % of gross national product	0.75
01.	Large % military personnel as a % of total population	0.71
75.	Long distance from U.S.S.R.	-0.52
76.	Long distance from China	-0.66

Factor 6 Population Dispersion

12.	Large area in square kilometers	0.72
02.	Large population per 1,000 hectares of agricultural land	-0.87
11.	Large population per square kilometer	-0.87

Factor 7 Instability

48.	Unstable government	0.85
61.	Unstable party system	0.81
62.	Negligible personalissimo	-0.68

Factor 8 Executive Interest Aggregation

64.	Negligible leadership Charisma	-0.53
59.	Negligible interest aggregation by executive	-0.86

Factor 9 Small Population Rate Increase

46.	Non-mobilizational system style	0.55
07.	Large annual % rate of increase in population	-0.57

Factor 10 Religious and Linguistic Heterogeneity

40.	Religious heterogeneity	0.76
42.	Linguistic heterogeneity	0.58

Factor 11 Small Communist China Economic Relations

20.	Large % literate of population age 15 and over, average annual increase	0.62
31.	Large dollar imports from Communist China	-0.69
30.	Large dollar exports to Communist China	-0.74

Factor 12 Low Voting Intensity

15.	Many votes in national elections as a % of voting age population	-0.64
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TABLE 1 Factor 13 (cont.)

Factor 13 Unitarism

65. Unitarism

0.68

Factors are named in terms of the characteristics of those with high factor scores. For example, on the first factor dimension, those with high factor scores tend to be "developed" in the sense that they tend to have many radios per 1,000 population, a large percentage literate of population aged 15 and over, few inhabitants per physician, high newspaper circulation per 1,000 population, and so forth.

Although numerous warnings have been given concerning the use of factor names, some investigators, I fear, still misunderstand the process of naming factors, using the techniques employed here. *Factor names are simply convenient handles. They do not, and usually cannot, fully describe all of the heavily loading variables.* The important thing to remember is that *a factor dimension has predictive power in respect to all of the variables. Those variables predicted best by a particular factor are simply grouped together for convenience.* Thus, the set of factor scores referred to as "Economic Development" can account for approximately .89² or 79% of the variance of the variable, many radios per 1,000 population, .88² or 77% of the variance of the variable, large number of inhabitants per physician, and so forth.

States standing low on the dimension, that is, those with low factor scores, of course, tend to have the opposite characteristics from those with high factor scores. For example, on this dimension, Afghanistan has a score of -2.02, Somalia a score of -1.35, and Sierra Leone, -1.47. This indicates that such states and others with low scores tend to have a large number of inhabitants per physician, very low newspaper circulation per 1,000 population, few radios per 1,000 population, and so forth.

The remaining dimensions may be similarly interpreted and have been named Democracy, U.S.A. Relations, Smallness, Militarism, Population Dispersion, Instability, Executive Interest Aggregation, Small Population Rate Increase, Religious and Linguistic Homogeneity, Small Communist China Economic Relations, Low Voting Intensity, and Unitarism.

To summarize, the 77 original predictor variables have been reduced to 13 variables whose relationship to the original variables is given by the factor loadings. Because factor scores using these techniques are uncorrelated, they possess certain advantages over the original variable scores, and these advantages will be revealed in subsequent analysis.

GENERATING DISTANCE SCORES (23rd and 24th COMBINED SESSIONS)

The 23rd and 24th Sessions were treated together for two reasons. First, a previous publication²⁶ shows that these two sessions are highly similar in terms of factor structure and the results that are obtained when attribute measures are related to that structure. Second, neither session, by itself, contained votes in all six of the analytical categories developed above. That is, the 23rd Session lacked votes in the category of U.S.A. against, U.S.S.R. abstain, while the 24th Session lacked votes in the category of U.S.S.R. against, U.S.A. abstain. For these reasons a two-session base was employed for the establishment of the predictive model. (The session to which the model will be applied, however, the 26th, contained votes in all six analytical categories.)

The first step in the model-building was to compute the standardized distance scores (defined earlier) in the six basic analytical categories. Table 2 shows the results.

As previously indicated, the votes used in each analytical category are given in Appendix A. The content of the votes can be found in the General Assembly Official Record or in

TABLE 2
23rd, 24th Sessions Distance Scores

1. U.S.A. For, U.S.S.R. Against

Bulgaria, Hungary,		U.A.R., El Salvador,	
Mongolia, Poland, USSR	3.67	Brazil, Cameroun,	
Czechoslovakia	3.63	Malaysia	-0.19
Rumania	2.97	Dahomey	-0.29
Cuba	2.43	Central African Rep.	-0.32
Chile	1.09	Lesotho	-0.33
Yemen	0.51	South Africa	-0.35
Tanzania	0.44	Paraguay, Ceylon,	
India	0.42	Bolivia, Ghana,	
Afghanistan, Gabon	0.38	Chad, Iceland,	
Guinea	0.37	Guyana	-0.39
Portugal	0.35	Niger	-0.42
Senegal	0.31	Sierra Leone,	
France	0.26	Cambodia	-0.44
Jamaica, Yugoslavia	0.25	Netherlands, New	
Peru, Kuwait	0.24	Zealand, Nicaragua,	
Burma	0.23	Argentina, Nigeria,	
Nepal	0.21	Norway, Pakistan,	
Mali	0.06	Panama, Liberia,	
Saudi Arabia, Libya,		Congo (Leo), Japan,	
Congo (Bra.)	0.01	Philippines,	
Malawi	-0.05	Australia, Ethiopia,	
Upper Volta	-0.07	Luxembourg, Malagasy,	
Denmark, United		Belgium, Morocco,	
Kingdom, Singapore	-0.09	Mauritania, Lebanon,	
Barbados	-0.11	Spain, Greece,	
Algeria, Sudan, Syria	-0.14	Sweden, Guatemala,	
Iraq	-0.17	Cyprus, Indonesia,	
Haiti, Columbia,		Trinidad, Iran,	
Rwanda, Somalia,		Jordan, Uganda,	
Thailand, Togo,		Austria, Ireland,	
Tunisia, Turkey	-0.19	Finland, Israel	-0.50

U.S.A. For, U.S.S.R. Against (cont.)

United States, Uruguay,		Burundi, Zambia,	
Venezuela, Italy,		Kenya, Ivory Coast,	
Dominican Rep., Costa Rica,		Mexico, Honduras,	
Laos, Ecuador	-0.50	Canada	-0.50

2. U.S.A. For, U.S.S.R. Abstain

Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,		Sierra Leone	-0.27
Hungary, U.S.S.R.	4.28	Trinidad, Saudi Arabia	-0.28
Poland	3.72	Gabon, Pakistan	-0.31
Mongolia	3.15	Congo (Bra), Laos,	
Portugal	1.13	Malawi	-0.32
Romania	1.08	Niger	-0.34
Cuba	1.03	Lebanon, Morocco,	
El Salvador	0.87	Brazil, Senegal,	
South Africa	0.73	Somalia, Sudan,	
Ceylon	0.20	Togo, Uruguay,	
Iraq	0.18	Cameroun, Turkey,	
Dahomey	0.14	U.A.R.	-0.35
Upper Volta	0.13	Peru, Philippines,	
Liberia	0.12	Ivory Coast, Chad	-0.36
France, United Kingdom	0.07	Congo (Leo), Italy,	
Central African Republic	0.06	Nepal, Netherlands,	
Syria	0.04	New Zealand, Nicaragua,	
Belgium	0.03	Ireland, Nigeria,	
Ethiopia, Greece,		Norway, India,	
Rwanda	0.02	Panama, Paraguay,	
Columbia, Yemen	0.00	Malagasy Rep., Mali,	
Tanzania	-0.01	Austria, Afghanistan,	
Jordan, Libya,		Mauritania, Cyprus,	
Algeria, Yugoslavia,		Argentina, Jamaica,	
Kuwait	-0.04	Guatemala, Japan,	
Barbados	-0.20	Burundi, Spain,	
Cambodia	-0.22	Dominican Republic,	
Iceland, Bolivia,		Sweden, Indonesia,	
Haiti, Lesotho	-0.24	Thailand, Iran	-0.39

U.S.A. For, U.S.S.R. Abstain (cont.)

Honduras, Tunisia,		Costa Rica, Zambia	
Ecuador, Uganda,		Finland, Denmark,	
Australia, Chile,		Guinea, Ghana,	
Luxembour, U.S.A.,		Kenya, Singapore,	
Burma, Israel,		Guyana, Malaysia,	
Venezuela, Canada	-0.39	Mexico	-0.39

3. U.S.A. Against, U.S.S.R. Abstain

Afghanistan, Algeria,		Niger, Central African	
Burma, Burundi,		Republic	0.56
Cameroun, Chile,		Barbados	0.36
Columbia, Congo (Bra.),		Iraq	0.30
Costa Rica, Cyprus,		Congo (Leo), Cuba,	
Ethiopia, Guatemala,		Dahomey, Somalia,	
Guinea, India,		Thailand, Gabon,	
Indonesia, Iran,		Yemen, Honduras,	
Ivory Coast, Jordan,		Kenya	0.12
Laos, Lebanon,		Denmark, Norway,	
Libya, Malagasy Rep.,		Iceland, Finland,	
Mali, Mauritania,		Liberia, Greece,	
Morocco, Nepal,		Austria	-0.09
Nigeria, Panama,		Chad	-0.13
Philippines, Rwanda,		Paraguay, Peru,	
Senegal, Sudan,		Romania, Bolivia,	
Togo, Tunisia,		Trinidad, Nicaragua,	
Turkey, Uganda,		Jamaica, Venezuela,	
U.A.R., Yugoslavia,		Mexico	-0.17
Kuwait, Zambia,		Brazil, Upper Volta,	
Malaysia	0.91	Tanzania	-0.23
Ceylon, Pakistan,		Spain, Singapore	-0.44
Dominican Republic,		Argentina	-0.53
Saudi Arabia, Syria,		New Zealand, Japan,	
Haiti, Lesotho	0.66	Australia, Luxembourg,	
Sierra Leone, Cambodia	0.61	Malawi	-0.88

U.S.A. Against, U.S.S.R. Abstain (cont.)

Ecuador, Uruguay,		U.S.S.R., Poland,	
El Salvador, Guyana	-0.96	Mongolia, Hungary,	
Netherlands, Sweden,		Czechoslovakia	-1.96
Ireland, Israel,		South Africa, Bulgaria	-2.32
France, Italy,		Canada	-2.57
Ghana, Portugal,		United Kingdom	-2.62
Belgium	-1.23	United States	-2.87

4. U.S.S.R. For, U.S.A. Against

United States	2.87	Malagasy Republic,	
Portugal, United Kingdom	2.36	Dominican Republic	0.64
France	2.22	Paraguay	0.51
Belgium	2.13	Columbia	0.47
New Zealand	2.01	Guatemala	0.44
Australia	2.00	Liberia	0.24
Italy	1.93	Central African Rep.	0.19
Canada	1.85	Bolivia	0.18
Netherlands	1.87	Barbados	0.13
South Africa	1.78	Iceland	0.12
Luxembourg	1.75	Honduras	0.07
Malawi	1.69	Haiti, Israel,	
Spain	1.66	Congo (Leo.)	-0.01
Austria	1.48	Ivory Coast	-0.06
Brazil	1.33	Thailand	-0.08
Denmark	1.32	Upper Volta, Philippines,	
Norway, Sweden	1.20	Dahomey, Venezuela	-0.09
Argentina	1.16	Cambodia	-0.12
Costa Rica	1.13	Gabon	-0.17
Japan	1.03	Panama, Jamaica	-0.18
Ireland	0.96	Laos	-0.21
Finland	0.93	Greece	-0.26
Lesotho	0.74	Chad	-0.30
El Salvador	0.73	Trinidad	-0.34
Nicaragua	0.72	Ecuador	-0.43
Uruguay	0.69	Sierra Leone	-0.45

U.S.S.R. For, U.S.A. Against (cont.)

Libya, Mexico	-0.48	Mali	-0.84
Burma, Ghana,		Pakistan	-0.85
Ethiopia, Peru,		U.A.R.	-0.89
Uganda, Kenya,		Syria, Somalia,	
Singapore, Guyana	-0.55	Algeria, India,	
Rwanda	-0.60	Tunisia, Turkey,	
Nepal	-0.61	Romania, U.S.S.R.,	
Lebanon	-0.63	Sudan, Mongolia,	
Niger, Saudi Arabia	-0.65	Afghanistan, Iran,	
Congo (Bra), Cameroun,		Cuba, Hungary,	
Chile	-0.72	Poland, Yugoslavia,	
Burundi, Togo,		Kuwait, Czechoslovakia,	
Nigeria	-0.73	Morocco, Tanzania,	
Cyprus, Indonesia,		Zambia, Mauritania,	
Jordan	-0.74	Bulgaria, Iraq,	
Guinea	-0.80	Malaysia, Senegal	-0.90
Ceylon, Yemen	-0.83		

5. U.S.S.R. For, U.S.A. Abstain

United States	4.82	Israel	0.29
Portugal, United Kingdom	3.29	Costa Rica	0.28
France	3.19	Greece	0.24
Malawi	3.08	El Salvador	0.20
South Africa	2.52	Denmark, Sweden	0.08
Canada	2.26	Bolivia	0.06
Luxembourg	2.08	Nicaragua, Gabon	0.01
Belgium	2.03	Liberia	-0.05
Italy	1.65	Congo	-0.08
Australia	1.54	Uruguay, Panama,	
Netherlands	1.43	Finland, Norway,	
Brazil, New Zealand	0.79	Austria, Ivory Coast	-0.10
Japan	0.57	Lesotho	-0.11
Argentina	0.41	Paraguay	-0.12
Dominican Republic	0.39	Uganda	-0.14
Barbados	0.38	Honduras, Guatemala,	-0.15

U.S.S.R. For, U.S.A. Abstain (cont.)

Congo (Bra.)	-0.15	Philippines, Libya	-0.48
Peru, Chile,		Kenya	-0.49
Haiti, Algeria,		Yugoslavia, Afghanistan	-0.50
Dahomey, Iceland	-0.17	Tunisia	-0.51
Turkey	-0.20	Ethiopia	-0.52
Syria	-0.23	Trinidad, Malaysia	-0.53
Yemen, Ceylon	-0.24	Spain, India	-0.54
Ecuador	-0.26	U.A.R., Venezuela,	
Ireland	-0.28	Cameroun, Mauritania,	
Burma, Guyana	-0.32	Thailand, Burundi,	
Mali, Tanzania	-0.33	Kuwait, Iran,	
Senegal	-0.34	Indonesia	-0.55
Upper Volta, Morocco,		Lebanon	-0.57
Guinea	-0.35	Jordan, Mongolia,	
Central African Rep., Jamaica,		Cuba	-0.65
Malagasy Rep., Cambodia	-0.36	Columbia	-0.67
Ghana, Singapore,		Togo	-0.70
Iraq	-0.37	Somalia	-0.71
Sierra Leone	-0.38	Bulgaria, Poland,	
Romania, Chad	-0.42	Hungary, U.S.S.R.,	
Rwanda	-0.43	Zambia, Nigeria,	
Laos	-0.44	Czechoslovakia,	
Sudan, Saudi Arabia	-0.45	Nepal, Pakistan,	
Mexico	-0.47	Cyprus	-0.74

6. U.S.S.R. Against, U.S.A. Abstain

Afghanistan, Algeria,		Columbia, Congo (Bra.)	
Argentina, Australia,		Congo (Leo.), Costa Rica,	
Austria, Belgium,		Cyprus, Denmark,	
Bolivia, Brazil,		Dominican Republic,	
Burma, Burundi,		Ecuador, El Salvador,	
Cambodia, Cameroun,		Ethiopia, Finland,	
Canada, Ceylon,		Gabon, Ghana,	
Chad, Chile,	0.37	Greece, Guatemala	0.37

U.S.S.R. Against, U.S.A. Abstain (cont.)

Guinea, Haiti	Syria, Thailand,	
Honduras, Iceland,	Togo, Trinidad,	
India, Indonesia,	Tunisia, Turkey,	
Iran, Ireland,	Uganda, U.A.R.,	
Israel, Italy,	Upper Volta, Uruguay,	
Ivory Coast, Jamaica,	Venezuela, Yemen,	
Japan, Jordan,	Yugoslavia, Kuwait,	
Laos, Lebanon,	Lesotho, Malawi,	
Liberia, Libya,	Tanzania, Zambia,	
Luxembourg, Malagasy Rep.,	Kenya, Singapore,	
Mali, Mauritania,	Guyana, Malaysia,	
Mexico, Morocco,	Barbados	0.37
Nepal, Netherlands,	Central African Rep.,	
New Zealand, Nicaragua,	Dahomey, Iraq	0.0
Niger, Nigeria,	France, Cuba,	
Norway, Pakistan,	U.S.A., Portugal,	
Panama, Paraguay,	Romania, South Africa,	
Peru, Philippines,	United Kingdom	-2.60
Rwanda, Saudi Arabia,	Czechoslovakia,	
Senegal, Sierra Leone,	Mongolia, Bulgaria,	
Somalia, Spain,	U.S.S.R., Hungary,	
Sudan, Sweden	Poland	-2.96
		0.37

Nations on Record: United Nations General Assembly Roll Call Votes (1946-1973) by Lynn Schopen, Hanna Newcombe, Chris Young and James Wert (PRI-D, 515 pages, \$17.00). For example, the category of U.S.A. For, U.S.S.R. Against, includes the votes, in the 23rd Session, of "Representation of China in the United Nations", "Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapons States (A)", "Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapons States (B)", "The Korean Question", and, in the 24th Session, of "Representation of China in the United Nations", "Question of Korea", and "Creation of the Post of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights".

An earlier factor analysis of all the votes of the 23rd and 24th Sessions of the General Assembly revealed that 12 factors could account for 79% of the variance in the voting data, using the 1.0 eigenvalue cut-off rule.²⁷ The details of the factor analysis have been fully reported and won't be repeated here, except in general terms, but it is interesting to note that the votes in the above category all load heavily on just two of the 12 voting dimensions. One of the dimensions was entitled "Pro-Red China", and the votes concerning Korea, Red China, and Commissioner of Human Rights all loaded heavily on it. The other two votes, pertaining to the arms race and the spread of nuclear weapons, loaded heavily on a dimension called "International Restraints". Other resolutions loading heavily on the same dimension included votes concerning the peaceful uses of atomic energy, disarmament and seabed issues.

Thus, when the United States supported resolutions in the 23rd and 24th Sessions of the General Assembly, the Soviet Union was at loggerheads with it only in respect to two fundamental dimensions (in factor analytic terms) of votes, one called "Pro-Red China" and the other "International Restraints".²⁸

An examination of Table 2 shows that states with the same score as the United States, $-.89$, voted identically with the United States on all those issues. This amounted to 36.8% of all states voting. A number of states, with scores close to $-.89$, voted in a highly similar fashion, but abstained, or, perhaps, even voted against an issue or two. This includes states such as Luxembourg, South Africa, Costa Rica and Uruguay. In contrast, some states were just barely U.S.A. Leaning (compared to the average state), such as Norway, Sweden and Denmark (with scores of $-.11$). Such states, that is, those that did not vote identically with the United States, but, nevertheless, were U.S.A. Leaning, constituted 22% of the entire sample.

The Soviet Union bloc, in contrast to the U.S.A.

bloc, constituted only 4.4% of all voters, with five member states. States close to the Soviet Union, but not voting identically with it on all issues, were Cuba and Mongolia. Other strongly Soviet Leaning states included Syria, Mauritania, Rumania and Guinea. Some weakly Soviet Leaning states (positive scores and not voting identically with the Soviet Union) constituted 36.8 of the entire sample.

In respect to the category of U.S.A. For, U.S.S.R. Abstain, a somewhat different pattern emerges. In the previous analysis of U.S.A. For, U.S.S.R. Against, resolutions loading heavily on Factor 4, the "Pro-Red China" dimension, were most prominent. In contrast, for this category, Factor 2 items (International Restraints) are the most frequent, constituting 3 out of 5 resolutions.

The resolutions loading most heavily on Factor 2 concerned seabed questions in the 23rd Session and disarmament issues in the 24th Session. The category also includes a "Colonial" issue (Portuguese colonies) in the 23rd Session and a resolution concerning non-nuclear weapon states (24th Session, B resolution) which, in contrast, did not load heavily enough upon any of the 12 dimensions to be viewed as identified with a single factor.

An eyeball comparison of the scores between the two voting categories shows that the size of the blocs at the polar extremes is diminished. The U.S.A. Bloc constitutes 13.2% of those voting (compared to 36.8% in the U.S.A. For, U.S.S.R. Against category), the U.S. Leaning group 56.1%, the U.S.S.R. Leaning group 28.9%, and the Soviet bloc 1.8% (compared to 4.4% in the U.S.A. For, U.S.S.R. Against category).

Regarding the Soviet bloc, the only country voting identically with the U.S.S.R. was Hungary. Certain other states, which constituted the Soviet bloc in the case

of the U.S.A. for, U.S.S.R. against category, have, through abstention, drifted away somewhat from the bloc. Close supporters, however, include Cuba, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Mongolia and Poland.

The question arises, in this connection, as to whether the two voting categories are mutually predictable. That is, can we predict the likely location of a country in respect to the U.S.A. For, U.S.S.R. Abstain from location in respect to U.S.A. For, U.S.S.R. Against? Impressionistically, correlation is definitely evident and the exact correlation is .67, far above chance expectations (.25 would suffice at the .01 level). More will be said on such intercorrelations between categories later.

Turning to the category of U.S.A. Against, U.S.S.R. Abstain, Appendix A shows that all of the resolutions falling in this category were generated in the 24th Session. Examination of the previous factor analytic study, cited above, indicates that the resolutions are scattered among the factor dimensions. The issues concerning the 25th Anniversary of the United Nations and the program of technical assistance both loaded on the first factor dimension, "Colonialism", but the loading for the anniversary issue was very weak (-.43) and it loaded weakly on other dimensions as well. The vote concerning the United Nations industrial development organization loaded weakly on Factor 12, "Against Report on Nuclear Explosions", while the vote concerning the status of women loaded modestly on Factor 5, "Terminate Colonial Status of Gibraltar".

In short, these resolutions do not show a predominant issue cluster, or clusters, in contrast to the previous categories treated. On the other hand, this category generates highly interesting results.

First, it can be seen that only Japan and Canada vote identically with the United States on these issues and

constitute the U.S.A. Bloc (2.6% of all those voting). In spite of this, a number of states show fairly similar voting patterns with the U.S.A., such as Belgium, Australia, Malawi and Ireland. What is important about this category, however, is the fact that nations that either voted with the U.S.S.R., or very similarly to the U.S.S.R., in the category of U.S.A. For, U.S.S.R. Against, are now (by the definitions provided for in this study) *U.S.A. Leaning, with the exception of Cuba*. Thus, these states, (with the exception of Cuba) have negative scores. For a number of them, the score magnitude, *including that of the U.S.S.R.*, is quite large. Thus, a very interesting phenomenon is observed. When the category of votes is *U.S.A. For, U.S.S.R. Abstain, the U.S.S.R. camp and the U.S.A. camp tend to be at polar extremes*. On the other hand, when the category is *U.S.A. Against, U.S.S.R. Abstain, the U.S.S.R. group, with the exception of Cuba, tends to be U.S.A. Leaning.*²⁹

In all, 36.9% of the states are classified as U.S.A. Leaning, and 63.1% as non-U.S.A. leaning. A bloc polar opposite to the United States, that is, containing those states voting for the issues and identically, shows considerable geographic scatter and includes nations such as Afghanistan, Bolivia, Burundi, Chile, Mali, Morocco and Thailand.

The category of U.S.S.R. For, U.S.A. Against includes issues of statutory limitations for war crimes, human rights in occupied territories, Southern Rhodesia, Oman, independence for colonial countries, Papua, Russian as a working language, chemical and bacteriological weapons, and Palestine refugees. Nine of the 12 votes considered load heavily on the "Colonialism" factor dimension. One additional issue concerning Russian as a working language also loads weakly on that dimension (-.47). Both of the other two issues, one concerning human rights in occupied

territories and the other, Palestine refugees, load heavily on Factor 8, "Against Israeli Practices". Thus, this category is heavily dominated by Colonial issues.

19.3% of the states voted identically with the U.S.S.R. on these issues, while 41.2% can be characterized as U.S.S.R. leaning. In contrast, the United States was the only state consistently against on all of these issues, although South Africa, Portugal, Australia, Belgium, Netherlands and New Zealand had similar voting patterns. In all, 38.6% were U.S.A. leaning, besides those states already mentioned. A sample of the U.S.A. leaning group includes Italy, United Kingdom, Denmark, Austria, Norway, Luxembourg, Canada, Iceland, Finland and Sweden. (It is interesting to note that the percentage of states voting identically with the United States in the category of U.S.A. For, U.S.S.R. Against is considerably larger (36.8%) than the category of states voting identically with the U.S.S.R. (19.3%) in the category of U.S.S.R. For, U.S.A. Against.)

The category of U.S.S.R. For, U.S.A. Abstain is again dominated by Factor 1, "Colonialism". Of the 15 resolutions considered, only the issues concerning Gibraltar, loading on Factor 5, "Terminate Colonial Status of Gibraltar", human rights in occupied territories, loading on Factor 8, "Against Israeli Practices", the international conference on human rights, loading heavily on Factor 6, "Assistance for Palestine Refugees", and Spanish Sahara and other small territories (such as Antigua), loading heavily on Factor 11, "Independence for Various Territories", were not heavy loaders on Factor 1.³⁰ Factor 1, then, or Colonialism, dominates the issues which separate the United States from the Soviet Union, both in the categories of U.S.S.R. For, U.S.A. Against, and U.S.S.R. For, U.S.A. Abstain.

The Soviet bloc constituted 14.9% of all states on the latter issues and, in addition, 58.9% were U.S.S.R. leaning. Only France voted identically with the United States on these

issues and, although the United States tends to be at the polar extreme from the U.S.S.R., Australia and Portugal were *even further* from the Soviet Union in their voting patterns.³¹ Thus, in the case of this category, we will have to characterize all states with positive numbers, but without identical scores with Portugal, as Portugal leaning (24.5%). A sample of states falling in this category besides those already mentioned, include New Zealand, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Belgium, South Africa, Canada, Denmark and Finland.

The final category of U.S.S.R. Against, U.S.A. Abstain only includes two issues from the 23rd Session. Both loaded on Factor 2, "International Restraints". Those voting identically with the Soviet Union (against the resolutions) constituted 5.3% of all those voting, and includes Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Mongolia and Bulgaria. The U.S.A. abstentions placed the United States, in terms of this analysis, in the camp of U.S.S.R. leaning and 13.2% of the states have similar scores, including Jordan, Cuba, U.A.R., Belgium, Canada, France and Guinea. The entire U.S.S.R. leaning group included 33.2% of the membership. Those voting for the resolution constituted a large bloc (all with a numerical score of .74) and constituted 56.1% of the entire membership.

It will be recalled from earlier discussion that the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. tended to polarize when the category was U.S.A. For, U.S.S.R. Abstain, as opposed to the category of U.S.A. Against, U.S.S.R. Abstain, and that the U.S.S.R., and many of the states that normally vote with it, became U.S.A. leaning in the latter category. A mirror image of the same pattern holds here. The category of U.S.S.R. For, U.S.A. Abstain tends to polarize the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., while the category of U.S.S.R. Against, U.S.A. Abstain locates the United States, and many states that usually vote with it, in the camp of the U.S.S.R. leaning.

CORRELATION OF PREDICTORS WITH DISTANCE SCORES

Earlier it was pointed out that the correlation matrix of the predictors with the distance scores could be viewed as creating a predictive model which then could be applied against the data of the 26th Session. Table 3 shows the relationship of the predictors to the 23rd, 24th Sessions distances.³²

TABLE 3
Correlations of Predictors with 23rd, 24th
Sessions Distance Scores

Factor* Numbers	Vote Categories†						Row Sum of Square
	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	
1.	-0.02	0.14	-0.55	0.47	0.45	-0.39	0.90
2.	-0.52	-0.55	-0.14	0.43	0.35	0.28	0.98
3.	-0.54	-0.34	0.09	0.36	0.24	0.24	0.66
4.	-0.10	-0.04	0.09	0.07	-0.02	0.04	0.03
5.	0.09	-0.01	-0.18	0.01	0.05	-0.23	0.10
6.	-0.03	-0.05	0.08	0.03	0.03	-0.09	0.02
7.	-0.08	0.05	0.32	-0.21	-0.30	0.14	0.26
8.	-0.01	-0.07	0.02	-0.08	0.00	-0.08	0.07
9.	-0.26	-0.34	-0.16	0.26	0.28	0.02	0.36
10.	-0.02	0.01	-0.13	-0.01	0.05	-0.11	0.03
11.	-0.20	-0.06	0.24	-0.15	-0.26	0.15	0.21
12.	-0.05	-0.07	0.17	-0.06	0.03	0.07	0.05
13.	0.00	-0.06	-0.09	0.04	-0.01	-0.04	0.01
Column Sum of Squares	0.70	0.58	0.62	0.69	0.63	0.42	

In interpreting the table, it should be recalled that the predictors have been correlated with distance scores

*As numbered in Table 1, pages 58-61.

†As numbered in Table 2, pages 63-69.

and, therefore, the country heading the column, either the U.S.A. or the U.S.S.R., will have the *smallest distance score* in the column that it heads. Thus, the United States has the smallest distance score in the first three columns and the U.S.S.R. in the last three. A negative correlation, in this regard, indicates that *high scores in respect to the predictor go with small scores in respect to the column.* For example, highly democratic states tend to vote with the United States in the category of U.S.A. For, U.S.S.R. Against (correlation = $-.52$) and this interpretation is possible because we know that the U.S.A. had the smallest distance score in this column. Once this is understood, the matrix becomes easy to interpret. For example, economically developed states tended to vote against the U.S.S.R. in the category of U.S.S.R. For, U.S.A. Against ($.47$). In other words, economically developed states were more distant than the economically underdeveloped states from the U.S.S.R. in respect to this category. It can be seen that only a few predictors have large correlations in each column.

Stressing the most predominant predictors, we can arrive at the following generalizations: When issues divide the United States and the U.S.S.R. so that the United States supports the issues and the U.S.S.R. is against them, democratic states and states with close U.S.A. Relations tend to support the United States.³³ (Conversely, of course, non-Democratic states and states with far U.S.A. Relations tend to support the Soviet Union.) When the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. are divided so that the U.S.A. supports the issues and the U.S.S.R. abstains, democratic states with close U.S.A. relations and small population rate increases tend to support the United States. When they divide so that the U.S.A. is against and U.S.S.R. abstains, economically developed states and stable states tend to support the United States.³⁴

When the United States and the U.S.S.R. divide

so the U.S.S.R. supports issues and the United States is against them, underdeveloped, undemocratic states with far U.S.A. relations tend to support the U.S.S.R. The same is basically true of the category, U.S.S.R. For, U.S.A. Abstain, although certain other predictors, such as Instability, Small Population Rate Increase, and Small Communist China Economic Relations, also show modest predictive power. Finally, regarding the category of U.S.S.R. Against, U.S.A. Abstain, the economically developed, undemocratic states, with far U.S.A. relations, tend to support the Soviet Union.³⁵

A rough index of the importance of the predictors across categories may be found by the last column entitled "row sum of squares". (Each row entry is squared and then all are summed to produce the final figures.) Although this column *cannot* be viewed as referring to the unique variance explained by the predictors (because the variables that the predictors were correlated with have intercorrelations) it can be viewed as a *rough guide* to the predictors' total importance. It can be seen that Economic Development, Democracy, and U.S.A. Relations are most important.

The row entitled "column sum of squares" gives the equivalent of R^2 . Because each of the predictors is orthogonal, each correlation, in a particular column cell, relates to unique variance explained. For this reason, the sum of squares of the columns produces the total variance explained or R^2 .³⁶ All of the R^2 's are significant (.05 level). Two categories, U.S.A. For, U.S.S.R. Against and U.S.S.R. For, U.S.A. Against, are particularly well accounted for, with only (approximately) 30% of the variance left unaccounted for by these predictors. Presented in these terms, of course, we are speaking in a purely descriptive sense and each predictor's correlation (squared) is allowed to contribute to the final column sum figure. It is apparent that certain predictors, as we have already noted, from the row square sum figures, are far more important than others, especially Economic Development, Democracy, and U.S.A. Relations, all with sizeable correlations along the columns.

From a descriptive point of view the entire matrix may be viewed as a model to be applied to the 26th Session. If the model is valid, there should be no significant difference between this simple correlation matrix and one generated by the 26th Session, using the same predictors.

ANALYSIS OF THE 26TH SESSION

Discussion of the 26th Session votes will proceed somewhat differently because there is no prior factor analysis to draw upon to characterize, in factor analytic terms, the kinds of issue clusters dominating the distance categories. Such a factor analytic application was beyond the scope of the present project. Examination of Appendix B, however, clearly indicates the kinds of issues on which the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. did not vote identically, in terms of the six categories. Some issues appear highly similar, such as those dealing with Palestine refugees, independence of colonial countries, Southern Rhodesia, and nuclear testing. Others, concerning the enlargement of the Economic and Social Council and fighting between India and Pakistan, appear as new issues. Table 4 shows the distance scores for the 26th Session, computed as previously described.

TABLE 4
26th Session Distance Scores

1. U.S.A. For, U.S.S.R. Against

Bulgaria, Hungary,		Yemen	1.29
Czechoslovakia, Poland		Algeria, Iraq,	
U.S.S.R.	2.44	Sudan, U.A.R.	1.22
Cuba, Mongolia	2.38	Cambodia	1.21
Syria	1.83	Burundi, Mali,	
Mauritania	1.80	Yugoslavia	1.08
Romania	1.77	Congo (Bra.)	0.99
Guinea	1.69	Burma	0.85

U.S.A. For, U.S.S.R. Against (cont.)

Nepal, Uganda	0.79	Lesotho, Chad	-0.45
Somalia	0.73	Peru, Rwanda,	
Libya	0.69	Togo, Mexico,	
Zambia	0.63	Haiti	-0.58
Ceylon	0.62	Guyana	-0.67
Kuwait	0.54	Luxembourg	-0.74
Tanzania, Kenya	0.49	South Africa, Costa	
Finland, Ghana,		Rica, Uruguay	-0.75
India, Afghanistan,		Panama, Paraguay,	
Nigeria, Pakistan,		Bolivia, Philippines,	
Tunisia, Singapore	0.48	Australia, Argentina,	
France	0.44	Israel, Gabon,	
Indonesia	0.32	Liberia, Senegal,	
Ethiopia	0.20	Laos, Canada,	
Morocco	0.19	Greece, Spain,	
Portugal	0.18	Malagasy Rep., Italy,	
Jordan, Lebanon,		Brazil, Thailand,	
Upper Volta	0.15	Belgium, Trinidad,	
Norway, Sweden,		Chile, Turkey,	
Denmark	-0.11	Cyprus, Columbia,	
Barbados	-0.13	Dominican Rep., Ireland,	
Ecuador	-0.23	United Kingdom, Japan,	
Malawi	-0.27	United States, Iran,	
Sierra Leone, Cameroun	-0.29	Guatemala, Venezuela,	
Saudi Arabia	-0.30	Netherlands, Dahomey,	
Congo (Leo)	-0.33	Honduras, El Salvador,	
Malaysia	-0.35	Ivory Coast, Iceland,	
Central African Rep.	-0.37	New Zealand, Niger,	
Austria	-0.42	Nicaragua, Jamaica	-0.89

U.S.A. For, U.S.S.R. Abstain

Hungary, U.S.S.R.	4.30	Malawi	1.85
Cuba	3.64	Cambodia	1.77
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,		Syria	1.40
Mongolia, Poland	2.61	El Salvador	0.73

U.S.A. For, U.S.S.R. Against (cont.)

Kenya	0.56	Pakistan, Panama,	
Guyana	0.45	Cyprus, Peru,	
Iraq	0.41	Philippines, Bolivia,	
Argentina, Ethiopia,		Honduras, Romania,	
Ghana, India,		Rwanda, Saudi Arabia,	
Indonesia, Israel,		Senegal, Somalia,	
Jordan, Mauritania,		Afghanistan, Dahomey,	
Morocco, Paraguay,		Sudan, Thailand,	
Sierra Leone, Spain,		Togo, Trinidad,	
Burma, Uganda,		Tunisia, Turkey,	
Algeria, Yemen,		Dominican Rep., Chad,	
Tanzania, Singapore	0.35	Guatemala, Upper Volta,	
Chile, Kuwait	0.19	Venezuela, Burundi,	
Barbados	0.09	Yugoslavia, Ceylon,	
France	-0.03	Cameroun, Malaysia	-0.31
U.A.R.	-0.10	Zambia	-0.37
Luxembourg	-0.17	Nicaragua	-0.41
Libya	-0.20	Brazil, Nigeria,	
Portugal, South Africa,		Uruguay, Congo (Bra.),	
Ecuador	-0.25	Haiti, Gabon,	
Greece, Columbia,		Lesotho	-0.47
Iran, Ivory Coast,		Austria, Ireland,	
Jamaica, Japan,		Iceland, Norway,	
Congo (Leo.), Laos,		Belgium, United Kingdom,	
Lebanon, Liberia,		United States, Italy,	
Guinea, Malagasy Rep.,		New Zealand, Netherlands,	
Mali, Costa Rica,		Australia, Finland,	
Mexico, Central African Rep.,		Sweden, Denmark,	
Nepal, Niger	-0.31	Canada	-1.08

3. U.S.A. Against, U.S.S.R. Abstain

Afghanistan, Bolivia,		Dominican Republic,	
Burundi, Chad,		Ecuador, Mali,	
Chile, Columbia,	1.11	Mauritania, Mexico	1.11

U.S.A. Against, U.S.S.R. Abstain (cont.)

Morocco, Peru,		Congo (Leo), Dahomey,	
Thailand, Tunisia,		Lesotho	-0.04
Uganda, Yemen,		Kenya	-0.05
Kuwait	1.11	Tanzania	-0.20
Congo (Bra.), Nigeria,		Malawi	-0.23
Saudi Arabia	0.92	Mongolia	-0.32
Costa Rica, Nepal,		Senegal, Ethiopia,	
Malagasy Rep., Rwanda,		Upper Volta	-0.37
Sierra Leone	0.82	Trinidad, Jamaica,	
Algeria, Ivory Coast,		Liberia	-0.40
Sudan, U.A.R.	0.75	Cambodia	-0.41
Nicaragua	0.66	Israel	-0.47
Indonesia, Laos,		Iceland	-0.63
Cuba, Argentina,		Burma	-0.68
Cyprus, Niger,		Togo	-0.69
Pakistan, Cameroun,		Bulgaria	-0.80
Turkey, Venezuela,		Netherlands	-0.85
Yugoslavia, Malaysia	0.64	Singapore	-0.86
Zambia	0.63	South Africa	-0.94
Iraq, Jordan,		Hungary	-1.00
Somalia, Syria,		Italy	-1.05
Gabon, Guinea,		Austria	-1.18
Ceylon	0.46	France	-1.24
Brazil, Ghana,		Denmark	-1.42
Philippines, Honduras	0.44	Sweden	-1.44
Iran	0.34	Czechoslovakia, U.S.S.R.,	
Spain	0.32	Finland, Poland,	
Libya, India,		Romania	-1.47
Barbados, Guatemala	0.27	Luxembourg, Portugal	-1.50
Guyana	0.25	United Kingdom	-1.65
Paraguay	0.20	Ireland, Norway	-1.83
Greece	0.17	Australia	-1.91
Panama, Haiti,		Belgium	-2.28
Uruguay	0.14	New Zealand	-2.37
Lebanon, El Salvador	0.10	Japan, United States,	
Central African Rep.	-0.01	Canada	-2.58

4. U.S.S.R. For, U.S.A. Against

United States	2.53	Barbados	0.10
South Africa	2.14	Laos	0.07
Portugal	2.04	Trinidad	0.03
Australia	1.98	Haiti	0.02
Belgium, Netherlands,		Ecuador	-0.01
New Zealand	1.97	Sierra Leone,	
Italy	1.84	Malagasy Republic	-0.03
United Kingdom	1.83	Malaysia	-0.04
Denmark, Austria,		Central African Rep.	-0.11
Norway	1.76	Mexico	-0.12
Luxembourg	1.72	Chile	-0.17
Canada	1.68	Guatemala, Burma	-0.22
Iceland	1.58	Guyana, Dominican Rep.	-0.26
Finland, Sweden	1.53	Venezuela	-0.30
Malawi	1.51	Singapore	-0.31
Japan	1.40	Turkey, Peru	-0.36
Ireland	1.34	Dahomey, Ethiopia	-0.37
France	1.29	Philippines	-0.45
Bolivia	1.01	Niger, Upper Volta,	
Paraguay	0.97	Ghana	-0.48
Honduras, Brazil	0.75	Nepal	-0.49
Nicaragua	0.71	Cuba	-0.50
Lesotho, Liberia	0.64	Congo (Bra.)	-0.53
El Salvador	0.56	Rwanda, Chad	-0.56
Israel	0.53	Togo, India	-0.57
Gabon	0.40	Cameroun	-0.59
Costa Rica	0.39	Tunisia	-0.60
Thailand	0.38	Congo (Leo)	-0.61
Argentina	0.36	Senegal, Iran	-0.66
Uruguay	0.33	Nigeria	-0.71
Columbia	0.30	Cambodia	-0.74
Jamaica	0.29	Uganda	-0.76
Greece	0.20	Somalia	-0.78
Spain	0.14	Kuwait	-0.79
Ivory Coast	0.13	Afghanistan	-0.83
Panama	0.11	Ceylon	-0.85

U.S.S.R. For, U.S.A. Against (cont.)

Yemen	-0.86	Poland, Algeria,	
Zambia, Kenya	-0.87	Pakistan, Syria,	
Libya	-0.88	Romania, Yugoslavia,	
Mali, Burundi,		Morocco, Hungary,	
Jordan	-0.94	Guinea, Tanzania,	
Mongolia, Iraq,		Sudan, Indonesia,	
Saudi Arabia, U.S.S.R.,		Mauritania, Lebanon,	
U.A.R., Bulgaria	-1.04	Czechoslovakia, Cyprus	-1.04

5. U.S.S.R. For, U.S.A. Abstain

Portugal	3.01	Guyana	0.00
Austarlia	2.95	Trinidad	-0.03
France, U.S.A.	2.87	Dominican Republic,	
United Kingdom	2.29	Nicaragua, Nigeria	-0.09
New Zealand	2.18	Jamaica	-0.12
Italy, Luxembourg,		Uruguay	-0.13
Netherlands, Belgium	2.09	Argentina, Togo	-0.14
South Africa	2.07	Liberia	-0.16
Malawi, Canada,		Singapore	-0.19
Denmark	1.65	Honduras, Upper Volta,	
Finland, Norway,		Ethiopia	-0.20
Austria	1.56	Paraguay	-0.22
Sweden	1.38	Ireland, Haiti	-0.23
Iceland	1.36	Central African Rep.	-0.28
Brazil	0.99	Columbia, Peru	-0.31
Spain	0.72	Sierra Leone	-0.32
Ecuador	0.36	Malagasy Rep., Israel	-0.35
Japan	0.27	Venezuela, Panama	-0.37
Gabon	0.24	Uganda, India	-0.38
Barbados	0.17	Yemen	-0.39
Ivory Coast	0.14	Ceylon	-0.40
Cuba	0.13	Guatemala	-0.41
Mexico	0.07	Congo (Bra.), El Salvador	-0.43
Lesotho	0.06	Burundi	-0.44
Costa Rica	0.01	Nepal, Niger	-0.46

U.S.S.R. For, U.S.A. Abstain (cont.)

Ghana, Cameroun,		Senegal, Kenya	-0.64
Thailand	-0.46	Somalia	-0.66
Dahomey	-0.47	Guinea	-0.69
Rwanda, Bolivia	-0.52	Libya, Zambia	-0.71
Laos	-0.53	Cambodia	-0.75
Iran, Sudan,		Morocco, Mongolia	-0.77
Syria, Iraq,		U.A.R., Afghanistan,	
Tunisia, Algeria,		Poland, Mali,	
Tanzania, Indonesia,		Pakistan, Mauritania,	
Malaysia	-0.55	Yugoslavia, U.S.S.R.,	
Greece, Kuwait,		Jordan, Lebanon,	
Congo (Leo)	-0.57	Romania, Turkey,	
Chad	-0.59	Cyprus, Hungary,	
Burma	-0.61	Bulgaria, Saudi Arabia,	
Chile, Philippines	-0.64	Czechoslovakia	-0.82

6. U.S.S.R. Against, U.S.A. Abstain

Afghanistan, Argentina,		Morocco, Nepal,	
Austria, Bolivia,		Netherlands, Nigeria,	
Brazil, Burma,		Pakistan, Panama,	
Burundi, Ceylon,		Paraguay, Peru,	
Chad, Chile,		Saudi Arabia; Senegal,	
Columbia, Congo (Leo.),		Sierra Leone, Somalia,	
Cyprus, Dahomey,		Spain, Sweden,	
Dominican Republic,		Thailand, Togo,	
El Salvador, Ethiopia,		Trinidad, Tunisia,	
Finland, Gabon,		Turkey, Venezuela,	
Ghana, Guatemala,		Yugoslavia, Kuwait,	
Haiti, Honduras,		Tanzania, Zambia,	
Iceland, India,		Kenya, Singapore,	
Indonesia, Iran,		Guyana, Malaysia,	
Ireland, Jamaica,		Barbados	0.74
Japan, Laos,		Nicaragua, Libya	0.39
Lebanon, Liberia,		Costa Rica, Cameroun,	
Mali, Mexico	0.74	Uruguay, Lesotho	0.34

U.S.S.R. Against, U.S.A. Abstain (cont.)

Ecuador	-0.01	Jordan, Cuba,	
Philippines, Rwanda,		U.A.R., U.S.A.,	
Denmark, Ivory Coast,		Belgium, Canada,	
Central African Rep., Yemen,		France, Guinea,	
Norway, Algeria,		New Zealand, Malawi,	
Uganda, Niger,		South Africa, Australia,	
Mauritania, Greece	-0.38	Israel, Congo (Bra.),	-1.56
Sudan, Italy,		Syria	-1.96
Portugal, Luxembourg,		United Kingdom	
Malagasy Rep.,	-0.44	U.S.S.R., Poland,	
Iraq	-0.73	Hungary, Mongolia,	
Romania	-0.79	Czechoslovakia,	
Upper Volta, Cambodia	-0.84	Bulgaria	-2.30

The first category included resolutions relating to hostilities between India and Pakistan, human rights issues, headquarters, budgetary and financial matters. Voting with the United States in favour of all the resolutions was a fairly large bloc constituting 43% of all those voting. Another 32.4% of states were U.S.A. Leaning. Thus, 75.4% were either U.S.A. bloc or U.S.A. leaning on these issues. This may be compared with the 23rd, 24th Sessions, where 36.8% were U.S.A. bloc and 22% U.S.A. leaning, for a total of 58.8%. 4.4% of the states (the same percentage as in the 23rd, 24th analysis) constituted the Soviet bloc, while 20.4% were U.S.S.R. leaning (in contrast to 36.8% previously). In this category, then, the Soviet Union has definitely lost ground to the United States, except for the percentage of its bloc membership.³⁷

It is interesting to observe, in this connection, that those constituting the Soviet bloc have shifted somewhat. Czechoslovakia previously voted identically with the U.S.S.R., while in the 26th Session it only voted similarly to the U.S.S.R. Mongolia, which previously voted similarly to the U.S.S.R., shifts, in the 26th Session, to voting identically with the U.S.S.R. Cuba and Romania continue to vote similarly

to the U.S.S.R. but Syria, which voted quite similarly to the U.S.S.R. in the 23rd, 24th Sessions, has now shifted (from the viewpoint of the analysis) to U.S.A. leaning, although only very slightly so. A number of other states, such as India and Afghanistan, continue to be slightly U.S.S.R. Leaning.³⁸

Appendix B indicates the resolutions dividing the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. in the U.N. in the U.S.A. For, U.S.S.R. Abstain category. It comprises a variety of issues including racism, aid in natural disaster cases, enlargement of the Economic and Social Council, and a U.N. building in Geneva. Again, the U.S.A. bloc is quite sizeable (45.6%) and may be contrasted with the bloc in the 23rd, 24th Sessions (13.3%). If this group is added to those that are U.S.A. leaning (31.6%), 77.2% of the entire list is on the U.S.A. side of the continuum. A comparable figure in the 23rd, 24th Sessions was 69.3%. Three states voted identically with the U.S.S.R.--Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. Highly U.S.S.R. leaning states included Poland and Mongolia. States somewhat further away included Portugal, Romania and Cuba. The entire U.S.S.R. leaning group only constituted 19.3% of the membership, in contrast to 28.9% in the 23rd, 24th Sessions. Again, a shift, favourable to the United States, is evident for this category.

Appendix B shows that only three resolutions fell in the category of U.S.A. Against, U.S.S.R. Abstain, concerning headquarters accommodations, the United Nations development program, and an environmental issue. Only the United States voted against all three of these issues. It is interesting to note that a number of U.S.S.R. group states become technically, given the nature of the analysis, U.S.A. leaning, with sizeable negative scores. At the other extreme, a sizeable block of states, 36%, voted identically for the resolutions. States with a U.S.A.

orientation (including the United States) constituted a 44.7% of the entire voting list, while in the 23rd, 24th Sessions, the equivalent figure was 39.5%. Again, then, a gain, although quite slight, seems evident for the U.S.A.

Appendix B shows 11 issues dividing the United States and the U.S.S.R. in the category of U.S.S.R. For, U.S.A. Against. As before, for this category, many resolutions pertain to colonial matters, such as racial discrimination, Portuguese territories, Southern Rhodesia, and independence of colonial countries. This category also included the important resolution to expel Taiwan and bring the People's Republic of China into the United Nations. The Soviet bloc constituted 22.8% of the entire membership. This is very close to the 19.3% figure in the same category in the previous analysis. The percentage of those U.S.S.R. leaning dropped somewhat from 41.2% (23rd, 24th Sessions) to 33%. As before, the United States was the only state voting against all of the resolutions in this category. The percentage of U.S.A. leaning shifted somewhat, to the disadvantage of the United States, from 38.6% (23rd, 24th Sessions) to 33.3%.

Appendix B shows a large number of issues, 18, fall in the category of U.S.S.R. For, U.S.A. Abstain. Many of the issues seem to pertain to colonialism, such as the ones on information on de-colonialization, Southern Rhodesia and apartheid in South Africa. Others seem to pertain to the kinds of issues which loaded on International Restraints, in the previous analysis, such as concerning chemical and bacteriological weapons and suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests. Questions concerning Israel and Palestine refugees also fall into this category, and a new issue of a World Social Situation Report.

The percentage of states voting identically with the U.S.S.R. (8.8) falls off somewhat from the 23rd, 24th Sessions figure of 14.9. However, 67.5% are U.S.S.R. leaning, in contrast to 58.9% in the 23rd, 24th Sessions. The net result

is that the total number of states with a U.S.S.R. orientation (bloc and leaning bloc) is quite similar, 76.3% in the 26th Session and 73.7% in the 23rd, 24th Sessions. It might be recalled that, in the previous analysis, Portugal stood at the polar extreme from the U.S.S.R. group, with the United States showing a voting pattern similar to Portugal. Here the United States has replaced Portugal at the polar extreme, although Portugal is next in line, followed by the United Kingdom and France. In all, 22.8% of the states lean toward the U.S.A. polar position in the 26th Session, whereas 24.5% leaned toward the Portugal extreme in the 23rd, 24th Sessions.

Appendix B shows that only one issue, concerning the budget for the financial year 1972, falls in the category of U.S.S.R. against, U.S.A. abstain. The numbering system, of course, reflects this fact, and may be interpreted as follows: All those states with .37 supported the resolution, or 86%. Those states assigned 0 were given a mean estimate because they were absent (2.6%). States with a score of -2.60 abstained (6.18%). Those states with a score of -.296 voted against the resolution (5.3%). As before, in this category, the United States is in the camp of U.S.S.R. leaning, compared to the behaviour of all other states. (To put it another way, to abstain in the face of an 86% majority is more similar to voting against the resolution than voting for it.) Comparison of these percentages with the 23rd, 24th Sessions category becomes somewhat strained because the index in the previous case was a composite index. In gross terms, however, we can say that the Soviet Union has lost ground in that those states with a U.S.S.R. orientation (bloc and leaning) previously constituted 38.6% of the entire list, while, in this case, they only constitute 11.4%.³⁹

PREDICTING 26th SESSION DISTANCE SCORES

Table 5 shows the relationship of the predictors to the distance scores.

TABLE 5
Correlations of Predictors With 26th
Session Distance Scores

Factor* Numbers	Vote Categories†						Row Sum of Square
	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	
1.	0.34	0.39	-0.65	0.46	0.35	-0.46	1.24
2.	-0.57	-0.54	0.04	0.35	0.25	0.45	1.01
3.	-0.36	-0.34	0.00	0.35	0.23	0.23	0.47
4.	-0.08	-0.07	0.09	0.00	-0.06	0.13	0.04
5.	0.03	0.04	-0.06	0.01	0.08	-0.06	0.02
6.	0.01	-0.02	-0.09	0.02	0.04	-0.04	0.01
7.	-0.14	-0.12	0.22	-0.17	-0.17	0.21	0.18
8.	-0.13	-0.17	0.06	-0.04	0.03	0.15	0.07
9.	-0.19	-0.10	-0.03	0.31	0.21	0.05	0.19
10.	0.05	0.10	-0.19	-0.01	0.08	-0.11	0.07
11.	-0.03	0.02	0.11	-0.16	-0.19	0.08	0.08
12.	-0.26	-0.19	0.11	-0.01	0.07	0.16	0.15
13.	0.01	0.00	-0.03	-0.07	-0.03	-0.01	0.01
Column Sum of Squares	0.72	0.67	0.56	0.61	0.37	0.60	

In gross terms, some striking similarities to the previous analysis are evident. For example, the column sum of squares tend to be roughly the same magnitude, although some decrease and some increase. For example, in the previous analysis, only 42% of the variance in the 6th category was accounted for, whereas in this analysis, 60% is accounted for. On the other hand, only 37% of the 5th category⁴⁰ is accounted for in this analysis, whereas 63% was accounted for in the previous analysis. Nevertheless, with one exception, all of the aggregate variance explained figures exceed 50%. An examination of the row sum of squares also indicates some differences. The big three, Economic Development, Democracy,

*As numbered in Table 3, pp. 58-61.

†As numbered in Table 1, pp. 80-87.

and U.S.A. Relations, continue in their primacy, but Economic Development seems to be enhanced somewhat as a predictor and U.S.A. Relations diminished.

Of particular importance is to determine whether the sign on the major predictors remains constant. It can be seen by simple inspection that in virtually every case where a predictor achieved a large correlation in the previous analysis, the correlation is large in this analysis and the sign agrees. Nevertheless, there is not perfect agreement. Economic Development has virtually no predictive power in respect to the U.S.A. For, U.S.S.R. Against category in the 23rd, 24th Sessions, whereas in the 26th Session it shows significant predictive power (.34). In addition, Economic Development had very weak predictive power (.14, not significant) for the category of U.S.A. For, U.S.S.R. Abstain, whereas in the 26th Session a sizeable correlation, .39, emerges in the same category. Perhaps the best way of analyzing this matrix is to compute a difference matrix subtracting the 23rd, 24th Sessions correlations from the 26th Session correlations. We can then determine the precise direction and degree of change. Table 6 gives this result. (See page 93.)

It can be seen by simple inspection that almost all entries are close to zero, indicating there is very little difference between the two matrices. Five exceptions are: Economic Development in respect to the categories of U.S.A. For, U.S.S.R. Against and U.S.A. For, U.S.S.R. Abstain; Executive Interest Aggregation in respect to the category of U.S.S.R. Against, U.S.A. Abstain; Small Population Rate Increase in respect to the category of U.S.A. For, U.S.S.R. Abstain; and Low Voting Intensity in respect to the category of U.S.A. For, U.S.S.R. Against. In the case of Executive Interest Aggregation, the shift was from a correlation of -.08 to a correlation of .15. Neither correlation is significant, so no further discussion is necessary. In the case of Small Population Rate Increase

TABLE 6
Correlation Difference Matrix
26th - 23rd, 24th Sessions Correlations

Factor* Numbers	Vote Categories†					
	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.
1.	.36	.25	-.10	-.01	-.10	-.07
2.	-.05	.01	.18	-.08	-.10	.17
3.	.18	.00	-.09	-.01	-.01	-.01
4.	.02	-.03	.00	-.07	-.04	.09
5.	-.06	.05	.12	.00	.03	.17
6.	.04	.03	-.17	-.01	.01	.05
7.	-.06	-.17	-.10	.04	.13	.07
8.	-.12	-.10	.04	.04	.03	.23
9.	.07	.24	.13	.05	-.07	.03
10.	.07	.09	-.06	.00	.03	.00
11.	.17	.08	-.13	-.01	.07	-.07
12.	-.21	-.12	-.06	.05	.04	.09
13.	.01	.06	.06	-.11	-.02	.03

the shift was from $-.34$ to $-.10$. In other words, Small Population Rate Increase was a significant predictor in the 23rd, 24th Sessions, but ceased to be so in the 26th Session. In the case of Low Voting Intensity, the shift was from $-.05$ to $-.26$, which indicates the predictor was insignificant in the 23rd, 24th Sessions, but became significant in the 26th Session. Thus, there was a slight tendency for those with low voting intensity to support the United States in the category of U.S.A. For, U.S.S.R. Against, in the 26th Session.

Perhaps the most notable shift occurred in the case of Economic Development. Its predictive power was virtually nil for the categories of U.S.A. For, U.S.S.R. Against and U.S.A. For, U.S.S.R. Abstain in the 23rd, 24th Sessions. In the 26th Session it becomes a moderate predictor in the sense

*As numbered in Table 1, pp. 58-61.

†As numbered in Table 2, pp. 63-69.

that economically developed states tended to support the U.S.S.R. position, in both cases. This is probably a consequence of the considerable expansion of the group associated with the U.S.A. position out of the underdeveloped ranks in the 26th Session and the fact that certain Soviet group members tend to achieve very high scores on the Economic Development dimension. In any case, this is a surprising divergence from the previous results and somewhat unexpected.

The question remains, however, can we view the model as a whole--all entries in the matrix--as significantly different from a previous matrix? If the entire matrix is treated in this regard, employing Chi-square analysis, the answer is no. All of the observed differences can be viewed as a result of random fluctuation.

In this connection, the question of reliability in respect to the basic indices can be raised. That is, is there a high degree of correspondence between the scores of a nation in the category of U.S.A. For, U.S.S.R. Abstain in the 23rd, 24th Sessions compared to the 26th Session, and does such correspondence hold across all categories? This question, of course, can be answered through simple correlation. If the indices are reliable, the correlations will tend to be high. If they are small, reliability is low. The exact reliabilities are: U.S.A. For, U.S.S.R. Against (.69), U.S.A. For, U.S.S.R. Abstain (.78), U.S.A. Against, U.S.S.R. Abstain (.70), U.S.S.R. For, U.S.A. Against (.91), U.S.S.R. For, U.S.A. Abstain (.83), and U.S.S.R. Against, U.S.A. Abstain (.66). It can be seen that the highest reliabilities are obtained when the U.S.S.R. is for the resolutions and the U.S.A. is either against or abstaining. Nevertheless, all of the reliabilities seem high enough to be taken seriously for social science research. To put it another way, there exists substantial stability across time as issues are sorted out within these six categories of analysis and

combined through the distance formula, in the sense that there is a substantial amount of mutual predictability (*within* categories) across time.

Also, a question was raised earlier about the mutual predictability *across* categories at a particular point in time. Rather than examining simple correlations, which can be quite laborious in a 6 x 6 matrix, it is much easier to factor analyze such a matrix to identify correlation clusters. When this is done, a remarkable correspondence between the clusters of the 23rd, 24th Sessions and the 26th Session emerges. Table 7 shows the results.

In both cases only two factors were extracted using the 1.0 eigenvalue decision. In the case of the 23rd, 24th Sessions, 82.49% of the variance was extracted, while in the case of the 26th Session, 89.29% of the variance was extracted.

It can be seen that Factor 1 of the 23rd, 24th Sessions basically matches (within a simple sign reversal) Factor 2 of the 26th Session, while Factor 2 of the 23rd, 24th Sessions basically matches Factor 1 of the 26th Session.

In the 23rd, 24th Sessions, those with high factor scores on the first factor tend to support resolutions the U.S.S.R. is for and the United States is against or abstains on *and* support resolutions that the U.S.S.R. abstains on when the United States is against them. Those with low factor scores tend to support resolutions that the United States is against or abstains on that the U.S.S.R. supports, and vote like the U.S.A. on resolutions the U.S.A. is against that the U.S.S.R. abstains on.

The state with the highest factor score on this dimension was Malawi (1.17) and as expected, it voted very similarly to the U.S.S.R. in the category of U.S.S.R. For, U.S.A. Against (Distance scores, Malawi = -.94, U.S.S.R. = -1.04). It voted identically in respect to the category of

U.S.S.R For, U.S.A. Abstain (Distance scores, Malawi = $-.82$, U.S.S.R. = $-.82$) and voted for all of the resolutions that the United States was against and the U.S.S.R. abstained on. The United States had the lowest factor score on the dimension and, of course, its voting pattern was the opposite to that of Malawi.

Those with high factor scores on the second factor tended to vote like the U.S.S.R. when the U.S.S.R. was against or abstained on resolutions the U.S.A. was for, and like the U.S.S.R., when the U.S.S.R. was against them and the United States abstained. The state with the highest factor score was the U.S.S.R.

Those with low factor scores tended to vote like the United States when the United States was for the resolutions and the U.S.S.R. was against or abstained on them, and supported resolutions that the United States abstained on that the U.S.S.R. was against. The state with the lowest factor score was the Netherlands, which incidentally voted identically to the United States in the two U.S.A. For categories and supported all of the resolutions passed in the U.S.S.R. against, U.S.A. abstain category.

In the 26th Session, those with high factor scores on the first dimension tended to vote like the U.S.S.R. when the U.S.S.R. was against or abstained on resolutions that the U.S.A. was for, and like the U.S.S.R. when the U.S.S.R. was against resolutions and the U.S.A. abstained. The states with the highest factor scores were Bulgaria, Hungary and the U.S.S.R.

States with low factor scores tended to vote like the United States when the United States was for resolutions and the U.S.S.R. was against them or abstained, and support resolutions that the U.S.A. abstained on and the U.S.S.R. opposed. The state with the lowest factor score was Costa Rica, which voted identically like the United States in the two

Table 7

Contributions of the Distance Categories to the Factor Scores

23rd, 24th Sessions
1st Factor (U.S.S.R. For Factor)

Factor Scores

96	High (Close to U.S.S.R.)	U.S. Against	U.S. Abstain	Others For
	= -.87	+ -.91	+ .85	
	Low (Close to U.S.)	U.S.S.R. For	U.S.S.R. For	U.S.S.R. Abstain U.S. Against

2nd Factor (U.S. For Factor)

Factor Scores

	High (Close to U.S.S.R.)	U.S.S.R. Against	U.S.S.R. Abstain	Others For
	= .86	+ .85	+ -.76	
	Low (Close to U.S.)	U.S. For	U.S. For	U.S. Abstain U.S.S.R. Against

26th Session
1st Factor (U.S. For Factor)

Factor Scores

High (Close to U.S.S.R.)	U.S.S.R. Against	U.S.S.R. Abstain	Others For
= .94	+ .96	+ -.90	
Low (Close to U.S.)	U.S. For	U.S. For	U.S. Abstain U.S.S.R. Against

2nd Factor (U.S.S.R. For Factor)

Factor Scores

High (Close to U.S.)	U.S. Against	U.S. Abstain	Others For
= .93	+ .93	+ -.69	
Low (Close to U.S.S.R.)	U.S.S.R. For	U.S.S.R. For	U.S.S.R. Abstain U.S. Against

NOTE: The weights in Table 7, such as -.87 on the U.S.S.R. For, U.S. Against category (23rd, 24th Sessions), indicates the correlation of the category with the factor scores.

U.S.A. For categories, and supported all the resolutions passed in the U.S.S.R. Against, U.S.A. Abstain category.

Those with high factor scores on the second dimension (26th Session) tended to vote like the U.S.A. when the U.S.A. was against or abstained on resolutions and the U.S.S.R. was for them, and like the U.S.A. when the U.S.A. was against resolutions and the U.S.S.R. abstained. The state with the highest factor score was the United States.

A state with a low factor score on the second factor tended to vote like the U.S.S.R. when the U.S.S.R. supported resolutions and the U.S.A. was against or abstained, and supported resolutions that the U.S.S.R. abstained on and the U.S.A. opposed. The state with the lowest factor score was Kuwait, which voted identically to the U.S.S.R. in the U.S.S.R. For, U.S.A. Against category, similarly to the U.S.S.R. in the U.S.S.R. For, U.S.A. Abstain category (Distance Scores, Kuwait = $-.55$, U.S.S.R. = $-.74$) and supported all those resolutions that the U.S.A. was opposed to and the U.S.S.R. abstained on.

All this leads to a very important generalization. In factor analytic terms, voting like the U.S.A. (when the U.S.A. supports resolutions) continues regardless of whether the U.S.S.R. is against the resolution or abstains. For example, the simple correlation of the U.S.A. For, U.S.S.R. Against category with the U.S.A. For, U.S.S.R. Abstain category was $.67$ in the 23rd, 24th Sessions and $.90$ in the 26th Session. Similarly, voting like the U.S.S.R. (when the U.S.S.R. supports resolutions) tends to continue regardless of whether the U.S.A. is against the resolution or abstains. The correlation of the U.S.S.R. For, U.S.A. Against category with the U.S.S.R. For, U.S.A. Abstain category was $.88$ in the 23rd, 24th Sessions and $.81$ in the 26th Session. These large correlations made it possible to generate what might be termed the U.S.A. and

U.S.S.R. support factors in the two sessions. For simplicity, these factors will be titled "U.S.A. For" and "U.S.S.R. For" factors. Table 7 uses these names and indicates, depending on loadings signs, whether the U.S.A. or U.S.S.R supporters have high or low factors scores in each case.

It is now of interest to see whether our predictors can account for variance in respect to these factors.

Treating the "U.S.A. For" cases first, in the 23rd, 24th Sessions, those supporting (voting like) the United States tended to be democratic states (.53) and states with close U.S.A. relations (.47).⁴¹ No other attribute scores were significantly related related to this factor. In the 26th Session, considering the same factor, those supporting the United States tended to be underdeveloped states (.43), democratic states (.53) and states with close U.S.A. relations (.33).

Considering the "U.S.S.R. For" cases, in the 23rd, 24th Sessions, states voting similarly to the U.S.S.R. were underdeveloped states (.57), undemocratic states (.26), and unstable states (.30). In the 26th Session, they were underdeveloped states (.48), undemocratic states (.29), and states with far U.S.A. relations (.28).

Although Chi-square analysis has shown that the total 23rd, 24th Sessions correlation matrix of predictors vs. distance scores is not significantly different from the 26th Session, it should be apparent, from these results, that certain important changes have occurred between the two sessions when the focus of attention concerns the factor dimensions of the distances. Regarding the U.S.S.R. For cases, Instability, which was a significant predictor in the 23rd, 24th Sessions is not so for the 26th Session, whereas U.S.A. Relations, which was not significant for the 23rd, 24th Sessions, became so for the 26th Session. Regarding the "U.S.A. For" cases, Development, which was not significant in the 23rd, 24th Sessions became so in the 26th Session, with underdeveloped

states voting like the United States. In the 26th Session then, *underdeveloped states tended to vote like both the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., when those states supported resolutions.*

Still another perspective on the matter may be gained through a technique called canonical correlation.⁴² A canonical correlation is the simple correlation between two sets of scores called canonical variates. Each is an array of composite scores generated through linear weighted combinations of variables in a group with the combining weights assigned to maximize the canonical correlation. For example, the attribute dimensions comprise one such group of variables for this study and the voting dimensions another. Because as many canonical correlations can be generated as there are variables in the smallest group of variables used and because there are two dimensions in the voting group, it is possible to compute two canonical correlations. Whenever the variables used in a canonical correlation are orthogonal (as the factors used in this study are) the combining weight assigned to a variable becomes a simple correlation of that variable with the canonical variate scores of its group, facilitating interpretation.

When these procedures are applied to the above data, the first canonical correlation is .84 (23rd, 24th Sessions) indicating that the attribute canonical variate scores correlate .84 with the voting canonical variate scores. The weights assigned to produce the attribute canonical variate scores are: Economic Development, -.27; Democracy, -.68; U.S.A. Relations, -.49; and Small Population Rate Increase, -.33. All of the other weights were near zero. We now know the characteristics of those at the polar extremes of the attribute canonical variate score distribution. For example, we predict that those with high scores should have low economic development, be undemocratic, have far U.S.A. relations and a high

population rate increase. Subjects with low canonical variate scores, of course, will have the opposited characteristics.

Knowing that the correlation between the attribute canonical variate scores and the voting canonical variate scores is .84, we now need to ascertain the primary characteristics relating to the voting canonical variate scores. The analysis reveals that those with high scores tend to be those that support the U.S.S.R. (.66) when the U.S.S.R. supports resolutions (U.S.S.R. For Factor) and support the U.S.S.R. (.74) when the U.S.A. supports resolutions ("U.S.A. For" Factor). We can reasonably call the voting canonical variate scores, then, "U.S.S.R. Support", indicating that those high on the distribution tend to support the U.S.S.R. and those low tend to support the U.S.A. U.S.S.R. supporters, in other words (regardless of whether the U.S.S.R. is for, or the U.S.A. is for, the resolution) tend to be underdeveloped, undemocratic, have far U.S.A. relations and have high population rate increases.

Examining the actual attribute canonical variate list, we find that those with the highest scores are: Romania, Bulgaria, Mongolia, Sudan, Poland, U.S.S.R., Hungary, Burma, Czechoslovakia, Cuba, Algeria, Yugoslavia, Ghana, U.A.R., Guinea and Cambodia. Those with the highest voting canonical variate scores are Hungary, U.S.S.R., Mongolia, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Syria, Cambodia, Mauritania, Guinea, U.A.R., Iraq, Algeria and Yemen. Those with the lowest attribute canonical variate scores are Dominican Republic, United States, Austria, Mexico, Japan, Ireland, Chile, France, Italy, Jamaica, Iceland, Denmark, Sweden, Uruguay, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Norway, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. Those with the lowest voting canonical variate scores include Ireland, Japan, Finland, South Africa, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Luxembourg, Portugal, Iceland, Austria, Canada, United Kingdom, Italy, Belgium, New Zealand, Netherlands, Australia and the United States.

The magnitude of the canonical fit is apparent and these states impressionistically appear to possess the kinds of characteristics we would expect in terms of the loadings. U.S.S.R. vs. U.S.A. support, then, is revealed by this analysis and the important predictors are identified.

A second canonical correlation with canonical variate scores orthogonal to the first can be computed. When this is done, the attributes are weighted as follows: Economic Development, $-.71$; U.S.A. Relations, $.26$; Instability, $.34$; and Small Communist China Economic Relations, $.37$. We know, then, that those with high attribute canonical variate scores tend to be underdeveloped, with close U.S.A. Relations, unstable, and with small Communist China economic relations.

What kind of states comprise the high scorers in respect to the voting canonical variate scores? The analysis indicates these are states that support the U.S.S.R. ($.74$) when the U.S.S.R. supports resolutions ("U.S.S.R. For" Factor) and support the United States ($.66$) when the United States supports resolutions ("U.S.A. For" Factor). We can reasonably call the voting canonical variate scores in this case "Support for Resolutions", in that a state having a high score tends to support resolutions regardless of whether the U.S.S.R. is for them or the U.S.A. is for them. To repeat, such states tend to be underdeveloped, with close U.S.A. relations, and have few Communist China economic relations. Oppositional states, of course, tend to have the opposite characteristics, or be developed, with far U.S.A. relations, possess stability, and have high Communist China economic relations.

Examination of the attribute canonical variate scores shows Sierra Leone, India, Congo Leopoldville, Nigeria, Honduras, Philippines, Panama, Guatemala, Indonesia, Somalia, Dominican Republic, Bolivia and Haiti have the highest scores. On the voting side, Cyprus,

Saudi Arabia, Chad, Turkey, Peru, Dominican Republic, Chile, Thailand, Columbia, Afghanistan, Bolivia and Venezuela have the highest scores. Those with the lowest attribute scores include Singapore, Austria, France, New Zealand, Denmark, Netherlands, Finland, Norway, Australia, Mongolia, Yugoslavia, Canada, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States, Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, Cuba, U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Those with the smallest voting scores include Syria, Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, South Africa, Cuba, Portugal, Malawi, Canada, United Kingdom, Belgium, New Zealand, Mongolia, Australia, Bulgaria, France, United States, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the U.S.S.R. It should be noted that these lists group the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. together at the polar extreme from the "support for resolutions" states. That is, even though they are supportive of resolutions on one of the dimensions, their opposition on the other leads them to be grouped together at the polar extreme to those states which are supportive in both cases.

For the 23rd, 24th Sessions, then, canonical analysis indicates that there are two distinct ways of looking at the correlational fit. One way stresses bi-polarization between the United States and the U.S.S.R. with the canonical variate scores indicating whether a state tends to be U.S.S.R. supportive or U.S.A. supportive, and the primary predictors are Democracy and U.S.A. Relations. A second way scores states to the degree to which they are supportive of resolutions, regardless of whether the U.S.S.R. is supportive or the U.S.A., and the primary predictor is Development, with the developed states tending to be less supportive of resolutions.

These results are highly significant from a statistical standpoint with the chance of them coming from random variation remote. For example, the weakest correlation has a Chi-square value of 100, with 12 degrees of freedom, while a Chi-square of 33 would suffice at the .001 level.

It is now of interest to find whether these same

predictive patterns hold for the 26th Session. The answer is no. The first canonical correlation is virtually identical in magnitude, .85, but the weights generated for the variables are different. In the first canonical correlation, Economic Development is weighted -.44; Democracy, .65; U.S.A. Relations, -.41 and Low Voting Intensity, .25. Those with high canonical variate scores on the attribute side, then, tend to be underdeveloped, undemocratic, have close U.S.A. relations and low voting intensity. On the voting canonical variate side, those with high factor scores tend to be supportive of the United States (.99) then the U.S.A. Supports resolutions ("U.S.A. For" Factor) with the other factor weighted hardly at all, only .11, i.e., is not worthy of discussion. The voting canonical variates, then, can be called "Support for Resolutions, U.S.A. For" and the resolution supporters are described above.

Examination of the canonical variate list shows that India, Dominican Republic, Chile, Luxembourg, Philippines and Jamaica are at the top of the attribute list and Costa Rica, Luxembourg, Australia, Dominican Republic, Italy and New Zealand at the top of the voting list (i.e., U.S.A. supportive).⁴³ Those at the bottom of the attribute list include Spain, Yugoslavia, Cuba, Mongolia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, U.S.S.R. and Romania, and at the bottom of the voting list Cuba, Romania, Mongolia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, U.S.S.R., Hungary and Bulgaria.

The second canonical correlation is .72, with the following variables given heavy weight: Economic Development, .72; Democracy, .31; U.S.A. Relations, .31; Executive Interest Aggregation, .27; and Small Population Rate Increase, .30. Those with high attribute canonical variate scores, then, tend to be developed, democratic, have close U.S.A. Relations, have low executive interest

aggregation, and have small population rate increases. Those with high canonical variate scores tend to be against the U.S.S.R. (.99) when the U.S.S.R. supports resolutions ("U.S.S.R. For" Factor) and the variates could probably be called "Not Support Resolutions, U.S.S.R. For". Supporters of resolutions the U.S.S.R. supports, of course, tend to have the opposite characteristics, or are underdeveloped, undemocratic, have far U.S.A. relations, high executive interest aggregation, and high population rate increases.

Examination of the canonical variate lists shows Canada, United Kingdom, Australia, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, New Zealand, United States, Norway, Sweden, France, Denmark, Italy, Chile, Uruguay, Austria, Ireland, Iceland, Finland, Portugal, Mexico, Argentina and Japan at the top of the attribute list, and United States, United Kingdom, Portugal, France, South Africa, Canada, Malawi, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, Australia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Japan and Brazil at the top of the voting list. Kenya, Guinea, Malawi, Senegal, Somalia, Nepal, Cambodia, Indonesia, Thailand, Sierra Leone, Mauritania, Yemen, Burma and Sudan stand at the bottom of the attribute list, and Pakistan, Senegal, Jordan, Sudan, Mauritania, Iran, U.A.R., Nigeria, Cyprus, Tunisia, Nepal, Malaysia, Togo, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, India, Kuwait and Zambia at the bottom of the voting list.⁴⁴


The 26th Session canonical analysis, then, contrasts support for resolutions when the U.S.A. is for as opposed to those the U.S.S.R. is for. Whereas in the 23rd, 24th Sessions, support for the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. could be collapsed into a single composite index, the 26th Session separates the two, called "Support for Resolutions, U.S.A. For" and "Not Support Resolutions, U.S.S.R. For".⁴⁵ (It will be recalled that in the 23rd, 24th Sessions the second canonical variates contrasted opposition and support for "U.S.A. For" and "U.S.S.R. For" resolutions).

It is interesting to observe that in the 26th analysis the underdeveloped are supportive of the U.S.A. when the U.S.A.


Table 8

23rd, 24th Sessions

.64 Canonical Correlation of Attributes and Voting



.72 Canonical Correlation of Attributes and Voting




NOTE: The symbols → and → indicate "tens to be at this location," given the correlational analysis.


Table 8

26th Session

.66 Canonical Correlation of Attributes and Voting



.77 Canonical Correlation of Attributes and Voting



is for resolutions and they are also supportive of the U.S.S.R. when the U.S.S.R. is for resolutions. In contrast in the 23rd, 24th Sessions analysis, the underdeveloped tended to vote against the U.S.A. when the U.S.A. was for resolutions (as given in the first canonical correlation).

The above results and changes between Sessions are summarized in Table 8.

This table clearly reveals changes between Sessions not revealed in the simple correlational analysis. *It emphasizes the importance of examining this type of data from a variety of perspectives.*

CONCLUSION

The purpose of the study was to establish a framework for the study of U.S.A.-U.S.S.R. support patterns in the General Assembly. Six different kinds of support patterns were identified and then analyzed for the 23rd, 24th Sessions vs. the 26th Session. A wealth of descriptive information was generated by computing z-scores in each of the different categories of support allowing percentage comparisons. It was demonstrated that national attributes can be used, on a simple correlational basis, to predict such patterns, and that the magnitude and type of correlations varies from support category to support category. When analyzed in these terms, there is no significant difference between the simple correlation matrices of the 23rd, 24th Sessions vs. the 26th Session. Factor analysis, however, demonstrates that the six support patterns of each session can be reduced to two factor dimensions. The primary loaders on one of the dimensions relates to resolutions the U.S.A. supports and the U.S.S.R. abstains on or is opposed to, and the other dimension is resolutions the U.S.S.R. supports and the U.S.A. abstains on or is opposed to. Simple correlational

analysis of attributes and these dimensions shows some highly interesting results, most notably that the underdeveloped supported resolutions the U.S.A. was for in the 26th Session, as opposed to the 23rd, 24th Sessions. Support patterns were further explicated by computing a canonical correlation between the attribute dimensions and the voting dimensions. Different patterns were found between the two sessions. Underdeveloped states have apparently either warmed up to U.S.A. resolutions or the United States has begun to support resolutions more compatible with underdeveloped interests. The canonical analysis demonstrated that for the 26th Session, patterns of support in respect to resolutions that the United States supports is basically orthogonal to patterns of support for resolutions the U.S.S.R. supports. The underdeveloped, undemocratic, close U.S.A. relations and low voting intensity states tend to be supportive of the United States when the U.S.A. supports resolutions and underdeveloped, undemocratic, far U.S.A. relations, large executive aggregation and high population rate increase states tend to be supportive of the U.S.S.R. when the U.S.S.R. supports resolutions. The canonical correlations are highly significant from a statistical standpoint and the probability that the findings could have occurred through chance combinations is small. The canonical analysis suggests that certain dynamic combinations are present in the issue of U.S.A.-U.S.S.R. report that cannot be ascertained through simple correlational analysis. A combination of factor analysis and canonical correlation has uncovered the changing patterns in this regard. Future research could explore the question of whether support patterns have stabilized along the lines evidenced in the 26th Session, whether the 23rd, 24th Sessions or 26th Session models have dominated earlier sessions, or whether still other patterns are evident across time.

FOOTNOTES

1. I would like to thank Myrtle Cassel for her typing assistance, John Gesch and Roger Baker for their research assistance, and Carol Jones and Wesley Kranitz for their programming assistance.

2. All resolutions treated are in Appendix A, organized by Session and in terms of the six analytical categories developed in this study. For example, considering the 23rd Session, there are four votes which fall in the category of U.S.A. For, U.S.S.R. Against. General Assembly Resolution numbers are given.

3. More formally, the project will attempt a test of attribute theory in respect to the support patterns. In equation form it may be stated as:

$$w_{ik} = \sum_{l=1}^p \beta_l s_{il}$$

where w_{ik} is the total behaviour of nation i on the k^{th} behavioural dimension, s_{il} is the l^{th} attribute dimension of the p -dimensional space of nation attributes, and β_l the corresponding parameters.

Full discussion of these matters may be found in Jack E. Vincent, "Comments on Social Field Theory", *Research Report No. 58*, Dimensionality of Nations Project, University of Hawaii, 1972, and Jack E. Vincent, "An Application of Attribute Theory to General Assembly Voting Patterns", *International Organization*, 26 (1972) 551-582. The latter publication correlates attribute factor dimensions generated from voting data generated from the 23rd and 24th

Sessions of the General Assembly. U.S.A. vs. U.S.S.R. support patterns, however, were not a concern in that study.

4 Hayward R. Alker, Jr., and Bruce M. Russett, *World Politics in the General Assembly* (New Haven, Ct.: Yale University Press, 1965). Other literature relevant to voting includes: Thomas Hovet, Jr., *Bloc Politics in the United Nations* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960); M. Margaret Ball, "Bloc Voting in the General Assembly", *International Organization* 5 (1951) pp.3-31; Geoffrey Goodwin, "The Expanding United Nations: I-Voting Patterns", *International Affairs* (London) 36 (1960), pp. 174-187; Chapter 2, "Coalitions, Groups and Blocs in the Assembly" in Sydney D. Bailey, *The General Assembly of the United Nations: A Study of Procedure and Practice* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961); Kurt Jacobson, "Some Aspects of UN Voting Patterns", *Proceedings of the International Peace Research Association* (Tallborg, Sweden, June 17-19, 1967) pp. 315-346; Catherine Senf Manno, "Majority Decisions and Minority Responses in the U.N. General Assembly", *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 10 (1966) pp. 1-20; Bruce M. Russett, *International Regions and the International System: A Study in Political Ecology* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967); Hayward R. Alker, Jr., "Supranationalism in the United Nations", *Peace Research Society (International) Papers* 3 (1965) pp. 197-212; Hayward R. Alker, Jr., "Dimensions of Conflict in the General Assembly", *American Political Science Review* 58 (1964) pp. 642-657; Charles F. Wrigley, "Toward an Orderly System for International Decision-Making: The Experience of the United Nations General Assembly", *Peace Research Society (International) Third Conference* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1965); Jan F. Triska and Howard E. Koch, Jr., "Asian-African Coalition and International Organization: Third Force or Collective Impotence?" *Review of Politics* 21 (1959) pp. 417-455; Leroy N. Reiselbach, "Quantitative Techniques for Studying Voting Behaviour in the UN General Assembly", *International Organization* 14 (1960) pp. 291-304; Arend Lijphart, "The Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General Assembly: A Critique and a Proposal", *American Political Science*

Review 57 (1963) pp. 902-917; Robert E. Riggs, *Politics in the United Nations* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1958); Thomas Hovet, Jr., *Africa in the United Nations* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1963); John Bernard Furey, "Voting Alignments in the General Assembly", (Ph.D. Thesis, Columbia University, Doctoral Dissertation Series, Publication 6220, Ann Arbor, Mich.: University microfilm, 1954) pp. 8, 16; John A. Houston, *Latin America in the United Nations* (United Nations Series, No. 8, New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1956) pp. 298-299; F.H. Soward, "The Changing Balance of Power in the United Nations", *Political Quarterly* 28 (1957) pp. 317-327; Hanna Newcombe, Michael Ross and Alan G. Newcombe, "United Nations Voting Patterns" *International Organization* 24 (1970) pp. 100-21; Edward T. Rowe, "The United States, the United Nations and the Cold War", *International Organization* 25 (1971) pp. 59-78; John F. Clark, Michael K. O'Leary, and Eugen R. Wittkopf, "National Attributes Associated with Dimensions of Support for the United Nations", *International Organization* 25 (1971) pp. 1-25; Hanna Newcombe, James Wert and Alan Newcombe, "Comparison of Weighted Voting Formulas for the United Nations", *World Politics* 23 (1971) pp. 452-492; Edward T. Rowe, "Changing Patterns in the Voting Success of Member States in the United Nations General Assembly: 1945-1966", *International Organization* 23 (1969) pp. 231-253; Leroy N. Reiselbach, "Quantitative Techniques for Studying Voting Behaviour in the UN General Assembly", *International Organization* 14 (1960) pp. 291-306; Arend Lijphart, "The Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General Assembly: A Critique and a Proposal", *American Political Science Review* 57 (1963) pp. 902-917; Jack E. Vincent, "The Convergence of Attitude and Voting Patterns at the United Nations", *Journal of Politics* 31 (1969) pp. 952-983; Jack E. Vincent, "Predicting Voting Patterns in the General Assembly", *American Political Science Review* 65 (1971) pp. 471-498; and Jack E. Vincent, "An Application of Attribute Theory to General Assembly Voting Patterns..." *op. cit.*

5. Reiselbach, *op. cit.*

6. Lijphart, *op. cit.*
7. Rowe, "Changing Patterns in the Voting Success", *op. cit.*
8. Newcombe, *et al.*, *op. cit.*
9. Rowe, "The United States, the United Nations and the Cold War", *op. cit.*
10. Clark, *et al.*, *op. cit.*
11. That is, the United States and the U.S.S.R. vote together, (both are for, both abstain, etc.) their support patterns would be identical. The scheme developed above, then, only treats the problem of support patterns when they vote differently.
12. The other states may or may not be aware of the U.S.A.--U.S.S.R. differences in respect to a particular vote. They are probably usually aware of such differences when the U.S.A. is on one side and the U.S.S.R. on the other. That is, when the United States has indicated that it intends to vote yes and the U.S.S.R. has indicated that it intends to vote no, or when the U.S.S.R. has indicated that it intends to vote yes and the U.S.A. has indicated that it intends to vote no. In this connection, it will be interesting to see if support patterns differ greatly between the analytical categories, and whether predictability will fall off as one moves from the above categories to other categories, such as U.S.A. For, U.S.S.R. Abstain, or U.S.S.R. For, U.S.A. Abstain.
13. The city block formula is preferred to the usual distance formula, given as:

$$D_{ij} = \sqrt{\sum_{v=1}^n (X_{iv} - X_{jv})^2},$$

where D is the distance from i to j , X_{iv} is the vote of the i^{th} nation on the v^{th} vote and X_{jv} is the vote of the j^{th} nation on the v^{th} vote.

See: Lee J. Cranbach and Goldine C. Gleser, "Assessing Similarity Between Profiles", *The Psychological Bulletin* 50 (1953) pp. 456-473, and E.E. Roskam, "Metric Analysis of Ordinal Data in Psychology", Psychological Laboratory, Kath. University, Nijmegen, Netherlands (Mimeo) p. 48. Each vote is weighted the same using the city block method, whereas the distance formula gives more weight to deviant cases. If the above formulae are applied to the same data, however, the resulting distance scores will be highly correlated.

14. Absentees will be given the mean value of the distribution, consistent with the procedures of Alker and Russett. Alker and Russett, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-31.

15. *Ibid.*

16. This is because the U.S.A. will have the smallest distance score in the distribution, that is, zero.

17. The magnitude of the z-scores, of course, measure the degree to which a state is U.S.A. vs. U.S.S.R. Leaning. Thus, cases very close to zero are only very slightly leaning one way or the other.

18. Other related UN studies using attributes as predictors include: Jack E. Vincent, *The Caucusing Groups of the United Nations: An Examination of their Attitudes Toward the Organisation* (Stillwater: Oklahoma State University Press, 1965); Jack E. Vincent, "National Attributes as Predictors of Delegate Attitudes at the United Nations", *American Political Science Review* 62 (1968) pp. 916-931; Jack E. Vincent, "The Convergence of Voting and Attitude

Patterns at the United Nations", *Journal of Politics* 31 (1969) pp. 952-983; Jack E. Vincent, "An Analysis of Caucusing Group Activity at the United Nations", *Journal of Peace Research* 2 (1970) pp. 133-150; Jack E. Vincent, "An Analysis of Attitude Patterns at the United Nations", *Quarterly Journal of the Florida Academy of Sciences* 32 (1969) pp. 185-209; Jack E. Vincent, "Predicting Voting Patterns in the General Assembly", *American Political Science Review* 65 (1971) pp. 471-498; Jack E. Vincent, "Testing Some Hypotheses about Delegate Attitudes at the United Nations and Some Implications for Theory Building", *Research Report No. 52, Dimensionality of Nations Project, University of Hawaii*, 1971; Jack E. Vincent, "An Examination of Voting Patterns in the 23rd and 24th Sessions of the General Assembly", *Research Report No. 54, Dimensionality of Nations Project, University of Hawaii*, 1971; and Vincent, "An Application of Attribute Theory...", *op. cit.* 19. Usage of factor analysis in this regard has been fully developed in the previous studies cited in Footnote 18. Also, see: Harry H. Harman, *Modern Factor Analysis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960); Henry R. Kaiser, "The Varimax Criterion for Analytical Rotation in Factor Analysis", *Psychometrika* 23 (1958) 187-200; Henry F. Kaiser, "Computer Program for Varimax Rotation in Factor Analysis", *Educational and Psychological Measurements*, 19 (1959) 413-430; Dean J. Clyde, Elliott M. Cramer, Richard J. Sharin, *Multivariate Statistical Programs* (Coral Gables, Florida: University of Miami, 1966) 15-19; Jack E. Vincent, *Factor Analysis in International Relations: Interpretation, Problem Areas and an Application* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1971); R.J. Rummel, *Applied Factor Analysis* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970); and Jack E. Vincent, "Factor Analysis as a Research Tool in International Relations: Some Problem Areas, Some Suggestions and an Application", *Proceedings of the 65th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association* (New York, 1969).

20. For a technical explanation of this, see Vincent, *Factor Analysis in International Relations: Interpretation...op. cit.* pp. 40-43.

21. The reasons for treating the 23rd and 24th Sessions together are explained later.
22. Before the application of the Chi-square test, the correlations are squared to make them proportions, i.e., proportions of variance explained. Chi-square, of course, can be applied to proportions as well as to frequencies.
23. Attribute data was taken from Arthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor, *A Cross Polity Survey* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1963) and Bruce M. Russett, *et al.*, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1964). It is assumed that the factor score location of subjects will not change very much as these resources are updated and analyzed (the latter is presently taking place at Florida Atlantic University). See: Arthur S. Banks, *Cross Polity Time Series* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971) and Charles L. Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, ICPR Edition, 1971). Although not yet provable, this assumption concerning the factor scores seems to be a reasonable one, particularly in respect to the large factors which have primary predictive importance in this study, because so many variables load heavily on such dimensions. That is, considerable changes would have to occur on a number of such heavily loading variables to get significant changes in factor score location.
24. See footnote 19.
25. See Vincent, *Factor Analysis in International Relations..* *op. cit.* pp. 4-12.
26. See Vincent, "An Application of Attribute Theory to General Assembly Voting Patterns..." *op. cit.*
27. *Ibid.* Comparison of the 23rd, 24th Sessions' factor structure with the 26th Session's factor structure, in terms

of votes on the dimensions, will not be attempted in this study. Distance scores in the six basic analytical categories, however, will be factored and the sessions compared. In addition, the resulting factor scores will be employed in the canonical analysis later in the paper.

28. The reader may feel somewhat uncomfortable about being given factor names without lists of loadings. As pointed out above, to report the details of the factor analysis would greatly overburden this paper and is unnecessary, since the results have already been previously reported. Although a factor analysis of the 26th Session raw votes will not be attempted or reported in this paper, it was felt that it was both reasonable and proper to tie in the findings generated here with the previous 23rd, 24th Sessions' analysis.

29. This is, of course, not entirely unexpected, given the fact that we are dealing with successful votes. That is, we expect the United States and the Soviet Union to be on the same side of the mean when most other states are supporting the resolutions and the United States and the Soviet Union are either abstaining or voting against the resolutions. Thus, we expect the same kind of situation to occur in respect to the category of U.S.S.R. Against, U.S.A. Abstain. That is, we expect the United States to have a negative standardized distance score and thus technically be U.S.S.R. leaning.

30. It might be wise to remind the reader again, at this point, that these observations stem from a previous factor analytic study, the details of which were not repeated in this paper.

31. This is possible, of course, because the United States abstained on all such issues, while states such as Australia and Portugal could either vote for, against, or abstain on such issues. For example, if a state abstained on every issue except one, where it voted against, it would be further away from the U.S.S.R. than the United States is, in distance

terms, in this category.

32. In the table, all correlations above .24 are significant at the .01 level and correlations above .18 at the .05 level. One hundred fourteen subjects were employed in the analysis.

33. It should be stressed that terms such as democratic, underdeveloped, etc., must be understood in factor analytic terms. The precise definition of democratic, for example, is given by the loadings presented earlier. Democratic is a convenient label to remind one of these loadings, but it has no content beyond those loadings.

34. It will be recalled that the U.S.S.R. and many states associated with voting with the U.S.S.R. are actually U.S.A. leaning in this category. States on the other side of the mean, such as Afghanistan, Dominican Republic, Congo Brazzaville, etc., then, tend to be economically underdeveloped and unstable compared to the U.S.A. and the U.S.A. leaning countries, including the U.S.S.R.

35. In this category, the United States itself is U.S.S.R. leaning and finds itself in the company of such states as Cuba, South Africa, Syria and Jordan, which tend to be undemocratic and have far U.S.A. relations. The association of high development with such voting states comes from the fact that, along with the United States, a number of states scoring high on the development dimension, such as Belgium, Canada, and France, are strongly U.S.S.R. leaning in this category.

36. See Vincent, *Factor Analysis in International Relations...* *op. cit.* pp. 40-46 for an extended discussion and example.

37. This observation should not be misconstrued. The United States could be swinging toward supporting more popular issues. In any case, when the United States was

for and U.S.S.R. against, in the 26th Session, the total number of states on the U.S.A. side of the mean appears considerably larger than in the case of the 23rd, 24th Sessions.

38. It should be apparent that this type of analysis creates a wealth of descriptive material for the researcher interested in particular states. An extended analysis of this type, however, is beyond the scope of the present project.

39. An interesting generalization emerges from these kinds of comparisons. It will be recalled that whenever the U.S.S.R. is against a resolution and the U.S.A. abstains, the U.S.A. becomes, technically, U.S.S.R. leaning. In contrast, when the U.S.S.R. is for a resolution and the U.S.A. abstains, it tends to fall at the polar extreme of the distribution. Similarly, when the U.S.A. is for a resolution and the U.S.S.R. abstains it tends to fall at the polar extreme from the United States. But when the U.S.A. is against a resolution and the U.S.S.R. abstains, it tends to find itself, technically, in the U.S.A. leaning camp. Statistically speaking, therefore, *the two parties are much further apart when one of them proposes something than when one of them opposes something, when "the other's" response is abstention.*

40. This is the only category not significant in the 26th Session at the .05 level. It is significant at the .10 level. An R of .40 is significant at the .05 level, while a simple correlation of .18 is significant at the same level.

41. Throughout the discussion, the terms "support" and "voting similarity to" will mean the same thing for stylistic simplicity. It is, of course, recognized that the state that votes similarly to the United States may not in its own mind be supporting the United States, but only reacting to the content of the resolutions. Nevertheless, there is ample evidence to indicate that the United States and the Soviet Union view the United Nations as a forum in which they attempt to garner support for their view of the world and resolutions compatible with it.

Because the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. are clearly among the dominant states of the world, it does seem reasonable, then, to use a term like support patterns in analyzing the votes.

42. See: Harold Hotelling, "Relations Between Two Sets of Variates", *Biometrika* 28 (1963) 321-377; Harold Hotelling, "The Most Predictable Criterion", *Journal of Educational Psychology* 26 (1953) 139-142; M.S. Bartlett, "The Statistical Significance of Canonical Correlations", *Biometrika* 32 (1941) 29-38; Paul Horst, "Relations Among m Sets of Measures", *Psychometrika* 26 (1961) 129-149; G. Thompson, "The Maximum Correlation of Two Weighted Batteries", *The British Journal of Psychology: Statistical Section*, Part 1 (1947) 27-34; and Jack E. Vincent, *Factor Analysis in International Relations...*, *op. cit.*

43. Some may question why the United States is not included with those at the top of the voting list. The United States tends to get an in-between score because of its U.S.S.R. leaning position in respect to the distance category of U.S.S.R. Against, U.S.A. Abstain. Only those states that support resolutions, when the United States is for them and the U.S.S.R. is against them or abstains, and support resolutions when the U.S.A. abstains and the U.S.S.R. is against them, are at the top of the canonical variate list. They are, however, closer to the U.S.A. than the U.S.S.R. This is because, first, they tended to support the resolutions the U.S.A. was for, and second, even though the U.S.A. abstained on certain resolutions they supported, the U.S.S.R. was *against* those same resolutions.

44. U.S.S.R. is not at the bottom of the voting list in respect to this canonical analysis for the same reasons that the United States was not at the top of the voting list in respect to the first canonical analysis. States at the bottom of the list tend to support the U.S.S.R. when the U.S.S.R. is for resolutions when the U.S.A. is against or

abstains, *and* support resolutions when the U.S.S.R. abstains and the U.S.A. is against them. They tend, then, to be closer to the U.S.S.R. than the U.S.A. for the same reasons presented above, even though the U.S.S.R. itself is not at the polar extreme of the list.

45. The reader should not be misled by these titles. The naming has been done for the purposes of describing those at the top of the canonical variate list. Those at the bottom, of course, have the opposite characteristics. Thus, for example, in the case of the second canonical correlation, those at the bottom of the list tend to support resolutions the U.S.S.R. is for.

APPENDIX A

23rd Session

U.S.A. For, U.S.S.R. Against: U.N. Resolution Numbers
2389, 2456-A, 2456-B, 2466.

U.S.A. For, U.S.S.R. Abstain: U.N. Resolution Numbers
2467-A, 2425.

U.S.S.R. For, U.S.A. Against: U.N. Resolution Numbers
2391, 2443, 2383, 2424, 2427, 2479, 2426

U.S.S.R. For, U.S.A. Abstain: U.N. Resolution Numbers
2403, 2395, 2422, 2429, 2430.

U.S.S.R. Against, U.S.S.R. Abstain: U.N. Resolution Numbers
2456-C, 2467-C.

24th Session

U.S.A. For, U.S.S.R. Against: U.N. Resolution Numbers
2500, 2516, 2595.

U.S.A. For, U.S.S.R. Abstain: U.N. Resolution Numbers
2602-E, 2605-A, 2605-B.

U.S.A. Against, U.S.S.R. Abstain: U.N. Resolution Numbers
2499-B, 2511, 2578, 2587.

U.S.S.R. For, U.S.A. Against: U.N. Resolution Numbers
2063-A, 2535-B, 2508, 2555, 2559.

U.S.S.R. For, U.S.A. Abstain: U.N. Resolution Numbers
2546, 2588-B, 2507, 2517, 2554, 2558, 2591, 2592,
2593.

APPENDIX B

26th Session

U.S.A. For, U.S.S.R. Against: U.N. Resolution Numbers
2793, 2850, 2841, 2858, 2889, 2890, 2895, 2900.

U.S.A. For, U.S.S.R. Abstain: U.N. Resolution Numbers
2785, 2816, 2800, 2847, 2872, 2891, 2892, 2894, 2901.

U.S.A. Against, U.S.S.R. Abstain: U.N. Resolution Numbers
2896, 2813, 2849.

U.S.S.R. For, U.S.A. Against: U.N. Resolution Numbers
2758, 2878, 2775-F, 2792-D, 2851, 2784, 2787, 2795, 2796,
2873, 2874.

U.S.S.R. For, U.S.A. Abstain: U.N. Resolution Numbers
2799, 2877, 2771, 2879, 2827-B, 2828-B, 2880, 2775-A,
2775-C, 2775-G, 2792-C, 2857, 2765, 2769, 2867, 2869,
2871, 2893.

U.S.S.R. Against, U.S.A. Abstain: U.N. Resolution Numbers
2899-A.

Codebook For:

Attributes and National Behaviour:
Modern International Relations
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Jack E. Vincent, Ph.D.,
Florida Atlantic University

Attributes and National Behaviour, Part 1, consists of two Peace Research Reviews: Volume VII, #4, Exploring Delegate Attitudes at the United Nations and Delegate Orientations at the United Nations; and Volume VII, #5, Quantifying and Predicting Delegate Behaviour at the United Nations, and Analyzing U.S.A.--U.S.S.R. Support Patterns in the United Nations.

Part 2 consists of 41 monographs of a large scale project testing several attribute, attribute distance based theories. Each research monograph is numbered and given a sub-title, listed below. Each focusses upon some aspect of a large scale research effort correlating national attributes to international behaviour. All monographs can be printed from tape by computer. Selected monographs are also available in print (see ordering information). It is recommended that a good document processing program be used to obtain copy, when using tape. However, any appropriate print command will generate copy. Each monograph is standardized, where possible, so that closely related analyses are presented using the same layout and design. This facilitates rapid comparisons across theories, and, also, allows each monograph to stand complete. Thus, if A-space construction is essential to a particular analysis, it will be given sufficient development to make reference elsewhere unnecessary.

The monographs will appear on your tape in the exact order listed below.

Tape specs are: 9 track, 800 BPI, EBCDIC, 132 character records, 2400 feet.

The monograph list follows:

1. Generating A-space for the Mid-1960's: With an Example of Possible Usage. Nations are located on 22 factor dimensions generated from a factor analysis of 144 attribute variables. Factor scores are provided. The various uses of A-space are discussed and demonstrated.¹
2. Creating Indexes for National Conflict and Cooperation Exportations (1966-1969) with an Empirical Application. One hundred and twenty-eight states are located on vectors of conflict and cooperation built from the WEIS data bank. Various uses for these vectors are illustrated and discussed.¹
3. Comparing Various Attribute Based Theories on Selected Dimensions, in Terms of Empirical Results. World models for social field theory, distance theory, and relative status-field theory are presented and compared and discussed. Policy prescriptions based on each model are then presented.¹
4. Distance Theory, Results for Conflict, 1966-1969. Distance theory is tested on WEIS 1966-69 data for over 16,000 dyadic relationships. A model for each nation in the system is generated and compared to a world model.¹
5. A Standardized Approach to International Relations Attribute Data. One hundred and forty-four attribute variables are standardized for 128 states. The various uses to which such data can be put are demonstrated and the value of utilizing z-scores discussed.¹
6. Distance Theory: A Comparison of Various Regional Groupings on 1966-69 Conflict Data. Over 30 regional groupings such as NATO and OAS are analyzed in terms of distance theory. A model is generated for each region which describes

typical conflict flows and comparisons are made.¹

7. Distance Theory: A Comparison of Various Regional Groupings on 1966-69 Cooperation Data. This has the same purpose as the sixth monograph, but applies the distance theory framework to cooperation data.

9. Distance Theory: Results for Cooperation, 1966-69. This has the same objectives as the fourth monograph, but uses cooperation rather than conflict data.

10. Relative Status-Field Theory, Results for Conflict, TT Behaviour, 1966-69.¹

11. Relative Status-Field Theory, Results for Cooperation, TT Behaviour, 1966-69.

12. Relative Status-Field Theory, Results for Conflict, TU Behaviour, 1966-69.

13. Relative Status-Field Theory, Results for Cooperation, TU Behaviour, 1966-69.

14. Relative Status-Field Theory, Results for Conflict, UT Behaviour, 1966-69.

15. Relative Status-Field Theory, Results for Cooperation, UT Behaviour, 1966-69.

16. Relative Status-Field Theory, Results for Conflict, UU Behaviour, 1966-69.

17. Relative Status-Field Theory, Results for Cooperation, UU Behaviour, 1966-69. The above monographs concern relative status-field theory and its application to conflict or cooperation data for the time period indicated. A model for each state is generated whenever a tt, tu, ut, or uu analysis is possible. Generally speaking, this means

that approximately 30 states are given a model in any one of the above applications. Implications for policymaking are generated from world models constructed out of such empirical results. All layouts are standardized.

19. Statistical Concepts for Students of International Relations. This provides an introduction to virtually all of the methodology utilized in connection with the generation of the research supplements. Topics treated include factor analysis, discriminant function analysis, path analysis and matrix algebra.¹

26. Project Programs. All significant project programs are given, many with innovative design (operation on Univac 1108, 256 k exec-8 operating system, level 31-244). All basic commands are defined in a thorough introduction to the supplement. Local programmers should be able to adjust the programs for use on their own system.

27. Distance Theory, Results for Conflict, 1966-69, An Inventory of Findings.¹

28. Distance Theory, Results for Cooperation, 1966-69, An Inventory of Findings.¹

29. Social Field Theory, Results for Conflict, 1966-69, An Inventory of Findings.

30. Social Field Theory, Results for Cooperation, 1966-69, An Inventory of Findings.

31. Relative Status-Field Theory, Results for Conflict, TT Actors, 1966-69, An Inventory of Findings.

32. Relative Status-Field Theory, Results for Cooperation, TT Actors, 1966-69, An Inventory of Findings.

33. Relative Status-Field Theory, Results for Conflict, TU

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35. Relative Status-Field Theory, Results for Conflict, UT Actors, 1966-69, An Inventory of Findings.

36. Relative Status-Field Theory, Results for Cooperation, UT Actors, 1966-69, An Inventory of Findings.

37. Relative Status-Field Theory, Results for Conflict, UU Actors, 1966-69, An Inventory of Findings.

38. Relative Status-Field Theory, Results for Cooperation, UU Actors, 1966-69, An Inventory of Findings. The above monographs apply discriminant function analysis to nations exhibiting positive vs. negative weights, across all of the dimensions of A- and D-space, for each of the theories. Thus, the attribute characteristics of nations exporting a particular way, say to those close below them on economic development, are identified and compared with the characteristics of those exporting differently.

39. Patterns of Conflict: Distance Theory.

40. Patterns of Cooperation: Distance Theory.

41. Patterns of Conflict: Social Field Theory.

42. Patterns of Cooperation: Social Field Theory.

43. Patterns of Conflict: Relative Status-Field Theory, TT Actors.

44. Patterns of Cooperation: Relative Status-Field Theory, TT Actors.

45. Patterns of Conflict: Relative Status-Field Theory, TU Actors.

46. Patterns of Cooperation: Relative Status-Field Theory, TU Actors.

47. Patterns of Conflict: Relative Status-Field Theory, UT Actors.

48. Patterns of Cooperation: Relative Status-Field Theory, UT Actors.

49. Patterns of Conflict: Relative Status-Field Theory, UU Actors.

50. Patterns of Cooperation: Relative Status-Field Theory, UU Actors. The above monographs apply second stage factor analysis to the parameter weights for all the theories. Such analyses determine whether behavioural tendencies tend to cluster. That is, to illustrate, if a nation tends to export conflict to other nations close below it in respect to economic development, does it also tend to do so in respect to power base? All nations are rank sorted in terms of the variable clusters that develop so that it is possible to determine whether any two nations, or, any group of nations, share the same "export profiles".

¹- Monographs 1-6 inclusive, 10, 19, 27 and 28 as listed above have been printed in book form by the University Press of America.

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